I see a lot of bad Brussels takes on the likely outcome of Polish parliamentary elections , so let me share a few points.
1/ We are unlikely to have a sworn in government until late November or more likely, December. So the new government starts really governing in the begining of the next year.
2/ The primary focus of the new government is likely to be internal Polish affairs. The only major exception is releasing EU funds. But those, to be released, will probably require domestic law changes (though Tusk claims he can release them "within a day"). We'll see.
3/ The ruling coalition, if manages to install a government, consists of many political parties, which come from different EU political groups: EPP, S&D, Greens, Renew. So not clear to what extent they will be united on numerous issues on EU agenda.
4/ There will be very strong opposition: if the leading exit poll is confirmed, PiS and Confederation (both eurosceptic) will lack only abt 15-20 votes to overthrow the govt, so the ruling coalition unlikely to go bold on EU issues.
5/ The main component of the ruling coalition is going to be the EPP, which - whether they admit or not - are not very far away from ECR on substance on some key EU issues (climate, migration, agri). There should not be any expectation of any major change on substance.
6/ The main difference and change is going to be the optics and esthetics. With Tusk the former Council President, he will reassure EU partners that Poland "is back". PL govt will put on a new smiley face. However, on substance, not much room for maneuver on some key files.
7/ There are local elections in Poland in spring 2024, followed by EU elections in June 2024, and Presidential elections 2025. The new govt will need to watch its back all along, so on many key EU topics (climate, migration, EU reform), its space for concessions limited.
END
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Jednomyślność - mimo niewątpliwej zalety gwarantowania każdemu Państwu możliwość zablokowania inicjatyw dla niego złe - ma też dwie duże wady, z których o jednej mało (lub w ogóle) się u nas mówi.
Mianowicie w związku z tym, że wiele kompetencji jest już obecnie w rękach UE, wiele państw po prostu nie może sobie regulować na własnym podwórku, bo kompetencje te są w ręku UE.
Ale wymóg jednomyślność z kolei stanowiłby, że nawet na poziomie UE nie można by takiej regulacji uchwalić bez zgody wszystkich. Więc np. Niemcy czy Francja nie mogłby wymusić na UE uchwalenia czegoś czego chcą u siebie, bo np. Cypr czy Malta by to blokowały.
So.... EU discussions on 11th EU sanctions package on Russia are seriously starting. ⚡
What's on the table?
It's all confidential and hush-hush 😶, so just a few teasers. (thread)
1/23
First, proposed listings of 72 new individuals (military, deportation of children, propagandists, others) and 29 entities (mainly defense 🚀, encryption 💻, propaganda 📺, banks 🏦).
If adopted, the totals are up to 1571 persons & 241 entities.
2/23
Second, a new ground for listing (i.e., subjecting to an asset freeze) for certain persons and entities involved in Russian IT sector). There is more here, but keeping it confidential. 🕵️
A short thread on the occasion of the review of the crude oil price cap in the EU Russia sanctions.
As most of you know, on Dec. 5, 2022, crude oil price cap went into effect at 60 USD per barrel. The cap had first been discussed & somewhat agreed within G7 (aka "Price Cap Coalition"), then unexpectedly had to be renegotiated after some EU states forced it down to 60 USD.
It was a real nail-biter, as discussions kept dragging for some time and the final level was published into law only on Dec. 3, 2022, so less than 2 days before going into effect.
The EU could have protected its domestic solar panel industry in the 2010s, but instead gave in to the free traders and green import lobby. In effect, Chinese imports destroyed EU PV industry completely.
For those that have short memory: late in 2012, the EU initiated an antidumping and antisubsidy action against Chinese PV panel, solar cell and wafer imports, to protect the EU industry from getting wiped out by Chinese imports.
However, the Chinese govt funded a massive campaign to kill it. PV importers, installers, green NGOs lined up to protect China. As did a number of "free trading" MS (mostly Nordics).
The (lack of realistic) debate about excluding Russian #fertilizers from sanctions shows how the West is still susceptible to Russian propaganda. As the 9th #sanctions package is getting bogged down in a stalemate, it's worth to unpack is to realize what is actually going on. 🧵
As news outlets report, a number of major Western EU countries, including Germany, France and Belgium (and some others) are blocking the adoption of the 9th sanctions package with their request to create an exemption for transactions involving agriculture and fertilizers.
By way of background, EU sanctions do not, per se, block imports of Russian fertilizers into the EU. Except for potash and some multi-nutrient fertilizers (so-called NPKs), which are subject to a quota 👇, all other fertilizers can be imported into the EU.
Sorry to be a bore, but the Eagle has landed! Last night, EU finally published the long-awaited price cap on Russian oil at 6⃣0⃣ USD per barrel🛢️+ some tweaks to EU oil sanctions scheme
I realize everyone's minds are in the World Cup. But lets muster some discipline & dive in!🧵
Before we get into it, two points.
1st: this batch of EU sanctions regs doesnt have an unofficial number. We are currently between 8th sanctions package (October) & the incoming 9th package (mid December). Yesterday's regs don't bring any new restrictions, so arent "numbered".
2nd: to understand what's happening, we need to take a step back.
In 6th sanctions package (July), EU introduced a complex set of oil & oil products sanctions on Russia.