In recent days, Avdiivka, an operationally vital settlement near Donetsk, emerged as a frontline hotspot. Our team has prepared this brief follow-up report to offer an overview of recent developments that took place between October 10th and 11th. 🧵Thread:
2/ On October 10th, Russian forces launched a ground offensive from Krasnohorivka and Vodiane, aiming to encircle Avdiivka. This assault featured an unusual use of armored vehicles, departing from their prior reluctance in large-scale armored attacks.
3/ The significant number of tanks and APCs highlights the Russian forces' intention for swift and overwhelming offensives on the flank and rear. They used artillery, air support, and their armored units to suppress, overrun, and at times, capture Ukrainian positions.
4/ Yet, Russian forces' advance decelerated. Despite reaching the northeast of Stepove, a rear area of Avdiivka, they faced minefields, anti-tank resistance, and artillery fire, resulting in significant losses and hindering their ability to exploit their initial success.
5/ Our most conservative estimate suggests that the Russian side suffered a minimum of 36 vehicle losses, which include abandoned, damaged, or destroyed vehicles. These losses predominantly consist of APCs, tanks of various configurations, and transportation vehicles.
6/ It is premature to say whether Russian forces will achieve substantial advances in the upcoming days, given the challenging situation for both sides. However, it is already clear that the assault has proven to be highly costly for the attackers
7/ We conclude that our prior concerns about the Russian reserves were justified, as they were able to allocate resources for this operation, despite their concurrent operations in Kupiansk and in the South. However, their offensive capabilities appear to be still limited.
8/ This update was compiled using a blend of satellite imagery and OSINT sources.
The video links are provided in the image descriptions.
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Since July, our team has published 4 major investigations: on foreign mercenaries and Cuban fighters in Russia’s ranks; procurement and targeting pod issues with the Su-57; and China’s role in Shahed UAV production. We also analyzed Russian losses in units and North Korean arms:
2/ We’ve also completed, but not yet published, data on Russian desertions and losses in several major units. Our research on artillery barrels is wrapping up, after which we’ll also release exclusive investigations into Russia’s weapons production
3/ None of this would be possible without your continued financial support and donations. Some of our earlier investigations have already helped several governments pursue their own inquiries into sanctions evasion
So far, Ukraine’s stabilization measures around Pokrovsk look broadly promising. While many speculated that Kyiv might strike elsewhere, Ukrainian forces have instead pushed back Russian troops in an area where Moscow’s leadership had placed its biggest bet. 🧵Thread:
2/ With only days left before the fall season, the chances of Russia taking Pokrovsk by summer’s end are virtually nil. Amid the so-called “peace talks,” the lack of progress risks undermining Russia’s resolve to fight for “years”, as they like to boast
3/ That does not mean Russia will stop advancing. But if the political goal remains the takeover of Donbas, achieving it by the end of this year appears impossible.
Drones, ISR, communications, battlefield awareness, electronic warfare, and mobile anti-tank systems: North Korea appears to have taken notes from the battlefields of Kursk. Its latest propaganda video offers clues, Frontelligence Insight finds in its newest analysis. 🧵Thread:
2/ When North Korean forces arrived in Kursk in the latter half of 2024, they entered a war already deep into its “drone phase.” Adapting to this reality required three urgent adjustments: countermeasures, offensive drone tactics, and battlefield surveillance.
3/ In a 19-minute video released by Korean Central Television, an FPV drone team, a pilot and a co-pilot, is shown striking Ukrainian vehicles in Kursk Oblast. The wiring setup suggests a reconnaissance unit with quadcopters was likely operating from the same building.
Russian investigative outlet The Insider spoke with numerous volunteers supplying troops with equipment and donations and discovered an eye-opening situation: in recent months, the volunteer movement has plunged into crisis, with rising signs of fatigue and frustration. 🧵Thread:
2/ A significant share of supplies for the Russian army, from uniforms to thermal imagers and drones, has come from volunteers since the start of the full-scale invasion. One of them, Natalia from the Bryansk region, says that people used to donate an average of 500 to 1,000 rubles
3/ Now she must seek funding from businesses and the government, but gets no response. Another volunteer from Belgorod, Ruslan, said he quit the movement, noting that more and more people have no motivation to support the army.
China is reportedly ready to send peacekeepers to Ukraine, according to Welt am Sonntag, citing European diplomats. Meanwhile, Frontelligence Insight is releasing a list of Chinese companies involved in scaling Russia’s Shahed drone program. Here is the list:
/2 Despite its efforts to present itself as a geopolitical actor capable of peacemaking, Chinese companies help to scale Russia's military production. As the data show, most of these companies are either not sanctioned or face restrictions from only a limited number of countries
3/ There are serious inconsistencies in sanctions, undermining their effectiveness. To maximize impact, sanctions should be coordinated across multiple states with leverage over China, including the United States, the European Union, the Commonwealth realms, Japan, and others.
iStories recently reported that Russian recruitment was falling, citing federal budget data on sign-up bonuses. In reality, enlistment still runs above 30,000 a month, and the dip reflects changes in published data, not an actual slowdown 🧵There are a few nuances, though:
2/ They reported that several regions, including Irkutsk and Vladimir, are struggling with recruitment. That is true, and has been an issue in many areas, which helps explain the steady rise in sign-up bonuses. Some recruits even register in other regions to secure higher payouts
3/ Still, despite ever-higher bonuses, Russia has found ways to offset shortfalls by drawing from the freshly detained and pre-trial prisoners, while increasingly pressuring illegal migrants and conscripts into signing contracts.