@solonko1648, who's a serving Ukrainian soldier, has published an excellent pair of threads in Ukrainian describing how the Russian system of trenches and firing positions works. It's a very helpful insight into why they have been so difficult to overcome.
He focuses on a Russian fortified stronghold between the villages of Robotyne and Novoprokopivka, through which the road from one village to the other runs. Tokmak lies further along the same road, which is currently contested. The following thread translates his description:
By @solonko1648:
This, dear friends, is one of the most difficult strongholds located in the Robotyne-Novoprokopivka area. A complex system of trenches-tunnels, dugouts, firing positions, to which the Russian invaders cling with all their might... 🧵 /1
What we see first. A system of trenches and firing positions. From observation and tracking of the movements of the occupiers' equipment and personnel, we confirm movement and approach routes to the position. /2
In general, these routes should be obvious, but of course, all the data should be studied and the information verified. That's why this is a formal process. Next, we see from above how these positions are equipped. We see the overlapping of dugouts. /3
But that's not all. Some of the trenches are covered over for a long distance. They may not be tunnels in the classical sense, but technically they are. This is actually a trench-tunnel, designed to hide the number of personnel and their movements in the trenches. /4
With the help of aerial reconnaissance, we determine not only which route the occupiers take to enter/leave. We also identify the entrances/exits of this stronghold/trench system. /5
A little more about the "tunnels". According to the soldiers of the frontline units, there is a classic tunnel here. It's under the road that leads from Robotyne to Novoprokopivka. It connects both flanks of this system. /6
Moreover, we also know that dugouts have been dug here, which actually have a second underground floor, going deep into the ground. While we were waiting for the shells, the occupiers were digging. And they dug long and deep. /7
After fierce fighting and artillery shelling, our artillery "opened" the dugouts and covered trenches. After that, it became clearer how much more difficult the task was. 8/
Furthermore, in the area where the main entrance to these positions is located from the west, it is only after a dense artillery barrage that the untrained eye will become aware of how well some of the trench-tunnels on this side were camouflaged. /9
The occupiers successfully used the forest belt to prepare and camouflage these positions. Such positions require us to conduct very thorough and vigilant reconnaissance. The occupiers know what we are interested in and try prevent us from conducting it properly. /10
You can watch the process in this video. /11
Now I will talk about the eastern part of the fortification. /12
It is not so much a separate fortified point as part of an extensive system, overcoming which was an extremely difficult task, taking into account the features of the hostilities, the terrain and the ratio of forces and means that I talked about. /13
The two main parts of the fortifications are connected by an underground tunnel that runs under the road. This way, the road is controlled and still used for its intended purpose. /14
Note the shape of the trench in front of the forest plantation (except for the area near the road). We have already seen a similar structure on the defence line that stretched northwest of Verbove. /15
Also note another example of the use of terrain. The system of fortifications uses the plantation to cover the entrance and exit. There are also fortifications in the rear. A circular defence pattern is observed. /16
Here, too, the artillery of the Ukrainian Armed Forces performed the task of "opening" the trenches built in the style of tunnels. A similar picture could be seen in the western part of these fortifications on the other side of the road, which I analysed earlier. /17
Also note the layout of the trenches closer to the road. Imagine what it would be like to storm/clear them. Another sceptical remark to the adherents of "elastic defence". No one was going to leave here even to return. They clung to this stronghold with all their might. /18
And then there's the wormhole. Another reminder that some people like to call the Russian invaders worms. /19
1/ Telegram will not be restored in Russia, and tighter restrictions will be imposed on mobile phone ownership, says Sergey Boyarsky, head of the State Duma IT Committee. He cites scammers, pro-Ukrainian sabotage, and drone attacks as the reasons behind these moves. ⬇️
2/ In a wide-ranging interview with the St Petersburg online newspaper Fontanka, Boyarsky has explained the thinking behind the government's new restrictions on Telegram. He says that "Telegram doesn't comply with Russian Federation law, and hasn't done so for many years."
3/ "The requirements are simple, basic: localise user data within the Russian Federation, remove prohibited information (extremism, terrorism), and cooperate with law enforcement agencies to solve serious crimes (for example, the Crocus [terroist attack] case)."
1/ While Telegram is only part of a wider complex of communications systems used in the Russian army, it comprises a keystone without which the wider system falls apart. A commentary by a Russian warblogger explains the Russian army's communications ecosystem in detail. ⬇️
2/ Responding to comments earlier this week by presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov, 'Vault No. 8' provides a "briefing note" on the role of Telegram in the Russian military communications ecosystem.
3/ "A typical motorised rifle regiment (today, the basic tactical unit—the military unit that holds the front line) utilises several tools to manage its troops:
1/ While the Russia army struggles with the impact of Telegram and Discord being throttled or blocked by the government, Ukraine has long used a highly sophisticated indigenously developed digital command and control system. Russian warbloggers have highlighted the contrast. ⬇️
2/ Detailed accounts such as the one in the thread below illustrate how Telegram – a commercial app run from Dubai – has been a central tool in the Russian kill chain, allowing for rapid responses to Ukrainian actions. Discord was also heavily used.
3/ Although this approach has been effective, it has now deliberately been rendered unusable by the Russian government. 'Two Majors' compares how Ukraine has approached digital command and control, and never made itself reliant on Telegram:
1/ The Russian army is reportedly forcing its soldiers to abandon Telegram and move over to the government-authorised MAX app. A Russian warblogger explains why the transition will prove to be very difficult. ⬇️
"Some challenges of switching from Telegram to MAX for our military personnel.
Telegram doesn't require a Russian number to be linked, making it difficult for adversaries to [de]anonymise users."
3/ "Max requires not only a Russian number but also real data (according to the messenger's rules), which enemy electronic warfare systems will immediately receive (although a Russian number alone is sufficient for the enemy to identify a user).
1/ Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov recently said (very wrongly) that "It's difficult, if not impossible, to imagine ... frontline communications being provided via Telegram or any other messenger." Warblogger Nikita Tretyakov has a list of other 'unimaginables'. ⬇️
2/ "What else is unimaginable?
It's unimaginable that just a week ago, our troops' communications relied on an enemy country's satellite constellation.
3/ "It's unimaginable that soldiers still obtain many essential items for war and military life (anti-thermal blankets, radios, gasoline-powered and electric tools, inverter generators, etc.) almost exclusively from their salaries or from volunteers.
1/ Russian warbloggers are outraged at being told by a journalist that it's their own fault that the Russian government is restricting Telegram. They argue that if not for the warblogger community, the military's lies would have gone unchallenged – which is exactly the point. ⬇️
2/ Komsomolskaya Pravda journalist Ivan Pankin has prompted fury with his claim that "endless nameless insiders, all those endless bloggers, the smartest people on earth who know everything and who have been spreading all sorts of nonsense" have annoyed the Russian government.
3/ He is almost certainly correct, but the warbloggers aren't having any of it and have responded angrily. They claim they have been consistently right in warning about the failures of the Russian military, to the overall benefit of the war effort and Russian population.