Amid the predominant public focus on the successful ATACMS strike at Berdyansk airfield, our team has also assembled a comprehensive report on the outcomes of a similar strike at Luhansk airport, where numerous Russian attack and transport helicopters are stationed.
🧵Thread:
2/ The visual evidence from the Planet Labs imagery at our disposal shows that a minimum of 5 helicopters have experienced varying degrees of damage. There's also a chance that other airfield vehicles have been affected, but the current resolution makes confirmation difficult.
3/
In the October 18th imagery, scorch marks from explosions are evident on the airport apron, confirming the deployment of the previously reported M-39 ATACMS missile with nearly a thousand anti-personnel and anti-material bomblets.
4/ To rule out the chance of these scorch marks being old or from previous shelling, we've included imagery from October 10 for comparison. In that imagery, you can observe various pre-existing scorch marks and oil stains, but there are no signs of extensive explosions.
5/ By analyzing scorch mark patterns and submunition characteristics, we've concluded that avoiding damage, especially for larger objects like helicopters, is highly challenging. This is supported by secondary indicators like rotor absence, leaks, and missing parts.
6/ The affected area is extensive, and there appears to be a crater. However, we cannot confirm whether it solely resulted from the missile impact, a vehicle detonation, or a combination of both simultaneously.
7/ While the report of the attack is dated October 17th, multiple helicopters are still present at the base, mirroring a pattern observed at Berdyansk airfield.
8/ In conclusion, the attacks in both Berdyansk and Luhansk were successful, despite being protected by various air defense systems. Our team will continue to closely monitor the situation to collect additional data for future updates.
9/ If you found this post valuable, please consider liking and sharing it. These images are made possible through donations on BuyMeACoffee and support from our website's premium subscribers. Consider this option to support future reports like this.
I mistakenly added the wrong image. This is the correct one (no annotations included in the old one)
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China is reportedly ready to send peacekeepers to Ukraine, according to Welt am Sonntag, citing European diplomats. Meanwhile, Frontelligence Insight is releasing a list of Chinese companies involved in scaling Russia’s Shahed drone program. Here is the list:
/2 Despite its efforts to present itself as a geopolitical actor capable of peacemaking, Chinese companies help to scale Russia's military production. As the data show, most of these companies are either not sanctioned or face restrictions from only a limited number of countries
3/ There are serious inconsistencies in sanctions, undermining their effectiveness. To maximize impact, sanctions should be coordinated across multiple states with leverage over China, including the United States, the European Union, the Commonwealth realms, Japan, and others.
iStories recently reported that Russian recruitment was falling, citing federal budget data on sign-up bonuses. In reality, enlistment still runs above 30,000 a month, and the dip reflects changes in published data, not an actual slowdown 🧵There are a few nuances, though:
2/ They reported that several regions, including Irkutsk and Vladimir, are struggling with recruitment. That is true, and has been an issue in many areas, which helps explain the steady rise in sign-up bonuses. Some recruits even register in other regions to secure higher payouts
3/ Still, despite ever-higher bonuses, Russia has found ways to offset shortfalls by drawing from the freshly detained and pre-trial prisoners, while increasingly pressuring illegal migrants and conscripts into signing contracts.
News of Ukrainian missile production (Flamingo missile) is inspiring, both at home and abroad. Yet, unless the production site, which was opened for journalists, was staged for cameras, it is striking how many details were left exposed - enough to make geolocation possible.
2/ Equally concerning is the decision to show crew members’ faces and list their positions. In our past investigations, my team was able to identify Russian servicemen and intelligence officers using just one facial photo, tracing some even to their actual home addresses
3/ Revealing factory staff could enable local agents from locals to follow employees and, in turn, uncover the site almost certainly making it a target. The interior itself is highly distinctive, a skilled team could likely narrow its location to a handful of candidates.
Exclusive Report: Shipments of engines, cylinders, pistons, and electronics are pouring from China into Alabuga, fueling Russia’s Shahed production. Frontelligence Insight analyzed export data, closed reports, and open sources, revealing the scale of support. 🧵Thread:
2/ Russia has sharply ramped up its use of Shahed (Geran), Garpia, and Gerbera UAVs, from dozens of launches in 2022 to tens of thousands per month by 2025. While Iran played a key role early on, it became clear that the only country that could scale the production was China.
3/ One of the biggest production bottlenecks was engines and electronics, without which large-scale Shahed production would be impossible. To address this, Russia set up multiple LLCs and intermediaries to streamline industrial-scale purchases and deliveries from China
Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence has posted a 3D model of an unidentified Russian UAV on its WarSanctions platform, complete with detailed descriptions and an interactive view. Key details on the drone, in 🧵thread:
2/ It can serve as a reconnaissance drone, loitering munition, or a decoy meant to overload Ukraine’s air defenses. Structurally, the drone features a delta-wing fuselage, similar to the Geran-1 (Shahed-131) but slightly smaller.
3/ The unidentified drone is powered by a two-stroke gasoline DLE engine produced by China’s Mile Haoxiang Technology Co.
The DLE engine is mounted in the nose of the fuselage, making the drone most similar to the “Italmas” loitering munition produced by Russia’s Zala Group
If we focus on the bigger picture today, the overall situation is not that bad. We went from Russia’s 2022 demands: military downsizing, government changes, the secession of multiple regions, and other demands: to a much shorter list of demands today:
2/ Notably, Ukraine has also stepped back from its maximalist demands for a de facto return to its 1991 borders and the full withdrawal of Russian forces. Clearly, its stance against direct negotiations has been abandoned as well.
3/ Whether this will work or not is beyond the scope of this message, but interestingly, if you read some of the more-or-less “semi-independent” Russian “Z” channels, not just those that repeat state propaganda, you can see that this realization is starting to take hold