@solonko1648, who's a serving Ukrainian soldier, has published an excellent pair of threads in Ukrainian describing how the Russian system of trenches and firing positions works. It's a very helpful insight into why they have been so difficult to overcome.
He focuses on a Russian fortified stronghold between the villages of Robotyne and Novoprokopivka, through which the road from one village to the other runs. Tokmak lies further along the same road, which is currently contested. The following thread translates his description:
By @solonko1648:
This, dear friends, is one of the most difficult strongholds located in the Robotyne-Novoprokopivka area. A complex system of trenches-tunnels, dugouts, firing positions, to which the Russian invaders cling with all their might... 🧵 /1
What we see first. A system of trenches and firing positions. From observation and tracking of the movements of the occupiers' equipment and personnel, we confirm movement and approach routes to the position. /2
In general, these routes should be obvious, but of course, all the data should be studied and the information verified. That's why this is a formal process. Next, we see from above how these positions are equipped. We see the overlapping of dugouts. /3
But that's not all. Some of the trenches are covered over for a long distance. They may not be tunnels in the classical sense, but technically they are. This is actually a trench-tunnel, designed to hide the number of personnel and their movements in the trenches. /4
With the help of aerial reconnaissance, we determine not only which route the occupiers take to enter/leave. We also identify the entrances/exits of this stronghold/trench system. /5
A little more about the "tunnels". According to the soldiers of the frontline units, there is a classic tunnel here. It's under the road that leads from Robotyne to Novoprokopivka. It connects both flanks of this system. /6
Moreover, we also know that dugouts have been dug here, which actually have a second underground floor, going deep into the ground. While we were waiting for the shells, the occupiers were digging. And they dug long and deep. /7
After fierce fighting and artillery shelling, our artillery "opened" the dugouts and covered trenches. After that, it became clearer how much more difficult the task was. 8/
Furthermore, in the area where the main entrance to these positions is located from the west, it is only after a dense artillery barrage that the untrained eye will become aware of how well some of the trench-tunnels on this side were camouflaged. /9
The occupiers successfully used the forest belt to prepare and camouflage these positions. Such positions require us to conduct very thorough and vigilant reconnaissance. The occupiers know what we are interested in and try prevent us from conducting it properly. /10
You can watch the process in this video. /11
Now I will talk about the eastern part of the fortification. /12
It is not so much a separate fortified point as part of an extensive system, overcoming which was an extremely difficult task, taking into account the features of the hostilities, the terrain and the ratio of forces and means that I talked about. /13
The two main parts of the fortifications are connected by an underground tunnel that runs under the road. This way, the road is controlled and still used for its intended purpose. /14
Note the shape of the trench in front of the forest plantation (except for the area near the road). We have already seen a similar structure on the defence line that stretched northwest of Verbove. /15
Also note another example of the use of terrain. The system of fortifications uses the plantation to cover the entrance and exit. There are also fortifications in the rear. A circular defence pattern is observed. /16
Here, too, the artillery of the Ukrainian Armed Forces performed the task of "opening" the trenches built in the style of tunnels. A similar picture could be seen in the western part of these fortifications on the other side of the road, which I analysed earlier. /17
Also note the layout of the trenches closer to the road. Imagine what it would be like to storm/clear them. Another sceptical remark to the adherents of "elastic defence". No one was going to leave here even to return. They clung to this stronghold with all their might. /18
And then there's the wormhole. Another reminder that some people like to call the Russian invaders worms. /19
1/ Russia's fuel crisis isn't just about a lack of fuel being produced by refineries. The country is in the grip of a full-blown fuel panic, with people buying far more fuel than normal to get ahead of shortages and in some cases to resell fuel for profit. ⬇️
2/ As the 'Intelligence Diary' Telegram channel reports:
"Russia is gripped by a fuel panic.
People are buying up gasoline by the hundreds of litres. There are huge queues at gas stations. Prices are rising.
It's a real fuel scare.
A true gasoline vendetta."
3/ 'New Look' reports:
"In response to government calls not to stockpile fuel, Muscovites emptied auto parts stores en masse, buying up every canister. This was immediately taken advantage of by resellers, who are now reselling the containers online at a significant markup."
1/ A Russian military police officer who stole 2 million rubles from a mentally disabled recruit was sent to an assault unit. However, illustrating the current state of morale on the front lines, he and three comrades reportedly blew their own legs off to avoid going to fight. ⬇️
2/ Russian warblogger 'BCh3' tells the story in three posts:
"We usually write about heroes, but here we have an anti-hero. One of those who profit from war; one of those who ‘while some suffer, others benefit’. Meet one of the staff officers of the Military Police."
3/ "Briefly, the situation...
A training ground. New arrivals are undergoing training. One of the fighters is a quiet guy, but something is wrong with his head. He is unwell.
1/ Why aren't Russia's treaty partners helping it in the war against Ukraine, ask Russian warbloggers. They wonder what use the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) is if it can't even help Russia to conquer a neighbouring state. ⬇️
2/ The CSTO was established in 2002 as a military alliance of six post-Soviet states – Armenia (which is in the process of withdrawing), Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. Its charter requires participants to abstain from the use or threat of force.
3/ Despite this, Russian warbloggers can't seem to understand why none of the CSTO states will provide military assistance against Ukraine. 'Direct Action Z' laments:
1/ Russia is constructing shelters for its heavy bomber aircraft to protect them from Ukrainian drone strikes, such as the famous 'Operation Spider's Web'. However, Russian warbloggers say it's too little, too late. ⬇️
2/ The shelters are being constructed at the Engels air base near Saratov, which has previously been attacked by fixed-wing Ukrainian UAVs. It houses the 22nd Heavy Bomber Aviation Division, which includes a single squadron of Tu-160s and another of Tu-95s.
3/ At least 17 shelters are being built to accommodate the strategic bombers housed at the base. Reportedly, the work began in April 2025, before the June 2025 'Spider's Web' attacks.
1/ Wounded Russian soldiers are having to wait for anything from 48 hours to a remarkable 90 days for evacuation from the battlefields of Ukraine. Russian medical specialists say that there is a widespread lack of field medical expertise, likely dooming many of the wounded. ⬇️
2/ The Bulletin of the Russian Military Medical Academy has published a new report "On the Impact of the Nature of Combat Operations on the Structure of Medical Losses and the Organization of Surgical Care for the Wounded." However, commentators say it doesn't reflect reality.
3/ The data in the report is old, covering 2022-2024, and for some reason was not published until now. As the specialist military-medical warblog '5mg. KGV.' notes, it's not representative of the current situation on the battlefield. The blog's author writes:
1/ Russian warblogger Nikita Tretyakov is "thinking the unthinkable" about the war in Ukraine and its disastrous consequences. He lists a long series of catastrophes that he says have befallen Russia since February 2022, and the Russian weaknesses that they have exposed. ⬇️
2/ Tretyakov quotes Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov's recent comments on the failed negotiations with Donald Trump in Anchorage on 15 August 2025, in which Lavrov implicitly accused Trump of betraying Putin's trust:
3/ “I don’t even want to suspect that Alaska, like the European actions, was conceived to buy time for the Kyiv regime to be armed; I don’t even want to think about it, but in reality, that's how it turned out.”