Share this page!

Enter URL or ID to Unroll

You can paste full URL like: https://x.com/threadreaderapp/status/1644127596119195649
or just the ID like: 1644127596119195649

How to get URL link on X (Twitter) App

  1. On the Twitter thread, click on or icon on the bottom
  2. Click again on or Share Via icon
  3. Click on Copy Link to Tweet
  4. Paste it above and click "Unroll Thread"!
  5. More info at Twitter Help
Tatarigami_UA Profile picture
@Tatarigami_UA
Oct 18, 2023 • 9 tweets • 3 min read • Read on X
Scrolly
The Frontelligence Insight team analyzed reports of a successful strike at Berdiansk airport using high-res imagery from September and medium-res imagery from October 17th. The analysis confirmed the strike's success. 🧵Thread: Image
2/ The official Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) account has officially confirmed the successful execution of Operation "Dragonfly." This operation effectively targeted both Berdyansk and Luhansk Airfields Image
3/ Our preliminary analysis aligns with the statement from the MoD, indicating that multiple vehicles are likely to be burnt or destroyed. Yet, due to the limited quality of the available imagery, we cannot definitively determine the extent of this damage at this time.
4/ By examining historical imagery from September and August, it becomes evident that this section of the airfield has consistently been used to house attack helicopters, including models such as the Mi-28, Mi-24, and Ka-52. Image
5/ The high consistency strongly suggests that the lost Russian helicopters match those previously identified in this area. Additionally, it's important to note that many other helicopters have remained parked on the airstrip, even after the attack. Image
6/ In conclusion, it's important to acknowledge that the damage is probably more widespread than reported here. There are additional signs of destruction on the airfield, but we haven't included them in this report because we couldn't properly identify damaged objects
7/ Nevertheless, the impact of this devastating attack is undeniable. It will likely disrupt helicopter operations in the South of Ukraine for some time, compelling the Russians to adjust their logistics and the operations of nearby helicopter bases.
8/ If you found our report valuable, we invite you to follow us on our project's website. The imagery is accessible thanks to premium subscribers and your contributions through Buy Me a Coffee.
A higher-resolution images have been published by (@cxemu) moments ago.

Turns out we accurately assessed the damage with a much lower resolution.
Image
Image

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
　

Keep Current with Tatarigami_UA

Tatarigami_UA Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @Tatarigami_UA

Tatarigami_UA Profile picture
Sep 17
The Defence Intelligence of Ukraine has published new details about the Russian “Geran-3” UAV. The “U” series model is equipped with a Chinese Telefly JT80 turbojet engine, allowing it to reach speeds of 300–370 km/h and an estimated operational range of up to 1,000 km. Image
2/ The “Geran-3” reaches its maximum speed of up to 370 km/h mainly in areas covered by Ukrainian air defense and electronic warfare systems, in zones where interceptor UAVs are deployed, and during the terminal phase of flight as it descends toward its target. Image
3/ Electronic units are largely the same as in the gasoline-powered versions of the “Geran-2” UAV of the “Ы” series. It includes, in particular, the standard SADRA inertial navigation system, an air data computer (ADC), a power distribution unit (PDU), and other components Image
Read 5 tweets
Tatarigami_UA Profile picture
Sep 16
The dynamics of the battlefield have shifted even further in 2025. With manpower shortages and infiltration tactics, the frontline in some areas has become far less defined and certain. That’s one of the reasons I haven’t posted any tactical updates for a while:
2/ It has reached the point where even soldiers on both sides are uncertain about the frontline - at least beyond their own unit’s tactical area. As a result, sources once considered reliable for mappers are no longer as dependable.
3/ The fog of war is nothing new, of course, but in recent years people grew accustomed to accurate maps to the point of taking them for granted. Unfortunately, even I’ve noticed that many OSINT maps have become markedly less accurate lately.
Read 5 tweets
Tatarigami_UA Profile picture
Sep 12
Up to two-thirds (66%) of respondents in Russia believe it is time to move toward peace negotiations, a record high for this indicator. Only 27% say military action should continue, the lowest level. The figures come from the Levada Center, known for its methodological rigor: Image
2/ Fifty-eight percent of respondents say the war has affected them or their families. Among those “strongly” affected, common issues include the death of relatives or friends, family members participating in combat, injuries/disability, emotional distress, and economic hardship
3/ Higher support for negotiations among: women; young people under 24; rural residents; those who believe national affairs are going poorly; people who disapprove of Putin; those who rely on YouTube or non-state sources for information.
Read 5 tweets
Tatarigami_UA Profile picture
Sep 11
Two days after being conscripted into Russia's army, Maxim Suvorov signed a contract. Less than a month later, he fell on the battlefield - one of many casualties of Russia’s new practice of filling contract ranks with conscripts. A detailed case showcasing recruitment problems: Image
2/ Frontelligence Insight has previously reported on Russia’s struggle to meet recruitment targets with monetary bonuses, pushing the military to seek alternatives, including pressuring conscripts to sign contracts. The recent death of a conscript allowed us to trace his story
3/ Our investigation begins with an obituary posted on a local Russian social media group dedicated to fallen soldiers in various conflicts. According to the post, Maxim was conscripted on June 25 and signed a contract on June 27. To verify this, we sought additional evidence Image
Read 11 tweets
Tatarigami_UA Profile picture
Sep 9
Reminder: the account that posted a photo said to show Iryna Zarutska, with a BLM poster in the background, drew 18 million views. In May 2025, France’s defense and security secretariat tied this account to Storm-1516, a state-backed Russian disinfo group. But there’s more: Image
Image
2/ According to a report by VIGI­­NUM, the French agency for countering foreign digital interference and disinformation under the General Secretariat for Defence and National Security, this unit is a Russian information manipulation set (IMS) linked to Russia’s intelligence (GRU) Image
3/ EclecticIQ, a Dutch cybersecurity and threat-intelligence firm, identified the LordBebo account as linked to the Storm-1516 disinformation unit in its report on disinformation campaigns. My team also looked into the matter and found a rather interesting pattern:
Read 5 tweets
Tatarigami_UA Profile picture
Sep 9
A recurring question is whether Russia categorizes AWOL cases as a way to conceal combat deaths in its official reports. The short answer is no. The longer answer is more complicated, and requires looking at how AWOL is treated within the Russian military system. 🧵Short thread: Image
2/ Most AWOL cases can escalate into actual criminal proceedings if all other measures to bring soldiers back fail. High rates of desertion or absence trigger investigations on record - problems that weigh more heavily on commanders and unit statistics than combat losses do
3/ Casualties themselves are rarely the main concern, provided objectives set by higher command are met. By contrast, desertion is seen as evidence of weak leadership and poor control over subordinates. KIA and MIA are regarded as an acceptable cost of war; AWOL is not.
Read 7 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!

This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Don't want to be a Premium member but still want to support us?

Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal

Or Donate anonymously using crypto!

Ethereum

0xfe58350B80634f60Fa6Dc149a72b4DFbc17D341E copy

Bitcoin

3ATGMxNzCUFzxpMCHL5sWSt4DVtS8UqXpi copy

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us!

Send Email!

:(