Amid the predominant public focus on the successful ATACMS strike at Berdyansk airfield, our team has also assembled a comprehensive report on the outcomes of a similar strike at Luhansk airport, where numerous Russian attack and transport helicopters are stationed.
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2/ The visual evidence from the Planet Labs imagery at our disposal shows that a minimum of 5 helicopters have experienced varying degrees of damage. There's also a chance that other airfield vehicles have been affected, but the current resolution makes confirmation difficult.
3/
In the October 18th imagery, scorch marks from explosions are evident on the airport apron, confirming the deployment of the previously reported M-39 ATACMS missile with nearly a thousand anti-personnel and anti-material bomblets.
4/ To rule out the chance of these scorch marks being old or from previous shelling, we've included imagery from October 10 for comparison. In that imagery, you can observe various pre-existing scorch marks and oil stains, but there are no signs of extensive explosions.
5/ By analyzing scorch mark patterns and submunition characteristics, we've concluded that avoiding damage, especially for larger objects like helicopters, is highly challenging. This is supported by secondary indicators like rotor absence, leaks, and missing parts.
6/ The affected area is extensive, and there appears to be a crater. However, we cannot confirm whether it solely resulted from the missile impact, a vehicle detonation, or a combination of both simultaneously.
7/ While the report of the attack is dated October 17th, multiple helicopters are still present at the base, mirroring a pattern observed at Berdyansk airfield.
8/ In conclusion, the attacks in both Berdyansk and Luhansk were successful, despite being protected by various air defense systems. Our team will continue to closely monitor the situation to collect additional data for future updates.
9/ If you found this post valuable, please consider liking and sharing it. These images are made possible through donations on BuyMeACoffee and support from our website's premium subscribers. Consider this option to support future reports like this.
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1/ The exhaustion of Russia’s vehicle fleet is becoming increasingly evident. The reduced use of armored vehicles and the growing reliance on civilian: including motorcycles, golf carts, and vans, continues to signal a degradation in Russian maneuvering capabilities.
2/ During the winter, outside of Kursk, Russia achieved mostly tactical gains, notably in Kharkiv Oblast, the Chasiv Yar area and Kurakhove–Velyka Novosilka axis. While these advances have been troubling for Ukraine, Russia has so far failed to capitalize on them strategically.
3/ Despite slow progress, Russia still retains the resources and capability to conduct active offensive operations through the summer and fall of 2025. However, as I noted in my analysis last year, the diminishing returns will determine whether Russia will continue this war
While our team continues working on the latest updates, here are a few updates on the current state of the frontline:
1/ Despite holding the advantage along much of the frontline, Russia’s winter campaign yielded limited results - indicating Ukraine’s situation is not dire
2/ The Pokrovsk area now appears more stable than in February. At that time, Russian forces had established a foothold in Zvirove, with deeper advances into Pokrovsk looking imminent. Since then, not only have the Russians stalled, but they have actually lost some ground.
3/ The overall composition and number of Russian forces near Sumy oblast currently seem insufficient to support a large-scale offensive operation deep into the region.
One of the biggest problems of this war is that Ukraine and the West haven’t clearly defined what "winning" looks like. This has allowed the Russians to present the "Istanbul Agreements" as the only viable negotiation framework, due to the absence of a well-defined alternative.
2/ The "Victory Plan" presented by Zelensky is not a true negotiation framework, and it didn’t resonate with the previous administration, let alone the current White House administration. Of course, there are alternative options, such as Russia retreating to 1991 borders
3/ The problem is that Russia won't do that, and there is no realistic enforcement mechanism, short of intervention. The United States isn’t going to bomb Russia. This raises the question: what does a "desired outcome," based on the realities on the ground, actually look like?
Almost every day, we hear about strikes against targets inside Russia, but we rarely get the full picture of their actual impact on the war. Radio Liberty and Frontelligence Insight have joined efforts to analyze hundreds of data points to answer this question.
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2/ Our research covered the period from September 2024 to February 2025, divided into two sections: strikes on military targets, infrastructure, and on the energy sector. We found that strikes on Russia’s energy sector caused at least $658 million in damage over ~6 months
3/ The real damage to the Russian energy sector and the economy as a whole may be higher. In at least 67 out of 100 cases, Ukrainian strikes were successful, while in another 33 cases the result of the attacks remains unknown or it is impossible to prove Ukraine's involvement.
Kursk Offensive: A Preliminary Assessment by Frontelligence Insight.
A condensed version of report for X. 🧵Thread:
1/ With Ukrainian forces withdrawing from Sudzha, the operation is clearly approaching its conclusion though it is not yet entirely over.
2/ To assess the operation, not in isolation, but within the broader context of the war, we broke down the Kursk operation into 3 key questions: whether its geopolitical objectives were met, whether the attrition rate was favorable, and whether it achieved battlefield success
3/ To determine equipment attrition, we analyzed data from OSINT analyst @naalsio26, who tracks losses across multiple frontlines. Our graphs show losses from August to March but are not exhaustive, as they exclude some retreat-related losses. The cut-off date was March 10.
Frontelligence Insight Special Report: AWOL Trends and Casualty Ratios in Russia and Ukraine
In assessing overall manpower casualty ratios, we analyzed Russian AWOL figures alongside Ukrainian estimates, factoring in KIA, MIA, and recruitment rates to assess the war’s prospects
2/ Thanks to @InformNapalm, a Ukrainian OSINT community, we analyzed a screenshot of a Russian presentation slide detailing desertion numbers. The percentage and corresponding figures allowed us to calculate the total number of AWOL cases across all Russian military districts.
3/ As shown in the translated graph, the Southern MD has the highest number of desertion cases. This is unsurprising, as it includes the former 1st and 2nd Army Corps (now the 51st and 3rd CAAs), which are largely composed of forcibly mobilized residents from occupied territories