Terrain Contour Matching, or TERCOM, is a navigation system utilized in cruise missiles. It compares a contour map of the overflown terrain stored in the onboard computer of the missile with measurements taken during flight by an onboard radar altimeter (see picture above). 2/22
Why is TERCOM useful? Every cruise missile relies on a basic navigation system called inertial measurement unit which measures changes in velocity and rotation of the missile to calculate its position in space. 3/22
The issue lies in the fact that these calculations can be inaccurate, and any errors in the calculations will compound over time. This is because the current position is calculated based on the previously incorrect position. We refer to this problem as "integration drift". 4/22
To overcome this issue, another type of navigation system is required that updates the missile regularly on its "true" position in space, as opposed to the calculated position. In case any deviations occur, the missile can course correct. One such system is TERCOM. 5/22
TERCOM compares the stored onboard altitude data with the measured altitude data. If the measured value matches the stored value, the missile confirms that it is on track. If the values differ, the missile recognizes the need for course correction. 6/22
To make TERCOM work, you need a substantial amount of topographical data, or as Chancellor Scholz would say, geodata. Targeting analysts must meticulously plan the route by inputting numerous altitude values that correspond to individual coordinates along the trajectory. 7/22
This process is complex, not because it's inherently difficult, but because it is very time-consuming (48-72 hours in the 1990s). While modern software and processing power can likely expedite the process, it is still expected to require a considerable amount of time. 8/22
Topographical data is neutral. It provides altitude values for various coordinates, but no militarily sensitive information in itself. It therefore remains unclear why the chancellor deems it more "sensitive" than the type of actual targeting data the West already provides. 9/22
How do we obtain topographical data? During the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union relied on satellite photography and a process called "stereogrammetry." Nowadays, the easiest method is to utilize synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellites. 10/22
A SAR satellite emits microwave pulses, records their reflections, and analyzes the time delay to create high-resolution 2D/3D images of Earth's surface. In doing so, it is very useful in creating TERCOM maps. 11/22
On top of their military applications, SAR satellites serve several civilian purposes, such as determining forest height & deforestation, for example. In addition to state agencies, several private companies operate SAR satellites and offer their services to state actors. 12/22
As chance would have it, ICEYE, a private satellite provider, announced in August 2022 that it is granting Ukraine access to its SAR satellite constellation. Ukraine therefore does not need to launch its own satellites to create TERCOM maps. 13/22 iceye.com/press/press-reβ¦
πΊπ¦ is working on several cruise missile programs, including the Korshun land-attack cruise missile that more than likely will incorporate TERCOM. There is no doubt in my mind that πΊπ¦ already has access to the required geodata or can easily get there. 14/22
For those saying that Taurus can only be made to work with German geodata: Why would countries like Spain and South Korea agree to import the system if this was the case? Naturally, they have a need to use their own geodata and would otherwise not have imported it. 16/22
Ukraine would also not need to depend on Germany for assistance to program trajectories (contrary to what has been stated). If provided with training on the mission planning software, similar to π°π· and πͺπΈ operators, Ukrainians could enter the TERCOM data themselves. 17/22
Consequently, there is no "constitutional" issue that would hinder Germany from delivering Taurus without parliamentary agreement. The presence of German operators in Ukraine is not essential for TERCOM to function, as long as adequate training is provided. 18/22
Finally, even if we give the chancellor all the benefit of the doubt, & πΊπ¦ would not be able to make TERCOM work for whatever reason, Taurus would still be a useable system. In this case, GPS and not TERCOM would provide updates on the missiles "true" position in space. 19/22
Given the planning requirements for TERCOM, it is unrealistic to expect πΊπ¦ to rely on it for every attack, especially when time-sensitive targets are involved. While TERCOM is valuable, especially due to its better jamming reistance, Taurus operates effectively without it. 20/22
So let me say it one more time for those in the back: There are no technical or legal obstacles preventing the delivery of Taurus and its accompanying geodata to Ukraine. The issue lies solely in the absence of political will and courage, not with the weapon system itself. 21/22
Just like in previous instances of weapon deliveries, such as artillery, IFVs, and tanks, Scholz is attempting to create artificial legal and technical obstacles to draw out the delivery process. This tactic is not new for Scholz; we've seen it before in the SPD playbook. 22/22
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Approximately 12 months ago, π·πΊ initiated a large-scale long-range strike campaign against Ukraine. I have gathered data on the long-range strike (LRS) weapons employed by Russia and Ukraine's success in intercepting them. This thread provides a summary of the findings. π𧡠1/14
According to official information provided by the Ukrainian Air Force, Russia has launched a minimum of 3,967 long-range strike weapons against Ukraine in the past 12 months. Out of these, 3,249 were successfully intercepted. 2/14
Please note that this estimate may underestimate the total number of long-range strike weapons launched, while it may potentially overestimate the number of intercepted long-range strike weapons (e.g., the AFU potraying failed launches as successful intercepts). 3/14
It seems that the Biden Administration has made the decision to provide Ukraine with MGM-140 ATACMS maneuvering missiles. In this thread, I want to explore the warhead effects of ATACMS, specifically discussing overpressure, fragmentation, and penetration effects. π§΅π 1/25
My analysis focuses on the ATACMS M57 unitary warhead variant, which appears to be one of the main variants in play for Ukraine. However, many aspects discussed also apply to the M48 variant. Towards the end, I also reference the M39A1 variant. 2/25
I view this thread as largely complementary to the works of others who have done an exceptional job at explaining the overall capability profile of ATACMS. I highly recommend checking out the excellent threads by @ColbyBadhwar and @dillonrpayton on this topic. 3/25
Secret meetings between government officials and MBDA have reportedly discussed the potential reprogramming of Taurus' navigation software to limit Ukraine's cross-border targeting capability. No contracts have been issued as of yet. 2/10
This somewhat settles the question about the extent of exchange between the manufacturer and German government officials. Talks, yes; contracts, no. 3/10
Thread about the April 2018 missile strikes against Syria, carried out by πΊπΈπ¬π§π«π·. Not many people are aware of it but it constitutes, in my opinion, a major reason why Putin knows that he cannot cross certain lines in πΊπ¦, especially by escalating to the nuclear level. 1/11 π
The missile strike came in response to a chemical weapons attack carried out by the Assad regime against the city of Douma. πΈπΎ Air Force Mi-8 helicopters dropped barrel bombs filled with chlorine gas & possibly sarin. 70 people were reported killed, hundreds more injured. 2/11
In response, πΊπΈπ¬π§π«π· prepared a retaliatory massed cruise missile strike against three sites involved in Syriaβs chemical weapons program:
(1) Scientific research center in Damascus (2) Equipment storage facility near Homs (3) Command post near Homs. 3/11
I don't think Taurus integration with F-16 is necessary at this point. If the current timeline regarding F-16 deliveries is correct and the first airframes arrive in mid-to-late 2024, there may not be many Taurus left in πΊπ¦'s arsenal anyways. There should be other priorities. 1/6
Ukraine has effective "cruise missile haulers" with its remaining SU-24M fleet that have very limited utility in other contexts and are, as such, fairly survivable. I don't see a desparate need to find a different delivery vehicle for Taurus. 2/6
If Germany wants to help Ukraine and provide its F-16 fleet with a substantial boost, it should advance integration of MBDA's Meteor air-to-air missile.
Meteor is, together with the US-manufactured AIM-120 AMRAAM-D, the most advanced air-to-air missile on the market. 3/6
Once the ICBM warhead comes into Arrow 3 kill range, it is way, way too fast (Mach 12-24) for an interceptor that is optimized to engage medium to intermediate-range targets.
"Optimization" really is the key word many do not seem to grasp. 2/7
The US has built a bunch of BMD systems that provide theoretical capability against ICBMs. This includes Aegis, Thaad, and yes, also Patriot. They are not optimized, however, and have a very uneven testing record. Tests were also often conducted under unrealistic conditions. 3/7