@solonko1648, who's a serving Ukrainian soldier, has published an excellent pair of threads in Ukrainian describing how the Russian system of trenches and firing positions works. It's a very helpful insight into why they have been so difficult to overcome.
He focuses on a Russian fortified stronghold between the villages of Robotyne and Novoprokopivka, through which the road from one village to the other runs. Tokmak lies further along the same road, which is currently contested. The following thread translates his description:
By @solonko1648:
This, dear friends, is one of the most difficult strongholds located in the Robotyne-Novoprokopivka area. A complex system of trenches-tunnels, dugouts, firing positions, to which the Russian invaders cling with all their might... 🧵 /1
What we see first. A system of trenches and firing positions. From observation and tracking of the movements of the occupiers' equipment and personnel, we confirm movement and approach routes to the position. /2
In general, these routes should be obvious, but of course, all the data should be studied and the information verified. That's why this is a formal process. Next, we see from above how these positions are equipped. We see the overlapping of dugouts. /3
But that's not all. Some of the trenches are covered over for a long distance. They may not be tunnels in the classical sense, but technically they are. This is actually a trench-tunnel, designed to hide the number of personnel and their movements in the trenches. /4
With the help of aerial reconnaissance, we determine not only which route the occupiers take to enter/leave. We also identify the entrances/exits of this stronghold/trench system. /5
A little more about the "tunnels". According to the soldiers of the frontline units, there is a classic tunnel here. It's under the road that leads from Robotyne to Novoprokopivka. It connects both flanks of this system. /6
Moreover, we also know that dugouts have been dug here, which actually have a second underground floor, going deep into the ground. While we were waiting for the shells, the occupiers were digging. And they dug long and deep. /7
After fierce fighting and artillery shelling, our artillery "opened" the dugouts and covered trenches. After that, it became clearer how much more difficult the task was. 8/
Furthermore, in the area where the main entrance to these positions is located from the west, it is only after a dense artillery barrage that the untrained eye will become aware of how well some of the trench-tunnels on this side were camouflaged. /9
The occupiers successfully used the forest belt to prepare and camouflage these positions. Such positions require us to conduct very thorough and vigilant reconnaissance. The occupiers know what we are interested in and try prevent us from conducting it properly. /10
You can watch the process in this video. /11
Now I will talk about the eastern part of the fortification. /12
It is not so much a separate fortified point as part of an extensive system, overcoming which was an extremely difficult task, taking into account the features of the hostilities, the terrain and the ratio of forces and means that I talked about. /13
The two main parts of the fortifications are connected by an underground tunnel that runs under the road. This way, the road is controlled and still used for its intended purpose. /14
Note the shape of the trench in front of the forest plantation (except for the area near the road). We have already seen a similar structure on the defence line that stretched northwest of Verbove. /15
Also note another example of the use of terrain. The system of fortifications uses the plantation to cover the entrance and exit. There are also fortifications in the rear. A circular defence pattern is observed. /16
Here, too, the artillery of the Ukrainian Armed Forces performed the task of "opening" the trenches built in the style of tunnels. A similar picture could be seen in the western part of these fortifications on the other side of the road, which I analysed earlier. /17
Also note the layout of the trenches closer to the road. Imagine what it would be like to storm/clear them. Another sceptical remark to the adherents of "elastic defence". No one was going to leave here even to return. They clung to this stronghold with all their might. /18
And then there's the wormhole. Another reminder that some people like to call the Russian invaders worms. /19
1/ Russian warbloggers are becoming increasingly open in expressing fears that Russia will lose the war unless various problems are resolved. 'Denazification UA' complains that Russia's failure to wean itself off imported Chinese drones and components will lead to defeat. ⬇️
2/ Over the past four years, Ukraine has undertaken a massive effort to scale up and indigenise its drone production. There are now over 40 drone component manufacturers in Ukraine, producing an increasing number of indigeneously-made drone parts.
3/ While both Ukraine and Russia still depend heavily on Chinese components, Russia is still stuck in Ukraine's former position of also having to import finished systems. Now, 99% of Ukraine's drones are assembled entirely in Ukraine, albeit with a lot of Chinese components.
1/ Moscow is being disrupted badly by a widespread shutdown of the Internet ahead of the May 9 Victory parade. A scathing Russian commentary complains that it is costing the economy trillions of rubles, sacrificing economic health for illusory security. ⬇️
2/ Russia's increasingly draconian Internet shutdowns have come as a huge shock to a country which had come to rely heavily on online services. Although the Russian government has whitelisted certain websites and services, the latest shutdown seems to have broken that, too.
3/ 'Political Report' complains:
"Russian citizens today experienced the full impact of the government's "concern" for their own security: authorities shut down mobile communications in most regions of the country,…
1/ The world is very rapidly running out of refined fuel due to the Strait of Hormuz blockade, according to a new Goldman Sachs report, with only 45 days' worth of stockpiles of jet fuel, naphtha, and LPG remaining. Rationing, surcharges, and mass cancellations are forecast. ⬇️
2/ A research note authored by Goldman Sachs strategists Yulia Zhestkova Grigsby and Daan Struyven has examined the impact of Middle East disruptions on refined product markets, finding that jet fuel and diesel are being hit far harder than crude oil.
3/ The analysts estimate that about 101 days' worth of usable global oil stocks remain in stockpiles. (While more oil than that is stockpiled, it can't all be used, as the JP Morgan report summarised below explains.)
1/ Russia's (allegedly) most incompetent general says he plans to stand for election in Tatarstan as a candidate for Vladimir Putin's United Russia party. Russian warbloggers are unimpressed at Colonel General Alexander Lapin's continued failure upward. ⬇️
2/ Lapin has repeatedly been dismissed from his positions since the start of the Ukraine war, and has attracted a great deal of criticism – likely justified – for his failures in command. Now retired, this unpopularity has not stopped him from declaring his candidacy:
3/ "At this stage in my life, I have a great desire to serve my multinational people, to defend the interests of my small homeland, to help people, to fight for truth, to fight for justice, to defend the interests of our republic and, as a whole, our great Motherland – Russia."
1/ Oil prices will rise to at least $140 per barrel by June if the Strait of Hormuz is not reopened by July, and will not return to pre-Iran War levels before 2028 even in a best-case scenario, predicts Goldman Sachs. It warns of price surges and major economic impacts. ⬇️
2/ A new report from Goldman Sachs predicts that 14.5 million barrels per day of production have been lost in April 2026. Global stockpiles are being drained at a record 11-12 mb/d which, as JP Morgan has noted, risks a cliff-edge drop in oil supplies.
3/ The longer the blockade continues, the worse the damage becomes. Goldman predicts that in all but the best-case scenario, there will be permanent reductions ("scarring") in Gulf oil production of between 0.5 mb/d and 2.5 mb/d.
1/ This is what $200 per barrel of oil would mean for US gas prices, which currently average $4.30 per gallon. It could go much higher. As one analyst says, once oil stockpiles are functionally exhausted by the end of May, "price increases become exponential rather than linear."
2/ The exponential point is reached at $250 per barrel, which is well within the range of realistic possibilities predicted by many analysts. Linearity breaks down because of:
3/ ♦️ Refinery margin blowouts — refineries pass through higher feedstock costs at elevated rates under stress
♦️ Speculation and panic premiums — markets take fright and price in fear, not just fundamentals