The Frontelligence Insight team analyzed reports of a successful strike at Berdiansk airport using high-res imagery from September and medium-res imagery from October 17th. The analysis confirmed the strike's success. 🧵Thread:
2/ The official Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) account has officially confirmed the successful execution of Operation "Dragonfly." This operation effectively targeted both Berdyansk and Luhansk Airfields
3/ Our preliminary analysis aligns with the statement from the MoD, indicating that multiple vehicles are likely to be burnt or destroyed. Yet, due to the limited quality of the available imagery, we cannot definitively determine the extent of this damage at this time.
4/ By examining historical imagery from September and August, it becomes evident that this section of the airfield has consistently been used to house attack helicopters, including models such as the Mi-28, Mi-24, and Ka-52.
5/ The high consistency strongly suggests that the lost Russian helicopters match those previously identified in this area. Additionally, it's important to note that many other helicopters have remained parked on the airstrip, even after the attack.
6/ In conclusion, it's important to acknowledge that the damage is probably more widespread than reported here. There are additional signs of destruction on the airfield, but we haven't included them in this report because we couldn't properly identify damaged objects
7/ Nevertheless, the impact of this devastating attack is undeniable. It will likely disrupt helicopter operations in the South of Ukraine for some time, compelling the Russians to adjust their logistics and the operations of nearby helicopter bases.
8/ If you found our report valuable, we invite you to follow us on our project's website. The imagery is accessible thanks to premium subscribers and your contributions through Buy Me a Coffee.
A higher-resolution images have been published by (@cxemu) moments ago.
Turns out we accurately assessed the damage with a much lower resolution.
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SLB, the world’s largest offshore drilling company headquartered in Texas, continues to operate in Russia despite international sanctions, according to documents published by the analytical firm @dallasparkua. 🧵Thread:
2/ In March 2022, SLB publicly announced that it would suspend all new investments in the Russian market in response to international sanctions. This was in the statement from Chief Executive Officer Olivier Le Peuch, issued from the company’s Houston headquarter
3/ In October 2022, the company underwent a global rebranding, changing its name from Schlumberger to SLB. The Russian subsidiary retained the name Schlumberger Technology Company. However, leaked correspondence point that it continues to be integrated into SLB’s global framework
Breaking: On October 13, Russia’s Government Legislative Commission backed a Defense Ministry bill allowing the use of reservists for defense-related tasks in peacetime. The measure expands the military’s authority to call up reservists for wartime needs. 🧵Thread:
2/ According to the draft law, “special assemblies” are military call-ups for specific defense missions during armed conflicts, counterterrorism operations, or when forces are deployed abroad. Only reservists will be subject to these special assemblies.
3/ Russia’s mobilization reserve consists of individuals who have voluntarily signed contracts to remain in reserve. Putin established the country’s mobilization manpower reserve in 2015 through an executive decree.
Our report on Russia’s tank production and expansion plans has, predictably, drawn significant attention and generated many questions. Rather than replying individually, we decided to answer the most common ones - and even address questions about the Armata. 🧵Thread:
Russia’s T-90 tank production in 2024 reached around 240 units, including both new and modernized tanks. But internal planning papers analyzed by Frontelligence Insight show Moscow’s plan to lift output by 80% and launch production of a new T90 variant. 🧵Our Special Report:
2/ Our investigation began with what appeared to be a routine document: Uralvagonzavod requested “IS-445” engine RPM sensors from Zagorsk Optical-Mechanical Plant (ZOMZ) for a project listed as “Product 188M2.” This single line became the starting point of a larger discovery
3/ Digging deeper, we identified “Product 188M2” as the T-90M2, the latest variant of the T-90M (Product 188M). A careless online bio from a Russian engineer posted on Russian Scientific and Engineering Union revealed its name: “Ryvok-1", which roughly can be translated as Dash-1
Recently, @CITeam_en has raised some good and bad points about verifying the authenticity of RU mil documents. I’ll start with a pushback: the notion that the legitimacy of Russian documents can be judged by whether they have all the formal characteristics is outdated:
2/ While it is true that all classified documents follow strict protocols, the reality of war is far messier. Most documents are produced internally, shared outside of formal chains: in Excel, Word, or PDF formats and shared through messengers, email, or other convenient channels
3/ I have personally reviewed hundreds, if not thousands, of pages of Russian documents: leaks, data from captured phones or submissions to our team, that contained sensitive information. Yet only a tiny fraction carried any formal classification stamps, despite being valuable
Despite progress, including holding Pokrovsk, inflicting tangible casualties, and striking Russia’s oil and gas infrastructure, it would be dangerous for Europe to assume that “Ukraine has this.”
The battlefield situation has improved but remains suboptimal.
🧵Thread:
2/ The recent negative dynamics in Kupyansk show that the fundamental issue of Ukraine’s military remains: it is forced to operate in a fire-brigade fashion, reinforcing threatened sectors of the front such as Pokrovsk at the cost of other directions.
3/ As our team’s investigation into desertions shows, Russian troops are abandoning their posts at increasingly growing rate. Yet desertions still remain more frequent on the Ukrainian side, and Moscow is more effective at returning its troops to the front.