@solonko1648, who's a serving Ukrainian soldier, has published an excellent pair of threads in Ukrainian describing how the Russian system of trenches and firing positions works. It's a very helpful insight into why they have been so difficult to overcome.
He focuses on a Russian fortified stronghold between the villages of Robotyne and Novoprokopivka, through which the road from one village to the other runs. Tokmak lies further along the same road, which is currently contested. The following thread translates his description:
By @solonko1648:
This, dear friends, is one of the most difficult strongholds located in the Robotyne-Novoprokopivka area. A complex system of trenches-tunnels, dugouts, firing positions, to which the Russian invaders cling with all their might... 🧵 /1
What we see first. A system of trenches and firing positions. From observation and tracking of the movements of the occupiers' equipment and personnel, we confirm movement and approach routes to the position. /2
In general, these routes should be obvious, but of course, all the data should be studied and the information verified. That's why this is a formal process. Next, we see from above how these positions are equipped. We see the overlapping of dugouts. /3
But that's not all. Some of the trenches are covered over for a long distance. They may not be tunnels in the classical sense, but technically they are. This is actually a trench-tunnel, designed to hide the number of personnel and their movements in the trenches. /4
With the help of aerial reconnaissance, we determine not only which route the occupiers take to enter/leave. We also identify the entrances/exits of this stronghold/trench system. /5
A little more about the "tunnels". According to the soldiers of the frontline units, there is a classic tunnel here. It's under the road that leads from Robotyne to Novoprokopivka. It connects both flanks of this system. /6
Moreover, we also know that dugouts have been dug here, which actually have a second underground floor, going deep into the ground. While we were waiting for the shells, the occupiers were digging. And they dug long and deep. /7
After fierce fighting and artillery shelling, our artillery "opened" the dugouts and covered trenches. After that, it became clearer how much more difficult the task was. 8/
Furthermore, in the area where the main entrance to these positions is located from the west, it is only after a dense artillery barrage that the untrained eye will become aware of how well some of the trench-tunnels on this side were camouflaged. /9
The occupiers successfully used the forest belt to prepare and camouflage these positions. Such positions require us to conduct very thorough and vigilant reconnaissance. The occupiers know what we are interested in and try prevent us from conducting it properly. /10
You can watch the process in this video. /11
Now I will talk about the eastern part of the fortification. /12
It is not so much a separate fortified point as part of an extensive system, overcoming which was an extremely difficult task, taking into account the features of the hostilities, the terrain and the ratio of forces and means that I talked about. /13
The two main parts of the fortifications are connected by an underground tunnel that runs under the road. This way, the road is controlled and still used for its intended purpose. /14
Note the shape of the trench in front of the forest plantation (except for the area near the road). We have already seen a similar structure on the defence line that stretched northwest of Verbove. /15
Also note another example of the use of terrain. The system of fortifications uses the plantation to cover the entrance and exit. There are also fortifications in the rear. A circular defence pattern is observed. /16
Here, too, the artillery of the Ukrainian Armed Forces performed the task of "opening" the trenches built in the style of tunnels. A similar picture could be seen in the western part of these fortifications on the other side of the road, which I analysed earlier. /17
Also note the layout of the trenches closer to the road. Imagine what it would be like to storm/clear them. Another sceptical remark to the adherents of "elastic defence". No one was going to leave here even to return. They clung to this stronghold with all their might. /18
And then there's the wormhole. Another reminder that some people like to call the Russian invaders worms. /19
1/ Russian senior commanders are bogged down with bureaucracy, according to a Russian war blogger, due to an insistence on 'hypercentralism' – the practice of making the administration of a unit the responsibility of one person, without delegation of responsibility. ⬇️
2/ The pseudonymous 'Vault No. 8' comments that whereas the US has long understood the need to unburden senior officers, Russia "loaded them to the maximum, saying that the top brass knows better how to manage and distribute resources."
3/ He provides "a few small details of this phenomenon in matters of supply," beginning with waybills to provide vehicles with fuel:
"There is a separate sheet for each vehicle. Some sheets have separate points: permission to drive up to 200 km/h and drive at night."
1/ Russian firefighters have failed to extinguish an out-of-control fire at an oil depot in Saratov, caused by a Ukrainian drone strike, despite repeated attempts. The attack is said to have caused fuel shortages for the nearby military airfield. ⬇️
2/ The Engels oil depot was targeted on the night of January 7-8 and has been burning out of control ever since. Attempts by firefighters to use a foam generator to extinguish the blaze have been unsuccessful. They are now reportedly waiting for new equipment and foam.
3/ Engels-2 air base is home to the 121st Guards Heavy Bomber Aviation Regiment with the Tu-160M and 184th Heavy Bomber Aviation Regiment with the Tupolev Tu-95MS strategic nuclear-capable bombers. Both bomber types have repeatedly carried out long-range attacks against Ukraine.
1/ A top-level scam at the Russian Ministry of Defence, in which decrepit old ships were used for one-way trips to transport weapons and equipment to Syria as part of the 'Syria Express', may have reduced Russia's ability to evacuate its equipment following Assad's fall. ⬇️
2/ The VChK-OGPU Telegram channel reports that top Russian defence officials purchased old cargo ships destined for scrapping, for the price of new ships, redesignated them as military transports, and used them to transport arms to Syria before selling them to Turkish scrappers.
3/ The scam was reportedly the work of former Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu (l) and his deputies Timur Ivanov (c) and Dmitry Bulgakov (r). All three have since been sacked, and Ivanov and Bulgakov have been charged with large-scale corruption.
1/ The military commander of the Wagner Group, Anton "Lotus" Elizarov, is reported to have been fired. The move is said to be the result of interpersonal conflicts and Wagner's disastrous defeats in Africa in 2024. A former GRU major is slated to replace him. ⬇️
2/ The Russian warblogger Anastasia Kashevarova writes that Elizarov left the Wagner Group before the New Year at the instigation of Yevgeny Prigozhin's son and heir Pavel, who took over Wagner following his father's death in August 2023.
3/ Kashevarova presents a number of reasons for Elizarov's dismissal:
"1. When the brigade commander was chosen, not all commanders were present at the Council.
1/ Russian air defence crews reportedly shot down Azerbaijan Airlines Flight 8243 with two missiles fired from a Pantsir launcher near Grozny, after being 'blinded' by a Russian electronic warfare system, according to a detailed account of the incident on 25 December 2024. ⬇️
2/ An account published by the VChK-OGPU Telegram channel, which has often published information that appears to have been leaked from sources in the Russian security forces, describes some of the preliminary findings of the official Russian criminal investigation.
3/ It reports that Grozny was guarded by the following air defence systems: two Pantsirs, an S-300 (recently delivered from Syria) and a Buk air defense system. One of the Pantsirs was installed in the Visaitovsky district north-west of Grozny.
1/ Russian Defence Minister Andrey Belousov recently boasted that 96% of injured Russian soldiers treated in hospitals were able to return to duty. However, Russian milbloggers point out that that is only because badly wounded men are usually left to die on the battlefield. ⬇️
2/ The '5 mg KGV' Telegram channel highlights Belousov's fallacy in claiming a mere 0.5% mortality rate with the (very graphic) illustration of the case of a soldier who went 32 days without evacuation after having his leg blown off by a drone-dropped munition.
3/ "Due to the impossibility of timely evacuation, the soldier ended up on the operating table 32 days later (!). Active growth of granulation and protruding bone fragments in the area of traumatic amputation are visible.