@solonko1648, who's a serving Ukrainian soldier, has published an excellent pair of threads in Ukrainian describing how the Russian system of trenches and firing positions works. It's a very helpful insight into why they have been so difficult to overcome.
He focuses on a Russian fortified stronghold between the villages of Robotyne and Novoprokopivka, through which the road from one village to the other runs. Tokmak lies further along the same road, which is currently contested. The following thread translates his description:
By @solonko1648:
This, dear friends, is one of the most difficult strongholds located in the Robotyne-Novoprokopivka area. A complex system of trenches-tunnels, dugouts, firing positions, to which the Russian invaders cling with all their might... 🧵 /1
What we see first. A system of trenches and firing positions. From observation and tracking of the movements of the occupiers' equipment and personnel, we confirm movement and approach routes to the position. /2
In general, these routes should be obvious, but of course, all the data should be studied and the information verified. That's why this is a formal process. Next, we see from above how these positions are equipped. We see the overlapping of dugouts. /3
But that's not all. Some of the trenches are covered over for a long distance. They may not be tunnels in the classical sense, but technically they are. This is actually a trench-tunnel, designed to hide the number of personnel and their movements in the trenches. /4
With the help of aerial reconnaissance, we determine not only which route the occupiers take to enter/leave. We also identify the entrances/exits of this stronghold/trench system. /5
A little more about the "tunnels". According to the soldiers of the frontline units, there is a classic tunnel here. It's under the road that leads from Robotyne to Novoprokopivka. It connects both flanks of this system. /6
Moreover, we also know that dugouts have been dug here, which actually have a second underground floor, going deep into the ground. While we were waiting for the shells, the occupiers were digging. And they dug long and deep. /7
After fierce fighting and artillery shelling, our artillery "opened" the dugouts and covered trenches. After that, it became clearer how much more difficult the task was. 8/
Furthermore, in the area where the main entrance to these positions is located from the west, it is only after a dense artillery barrage that the untrained eye will become aware of how well some of the trench-tunnels on this side were camouflaged. /9
The occupiers successfully used the forest belt to prepare and camouflage these positions. Such positions require us to conduct very thorough and vigilant reconnaissance. The occupiers know what we are interested in and try prevent us from conducting it properly. /10
You can watch the process in this video. /11
Now I will talk about the eastern part of the fortification. /12
It is not so much a separate fortified point as part of an extensive system, overcoming which was an extremely difficult task, taking into account the features of the hostilities, the terrain and the ratio of forces and means that I talked about. /13
The two main parts of the fortifications are connected by an underground tunnel that runs under the road. This way, the road is controlled and still used for its intended purpose. /14
Note the shape of the trench in front of the forest plantation (except for the area near the road). We have already seen a similar structure on the defence line that stretched northwest of Verbove. /15
Also note another example of the use of terrain. The system of fortifications uses the plantation to cover the entrance and exit. There are also fortifications in the rear. A circular defence pattern is observed. /16
Here, too, the artillery of the Ukrainian Armed Forces performed the task of "opening" the trenches built in the style of tunnels. A similar picture could be seen in the western part of these fortifications on the other side of the road, which I analysed earlier. /17
Also note the layout of the trenches closer to the road. Imagine what it would be like to storm/clear them. Another sceptical remark to the adherents of "elastic defence". No one was going to leave here even to return. They clung to this stronghold with all their might. /18
And then there's the wormhole. Another reminder that some people like to call the Russian invaders worms. /19
1/ The Iranian Republican Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy has published a map showing the 'new' shipping lanes for vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz. However, what it shows greatly increases the risk of future shipping disasters in the Persian Gulf. ⬇️
2/ The Strait of Hormuz is only 33–39 km (20-24 mi) wide at its narrowest point, but its usable width is far narrower. The shipping lanes in the middle of the Strait pass through a 9 km-wide (5 mi) stretch of the deepest water, comprising two 3 km wide lanes with a 3 km gap.
3/ Iran is currently diverting ships around Larak island to the north of the existing shipping lanes, through the so-called 'Tehran Tollbooth'. However, this has a major problem: the water between Larak and Qeshm is only 20 m deep, far too shallow for fully loaded oil tankers.
1/ This continues Russian drone developer Alexey Chadayev's analysis of the state of Russia's drone warfare; see the links below for parts 1 and 2. In this part, he assesses the crucial role of communications systems in drone control. ⬇️
1/ This continues Russian drone developer Alexey Chadayev's analysis of the state of Russia's drone warfare; see the link below for part 1. In this part, he assesses problems with unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) which have become acute since Russia lost access to Starlink. ⬇️
There's an interesting picture here: the enemy is increasing their use, while we're decreasing it. And it's not because we're physically short of them—they're sitting in warehouses by the thousands.
1/ Russian drone developer Alexey Chadayev has posted a lengthy and detailed description of what is going wrong for Russia in the drone warfare arms race, where he admits that it has fallen badly behind Ukraine, with lethal consequences for the Russian army. ⬇️
2/ Chadayev is the head of the Ushkuynik Research and Production Centre, a leading Russian drone development organisation. He is a key organiser in the 'People's Military-Industrial Complex', a loose coalition of voluntary groups which provides the army with equipment.
3/ He asks:
"1. How exactly has Ukraine regained its lost leadership in the "small sky" over the past six months?
1/ Igor 'Strelkov' Girkin reflects the views of many Russian commentators today in declaring Donald Trump's apparent climbdown over Iran to be a huge fiasco. He argues that "US authority will now be greatly undermined, and Trump's authority even more so." ⬇️
2/ News of the ceasefire in the Gulf has made its way very quickly to the special prison for jailed former security officials where Girkin has been held since January 2024. He also hasn't wasted any time in responding on his Telegram channel:
3/ "To say I'm shocked to the core—no, I'm not. In fact, deep down, I suspected the possibility of such a U-turn. The shouting and threats leading up to the behind-the-scenes agreement were too theatrical.
1/ Russia's current efforts to advance are getting nowhere due to endless swarms of Ukrainian drones, says the head of the Novorossiya Aid Coordination Centre. He suggest that instead, Russia should 'temporarily' bank its gains and go on the defensive. ⬇️
"Now it's important to take a very realistic assessment of the situation as of April 2026 and determine what we need to do in the near future to achieve Victory.
The most important factors in this situation are:"
3/ "▪️The fatigue of our troops, due to the lack of long-term rotations and many other reasons, is becoming a critical factor of strategic significance!!!
▪️The enemy achieved considerable success in destroying our air defences in February and March.