Amid the predominant public focus on the successful ATACMS strike at Berdyansk airfield, our team has also assembled a comprehensive report on the outcomes of a similar strike at Luhansk airport, where numerous Russian attack and transport helicopters are stationed.
🧵Thread:
2/ The visual evidence from the Planet Labs imagery at our disposal shows that a minimum of 5 helicopters have experienced varying degrees of damage. There's also a chance that other airfield vehicles have been affected, but the current resolution makes confirmation difficult.
3/
In the October 18th imagery, scorch marks from explosions are evident on the airport apron, confirming the deployment of the previously reported M-39 ATACMS missile with nearly a thousand anti-personnel and anti-material bomblets.
4/ To rule out the chance of these scorch marks being old or from previous shelling, we've included imagery from October 10 for comparison. In that imagery, you can observe various pre-existing scorch marks and oil stains, but there are no signs of extensive explosions.
5/ By analyzing scorch mark patterns and submunition characteristics, we've concluded that avoiding damage, especially for larger objects like helicopters, is highly challenging. This is supported by secondary indicators like rotor absence, leaks, and missing parts.
6/ The affected area is extensive, and there appears to be a crater. However, we cannot confirm whether it solely resulted from the missile impact, a vehicle detonation, or a combination of both simultaneously.
7/ While the report of the attack is dated October 17th, multiple helicopters are still present at the base, mirroring a pattern observed at Berdyansk airfield.
8/ In conclusion, the attacks in both Berdyansk and Luhansk were successful, despite being protected by various air defense systems. Our team will continue to closely monitor the situation to collect additional data for future updates.
9/ If you found this post valuable, please consider liking and sharing it. These images are made possible through donations on BuyMeACoffee and support from our website's premium subscribers. Consider this option to support future reports like this.
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Breaking: On October 13, Russia’s Government Legislative Commission backed a Defense Ministry bill allowing the use of reservists for defense-related tasks in peacetime. The measure expands the military’s authority to call up reservists for wartime needs. 🧵Thread:
2/ According to the draft law, “special assemblies” are military call-ups for specific defense missions during armed conflicts, counterterrorism operations, or when forces are deployed abroad. Only reservists will be subject to these special assemblies.
3/ Russia’s mobilization reserve consists of individuals who have voluntarily signed contracts to remain in reserve. Putin established the country’s mobilization manpower reserve in 2015 through an executive decree.
Our report on Russia’s tank production and expansion plans has, predictably, drawn significant attention and generated many questions. Rather than replying individually, we decided to answer the most common ones - and even address questions about the Armata. 🧵Thread:
Russia’s T-90 tank production in 2024 reached around 240 units, including both new and modernized tanks. But internal planning papers analyzed by Frontelligence Insight show Moscow’s plan to lift output by 80% and launch production of a new T90 variant. 🧵Our Special Report:
2/ Our investigation began with what appeared to be a routine document: Uralvagonzavod requested “IS-445” engine RPM sensors from Zagorsk Optical-Mechanical Plant (ZOMZ) for a project listed as “Product 188M2.” This single line became the starting point of a larger discovery
3/ Digging deeper, we identified “Product 188M2” as the T-90M2, the latest variant of the T-90M (Product 188M). A careless online bio from a Russian engineer posted on Russian Scientific and Engineering Union revealed its name: “Ryvok-1", which roughly can be translated as Dash-1
Recently, @CITeam_en has raised some good and bad points about verifying the authenticity of RU mil documents. I’ll start with a pushback: the notion that the legitimacy of Russian documents can be judged by whether they have all the formal characteristics is outdated:
2/ While it is true that all classified documents follow strict protocols, the reality of war is far messier. Most documents are produced internally, shared outside of formal chains: in Excel, Word, or PDF formats and shared through messengers, email, or other convenient channels
3/ I have personally reviewed hundreds, if not thousands, of pages of Russian documents: leaks, data from captured phones or submissions to our team, that contained sensitive information. Yet only a tiny fraction carried any formal classification stamps, despite being valuable
Despite progress, including holding Pokrovsk, inflicting tangible casualties, and striking Russia’s oil and gas infrastructure, it would be dangerous for Europe to assume that “Ukraine has this.”
The battlefield situation has improved but remains suboptimal.
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2/ The recent negative dynamics in Kupyansk show that the fundamental issue of Ukraine’s military remains: it is forced to operate in a fire-brigade fashion, reinforcing threatened sectors of the front such as Pokrovsk at the cost of other directions.
3/ As our team’s investigation into desertions shows, Russian troops are abandoning their posts at increasingly growing rate. Yet desertions still remain more frequent on the Ukrainian side, and Moscow is more effective at returning its troops to the front.
The Ukrainian project @hochuzhit_com has published a photo of a document with Russian losses over 8 months, from January to September 2025. According to it, total KIA numbers 86,744, roughly 10,843 per month, which is very close to our earlier estimates. Total losses are 281,550
2/ The published document contains a breakdown by units. Our team will work tonight to verify whether the numbers match the Russian documents we have on hand, but at first glance, it appears authentic. Notably, over 33,966 are listed as MIA, so the majority of them are likely KIA
3/ This is very close to our earlier estimates published in July and August, which pointed to 8,400–10,500 KIA per month. These estimates have proven to be quite accurate, demonstrating that our methodology is precise and reliable