The 74th Motor Rifle Brigade of the RuAF 41st Army loss 100 pieces of heavy military vehicular equipment then.
Where as the RuAF lost 125 tanks & infantry fighting vehicles at Avdiivka with another 40 odd artillery systems, trucks and other major kit.
5/
That is 170% of the RuAF failed May 2022 Siverskyi Donets River crossing attempt...
...without a river!
The RuAF attempted a major operation using Mobiks and PTSD-ed veterans - a self-inflicted 🦃shoot.
6/
It is amazing how attrition impacts the skills base -and the moral dimension- of a force.
And the video below of Russian soldiers pounding a 122mm rocket into a warped Grad tube with a wooden packaging box is evidence of that Mobik skills collapse.
The lack of training of Russian mobiks is so low that, I'm told, 20% of Mobiks are dead after two months inside Ukraine.
Given the poor RuAF medical care and casevac capabilities, that means another 30% are wounded in that same time period.
8/
That RuAF took 170% of the casualties of the Siverskyi Donets River crossing is very much evidence of a Lanchester Square Law Collapse in RuAF ground force effectiveness.
AKA more and more effort for less and less combat power.
These imagined, trivial or irrelevant RuAF gains get more traction than warranted because there are too many people with personal vested interests in "Invincible Russia".
Avdiivka🦃 shoot shows such people are living in a delusional fantasy world.
11/11 End
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This is a reality that will have to faced regarding Israeli actions in Gaza going forward.
"The International Panel on Fissile Materials estimates that as of the beginning of 2020, Israel may have a stockpile of about 980 ± 130 kilograms of plutonium
...(International Panel on Fissile Materials 2021). That amount could potentially be used to build anywhere between 170 and 278 nuclear weapons, assuming a second-generation, single-stage, fission-implosion warhead design with a boosted pit containing 4 to 5 kilograms
2/
...of plutonium.4"
This link provides more information on Israel nuclear cruise missile armed submarines mentioned above.
This map is a 150 km radius map of Southern Crimea from the damaged and by-passed Chonhar Bridge just north of Dhzankoy.
And remember, that is as the bird flies.
Ground travel on primary and secondary roads to supply depots is going to greatly reduce this footprint.
2/
The use of manual labor to fill/unload trucks takes a lot more time than with pallets & forklifts.
This means RuAF trucks do one trip a day to 93 mile/150 km and _maybe_ two a day to 47 mile/75 km with the drivers getting a little sleep & their truck
The way such "calculated risks" works in real life is that senior Israeli political and flag rank leaders invested in the threat of Hezbollah in Lebanon refused to hear anything contrary to their "calculated risk consensus" concerning Hamas.
2/
My gut says this is an Israeli Air Force budget driven thing.
The reason I say that is the failure to put a West Bank style 20 foot wall between Gaza and Israel the way there is between the West Bank and Israel.
Money spent on a Gaza wall isn't available for Hezbollah.
3/
3. (con't) supply system. 4. SUV's have an incredibly short service life in an artillery fragment rich battlefield. (SUV radiators & high speed fragments don't mix well)
The absolute last place you use an SUV is as a logistical resupply vehicle is supporting artillery.
3/
Counter battery fire will shred SUV non-run flat tires as well as radiators.
Yet, here we are with Russia in Southern Ukraine.
Russian tactical trucks in the Artillery have to be as rare as junior officers in the Russian Army infantry battalions.