Tom Shugart Profile picture
Oct 23, 2023 21 tweets 8 min read Read on X
This week saw the release of the 2023 China Military Power Report (CMPR). For those not familiar, this is DoD’s congressionally-mandated unclassified update on the Chinese military. It’s an annual feast of open source data.

So, here are few thoughts (Part 1) on the report: Image
Big flick: the PRC, through the increasing military capability of the PLA, is taking more coercive action against its neighbors in the region (just ask the Philippines & Taiwan).

While improving its ability to fight the U.S., it seems largely uninterested in talking anymore. Image
On to the details: first up - the PLA Army section (yes, Army is repeated).

We get a bit of news that the PLAA used its new long-range rocket artillery during Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in 2022. Image
Why does this matter? Well, the PCH191 (one name seen for it) is a multiple rocket system whose open source range covers Taiwan’s west coast (and thus likely landing sites)n from the mainland. militarytoday.com/artillery/phl_…
This means the PLAA can hit those key spots with much large numbers of rockets, requiring less help from the PLAAF or the PLARF and saving those services’ munitions for targets further afield.

It’s just one of a number of invasion-related capabilities the PLA practiced using. Image
Moving on to the PLA Navy (always a source of developments in recent years).

The report puts the PLAN’s hull count at 370 this year, up from 340, and 140 surface combatants, up from 125.

(Where appropriate, I’ll put the ’23 report on the last, ’22 report on the right.)
Image
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That 30-hull jump is more than I expected, as well as the 15-hull jump in surface combatants. I knew they were building, but not that they were building THAT fast.
On this page we also have DoD confirmation that:
more Type 055 Renhais cruisers are under construction, and…
there is a new class of frigates (which we’ve known at the Type 054B), that DoD is going to call the Jiangkai III, and…
that there is indeed likely another Type 075 large amphib under construction:
DoD this year makes a point to call out the PLAN’s hypocrisy: how it claims to have the right to regulate naval activities within its EEZ (which it doesn’t), and then feels free to operate as it pleases in other nations’ EEZs. Image
In terms of future PLAN growth, DoD estimates 395 ships by 2025 and 435 by 2030. This is actually down by 5 hulls from the 2022 report. However…
Image
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Estimates of future PLAN submarine force go up a bit, with an expectation of growth to 80 boats by 2035:
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DoD estimates that the PLAN has now built 21 Yuan Class submarines in the last year, up from 17 in 2022. I’d seen a few at the piers at the Wuchang shipyard, but didn’t know they’d built 4 in the last year. 😯
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We also have confirmation that the Huludao shipyard did in fact launch TWO new Type 093B VLS-equipped SSGNs.
The report also indicates that construction of the new, larger Type 096 SSBN is likely to start “in the near future”. This statement didn’t exist in previous reports, so I guess it’s finally happening.
On the PLAN’s Type 094 SSBNs, DoD goes from characterizing it as “likely” that they’re conducting at-sea deterrence patrols (i.e., carrying mated nuclear warheads) to a more definitive statement that they ARE doing so.
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Moving on to the PLA Air Force: this year’s report indicates that the PLAAF now has 1300 4th-gen fighters out of 1900 total (I assume that 1300 includes 5th-gen too), up *500* from the previous year.
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Of note, by my count that 1300 4th-gen-fighter total outnumbers the total number of 4th- (and a few 5th) gen fighters operated by the air forces of the UK, France, Italy, Spain, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Poland, Canada, Sweden, and Finland combined.
Ok, enough for tonight. In our next installment, I’ll take a look at sections that discuss the PLA Rocket Force, PRC nuclear forces, the PLA’s (dangerous) operational shenanigans, and of course one of my (and apparently now one of DoD’s) faves: China’s dual-use RO/RO ferries.
As promised, see here for the 2nd installment:

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More from @tshugart3

Feb 13
@rand recently published this piece by Dr. Timothy Heath, in which he voiced substantial doubts about the PLA's combat readiness. It's received a fair bit of attention since then.

Having read it & examined the evidence he cites, I have some thoughts: Image
NOTE: if this thread looks familiar, it's because I put it up yesterday with a link to the article at the top. I'm re-upping it today as ab experiment to see if there's a difference in reach from not putting the link at the top (plus I'll fix some typos).
rand.org/pubs/perspecti…
Anyway, let's look at his key takeaways:
- the PLA is focused on upholding CCP rule rather than preparing for war
- PLA modernization is mostly to bolster CCP credibility
- over the PLA’s history it's prioritized political loyalty & CCP rule over combat readiness
- As China declines, the PLA’s mission of upholding CCP rule will become more important, combat readiness less so
- large-scale, high-intensity US-PRC war is improbable. If US-PRC tensions escalate, China will face strong incentives to favor indirect methods
- US defense planning elevate a broader array of threats versus remote possibility of war w/ ChinaImage
Read 40 tweets
Feb 12
@rand recently published this piece by Dr. Timothy Heath, in which he voiced substantial doubts about the PLA's combat readiness. It's received a fair bit of attention since then.

Having read it & examined the evidence he cites, I have some thoughts:
rand.org/pubs/perspecti…
First, let's look at his key takeaways:
- the PLA is focused on upholding CCP rule rather than preparing for war
- PLA modernization gains are designed first/foremost to bolster the credibility of the CCP
- over the PLA’s history, it's prioritized political loyalty and CCP rule over combat readiness
- As China declines, the PLA’s mission of upholding CCP rule will become more important, its combat readiness less so
- large-scale, high-intensity US-PRC war is improbable. If US-PRC tensions escalate, China will face strong incentives to favor indirect methods
- US defense planning should consider a threat framework that elevates a broader array of threats versus the remote possibility of war with ChinaImage
It will surprise no one who follows me that, while some of his points on the history of the PLA and CCP are valid, I disagree with his larger overall conclusion: that the threat of military aggression from the PLA in the future is remote due to a lack of combat readiness.
Read 37 tweets
Feb 1
One key thing the armchair “wHY dIdN'T THe hELicOpteR SEe ThE airLinER On A CLeAr NiGhT” folks miss is a concept folks in the maritime business call CBDR: constant bearing, decreasing range.

What that means is that if you’re on an intercept course with another vessel (or airplane), they will have no apparent relative motion when you look at them. eoceanic.com/sailing/tips/2…
Put simply, if you can see the other party moving right or left across your field of view, then you’re guaranteed not to hit them (if you both maintain your course and speed).

They’ll either pass ahead or behind.
However, if the other vessel/plane stays in the same spot in your field of view, but is just getting bigger, then you have a problem - CBDR.
Read 7 tweets
Jan 20
Many folks probably saw @CovertShores' recent find: that China is building multiple special vessels seemingly intended to transfer vehicles ashore in support of a PRC invasion of Taiwan.

What follows is an update, based on high-res imagery I've acquired:
navalnews.com/naval-news/202…
Let's start with overall numbers. @CovertShores indicated in his article that there are, "3 but likely 5 or more...".

I'd put the emphasis on "or more", as I count what looks like 7 in this image of the GSI Longxue Island shipyard taken on 28 November 2024: Image
Next, let's zoom in, starting with #1 above.

Since I know of no designation for this type of vessel, I'm going to make one up: the T-LPT (i.e., civilian-crewed auxiliary landing platform—transfer). And I'll call this one the Type 1.

It measures ~135m by 35m, w/ a ~140m ramp. Image
Read 22 tweets
Jan 7
I'm pleased to announce the release of a new report I co-authored with @timothyawalton for @HudsonInstitute titled Concrete Sky: Air Base Hardening in the Western Pacific.
Some folks may recall a preliminary assessment I posted in 2023 on this topic, as I came to realize that China appeared to be engaged in a nationwide, robust effort to harden its air bases - and that the US was doing relatively little in this area.
The scale of those numbers inspired an @TheEconomist article on this issue: economist.com/interactive/gr…
Read 13 tweets
Dec 20, 2024
"Rattner [sic] said Xi Jinping’s goal of having his military ready to carry out a “short, sharp invasion” of Taiwan by 2027 “is not possible right now.”"

I was at this event, and that is not what I recall them saying. What I recall is them saying is...
news.usni.org/2024/12/19/chi…
...that invasion was "neither imminent nor inevitable", that the PLA faced obstacles in reaching Xi's 2027 goal, and in terms of a short sharp invasion at acceptable cost, "they're not there today".

But judge for yourself, that portion is around 12:00:
IMO my recollection is consistent with this statement, provided at a separate brief to reporters—and released by DoD.

Again: not imminent or inevitable, Xi remains committed to 2027 goals but corruption could slow them down (i.e., not "not possible" to meet 2027 goals). 🤷‍♂️ Image
Read 4 tweets

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