@solonko1648, who's a serving Ukrainian soldier, has published an excellent pair of threads in Ukrainian describing how the Russian system of trenches and firing positions works. It's a very helpful insight into why they have been so difficult to overcome.
He focuses on a Russian fortified stronghold between the villages of Robotyne and Novoprokopivka, through which the road from one village to the other runs. Tokmak lies further along the same road, which is currently contested. The following thread translates his description:
By @solonko1648:
This, dear friends, is one of the most difficult strongholds located in the Robotyne-Novoprokopivka area. A complex system of trenches-tunnels, dugouts, firing positions, to which the Russian invaders cling with all their might... 🧵 /1
What we see first. A system of trenches and firing positions. From observation and tracking of the movements of the occupiers' equipment and personnel, we confirm movement and approach routes to the position. /2
In general, these routes should be obvious, but of course, all the data should be studied and the information verified. That's why this is a formal process. Next, we see from above how these positions are equipped. We see the overlapping of dugouts. /3
But that's not all. Some of the trenches are covered over for a long distance. They may not be tunnels in the classical sense, but technically they are. This is actually a trench-tunnel, designed to hide the number of personnel and their movements in the trenches. /4
With the help of aerial reconnaissance, we determine not only which route the occupiers take to enter/leave. We also identify the entrances/exits of this stronghold/trench system. /5
A little more about the "tunnels". According to the soldiers of the frontline units, there is a classic tunnel here. It's under the road that leads from Robotyne to Novoprokopivka. It connects both flanks of this system. /6
Moreover, we also know that dugouts have been dug here, which actually have a second underground floor, going deep into the ground. While we were waiting for the shells, the occupiers were digging. And they dug long and deep. /7
After fierce fighting and artillery shelling, our artillery "opened" the dugouts and covered trenches. After that, it became clearer how much more difficult the task was. 8/
Furthermore, in the area where the main entrance to these positions is located from the west, it is only after a dense artillery barrage that the untrained eye will become aware of how well some of the trench-tunnels on this side were camouflaged. /9
The occupiers successfully used the forest belt to prepare and camouflage these positions. Such positions require us to conduct very thorough and vigilant reconnaissance. The occupiers know what we are interested in and try prevent us from conducting it properly. /10
You can watch the process in this video. /11
Now I will talk about the eastern part of the fortification. /12
It is not so much a separate fortified point as part of an extensive system, overcoming which was an extremely difficult task, taking into account the features of the hostilities, the terrain and the ratio of forces and means that I talked about. /13
The two main parts of the fortifications are connected by an underground tunnel that runs under the road. This way, the road is controlled and still used for its intended purpose. /14
Note the shape of the trench in front of the forest plantation (except for the area near the road). We have already seen a similar structure on the defence line that stretched northwest of Verbove. /15
Also note another example of the use of terrain. The system of fortifications uses the plantation to cover the entrance and exit. There are also fortifications in the rear. A circular defence pattern is observed. /16
Here, too, the artillery of the Ukrainian Armed Forces performed the task of "opening" the trenches built in the style of tunnels. A similar picture could be seen in the western part of these fortifications on the other side of the road, which I analysed earlier. /17
Also note the layout of the trenches closer to the road. Imagine what it would be like to storm/clear them. Another sceptical remark to the adherents of "elastic defence". No one was going to leave here even to return. They clung to this stronghold with all their might. /18
And then there's the wormhole. Another reminder that some people like to call the Russian invaders worms. /19
1/ The acting US Ambassador to Ukraine is to resign over differences with the Trump Administration, becoming the second ambassador to do so in just over a year, and the third to resign under Donald Trump. She is said to be frustrated at Trump's lack of support for Ukraine. ⬇️
2/ The Financial Times reports that Julie Davis will leave her post in the next few weeks and retire from the diplomatic service. She has been serving simultaneously as ambassador to Cyprus and Ukraine, but is based in Kyiv.
3/ Davis is said to have been blindsided by Trump's decision to nominate Republican donor John Breslow to be the next ambassador to Cyprus. The State Department has been sidelined in diplomacy in Ukraine, with Trump allies like Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner leading instead.
1/ Russian warbloggers are increasingly speculating about what will happen after the war ends and/or the fall of Putin. They predict chaos, disorderly struggles, repression, and not least their own violent elimination. ⬇️
2/ In a since-deleted post, Maxim Kalashnikov sees gloomy prospects ahead for Russia:
3/ “I believe that after the Transition (change of the central figure of power), as a result of this untriumphant war, a period of chaos and instability is inevitable.
No matter what “Sukharev conventions” are signed by the highest beau monde these days. What do I predict?
1/ After spending years demanding a full mobilisation, Igor 'Strelkov' Girkin has come to the realisation that it would now be pointless: Ukraine's swarms of drones are capable of destroying "any number of infantry", and Russia doesn't even have enough weapons to arm them. ⬇️
2/ A reader of his Telegram channel asks:
"Question: there's increasing talk of possible mobilisation—do you think the government will take such a step? And is mobilisation necessary under the current circumstances?"
To which Girkin replies:
3/ "Mobilisation was needed in the spring of 2022, the spring of 2023, the spring of 2024, and perhaps even the spring of 2025. Now, mobilisation is catastrophically late. Currently, mobilisation, as perceived by the majority of the population, will yield no results.
1/ Russian drone developers are complaining that because of bureaucratic restrictions, they are having to use firecrackers as the warheads on interceptor drones, or rely solely on kinetic methods instead of explosive warheads. ⬇️
2/ The Russian warblogger 'UAV Developer' shows a photo of two firecrackers and asks:
"Do you know what this is?
It's the warhead of an interceptor drone."
3/ "While those Ukrainian drones are hitting a house in Yekaterinburg, smashing a landing craft in Crimea with shrapnel, and killing a dozen civilians along the way, the developers of interceptor drones are trying to somehow circumvent the restrictions of the mad printer…
1/ Ukrainian citizens are reportedly selling 'whitelisted' Starlink terminals to Russia, to enable the Russian army to get around the blocking of unauthorised Starlink terminals. The trade highlights how corruption in Ukraine is directly aiding Russia's war effort. ⬇️
2/ Russian forces in Ukraine used Starlink on a large scale for both battlefield communications and, increasingly, drone guidance. Since early February 2026, however, only whitelisted terminals – which can only be acquired with Ukrainian government permission – can be used.
3/ However, some in Ukraine appear to be helping Russia to circumvent these restrictions. So-called 'White Starlink' offers are proliferating on Telegram channels, offering whitelisted "Starlink for military and civilians in the new territories of the Russian Federation".
1/ Starving Russian soldiers in Ukraine have been eating their comrades and Ukrainians, according to intercepted Russian communications. Audio and photographic evidence indicates that several incidents of cannibalism likely occured in 2025. ⬇️
2/ The UK's Sunday Times newspaper has published evidence of what Ukrainian intelligence sources say were at least five instances where Russian soldiers were said by their fellow soldiers and commanders to have engaged in cannibalism.
3/ The evidence reportedly came to light from intercepted messages on Telegram, which has universally been used by the Russians for battlefield communications until it was recently blocked by the Russian government.