...4xCIWS (30mm+), & 64 VLS cells plus several light autocannon are the floor capability for a naval combatant.
For a power projection naval combatant, you are also going to need an old style Mark 26 launcher plus 32-to-64 VLS cells because you can reload at Mark 26 via...
2/
...underway replenishment (UNREP).
Drones have made all current VLS cell designs that can't be reloaded underway 'unfit for purpose' in a power projection navy.
These limitations reflect both the technological and logistical incompetence of USN flag ranks and their staffs.
3/
USN flag ranks & their senior staffs are too old to understand drones & the early retirement of the Samuel Gompers & Yellowstone-class destroyer tenders meant no one who was really competent at power projection could get a ship command needed for an
It's 2023 and the last USN Destroyer tender was retired in 1996.
Most USN staffers have never seen a Destroyer Tender, let alone operated the USN logistical power projection supply chain with one.
The USN's staff officers can't help but be
5/
...logistically incompetent compared to the Cold War era US Navy
And to be clear, the current generation of USN logistical officers know of the "Destroyer Tender gap" in USN capability
The US Navy has deployed 3D printing/Additive Manufacturing devices on naval naval
6/
combatant deployments since 2014 as a fix
This was my US Navy 3D/AM platform list as of 2018:
USS Essex (LHD-2) 2014 3D Printer (test)
USS Kearsarge (LHD 3) 2015 MARMC Mini-Fab Lab
USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75) 2015 MARMC Mini-Fab Lab
USS Wasp (LHD 1) 2016 MARMC Mini-Fab Lab 7/
USMC Pre-position Ships that have hosted Mini-Fab-Labs:
USNS Sacagawea (T-AKE 2)
USNS Robert E Peary (T-AKE 5)
See: USS Essex sits at port under an 18 month maintenance, officials have installed the very first naval ship 3D printer into the vessel. 8/ 3dprint.com/2554/uss-essex…
You have to have a ship command to get to flag rank in the US Navy and fab-labs on combatants don't provide that for USN logistical officers.
Destroyer tenders provided that.
13/
Which is why CNO's Admiral
Frank B. Kelso II, Admiral
Jeremy M. Boorda, & Admiral
Jay L. Johnson (1990-1996) went out of their way to retire the Destroyer Tenders.
That is, Submarines, Aviation and Cruisers-Destroyers.
Flag ranks have to be good at logistics and former DD tender captains turned Admirals kicked the "CNO Union" Admirals to the curb in understanding/executing logistics.
In the Post-Cold War demobilization USN that was...
15/
...an existential threat to the "CNO Union's" budgets and promotion opportunities.
All the stupid procurement and logistical decisions executed by the "CNO Union" leaders since the late 1990's stem from that Kelso/Borda/Johnson "CNO Union threat elimination conspiracy"
16/
...to kick DD Tender captains out of the USN Flag Rank promotion chain so they could divide the DD Tender logistical capability budget for the CNO Union's platforms in a shrinking naval pie.
Current USN staff & leaders from the Submarines, Aviation and Cruisers-Destroyer
17/
..."CNO Unions" simply can't be as competent as Cold War US Navy staffs because the staffers that used to follow DD Tender captains into high command are gone.
That logistical staffer promotion lane to senior combat command and CNO staffs hasn't existed for over 25 years.
18/
The reality for the existing US Navy command culture facing the PLAN in the South China Sea is that they are suffering from an institutional Dunning-Kruger Effect for power projection logistics and drone age ship design.
H/T Prof. Carlo Kopp & APA 19/
Nothing short of building new DD Tenders based on a proven amphibious ship design like the USS San Antonio will begin the process of "Re-skilling" the US Navy's command culture.
Historically it will take a champion inside the USN & an outside intervention by a US President 20/
...a USN command culture problem of this scale.
I don't know that either exist in the Dunning-Kruger Effect addled American military & political cultures.
The closing of Red Hill in Hawaii says they don't.
And remember, these Russian losses are _UNDERCOUNTED_ due to the OSINT technical limitation in recognizing fragmentation damage caused by US & Turkish cluster munitions & airburst 155mm shells.
And this OSINT UNDERCOUNT has been true the entire war.
GPR have been a part of US Military anti-tunnel tactics since the late 1990's because of DPRK nuclear weapons developments and the work of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency's (DTRA).
The drone based, persistent, Sauron from Lord of the Rings-like "All Seeing Eye" didn't just "kill the archer" the way a CB-Radar does.
The drone's persistent surveillance killed two "archers" & an important node in the artillery supply chain supporting both destroyed Grads 2/
Counter-battery radars like the AN/TPQ-53 Quick Reaction Capability Radar are simply a lot more expensive that drones, are uniquely vulnerable to anti-radiation missiles, and take a long time to replace.
Furthermore, CB-radars are much more limited in allocated frequencies... 3/
I think both occurred, but the competence matters far less than senior leaders who reward being lied too in order to support their delusions about the world.
Yet the brutal ignorance & technical incompetence demonstrated by Western & Israeli
2/
...intelligence of the implications of the GPS jamming on Iran’s road to Lebanon just makes me shake my head.
The implications of the map be low stands out like an airport beacon.
Former CIA director & DoD SecDef Gates "no major wars" defenestration of US EW capability,