This week saw the release of the 2023 China Military Power Report (CMPR). For those not familiar, this is DoD’s congressionally-mandated unclassified update on the Chinese military. It’s an annual feast of open source data.
So, here are few thoughts (Part 1) on the report:
Big flick: the PRC, through the increasing military capability of the PLA, is taking more coercive action against its neighbors in the region (just ask the Philippines & Taiwan).
While improving its ability to fight the U.S., it seems largely uninterested in talking anymore.
On to the details: first up - the PLA Army section (yes, Army is repeated).
We get a bit of news that the PLAA used its new long-range rocket artillery during Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in 2022.
Why does this matter? Well, the PCH191 (one name seen for it) is a multiple rocket system whose open source range covers Taiwan’s west coast (and thus likely landing sites)n from the mainland. militarytoday.com/artillery/phl_…
This means the PLAA can hit those key spots with much large numbers of rockets, requiring less help from the PLAAF or the PLARF and saving those services’ munitions for targets further afield.
It’s just one of a number of invasion-related capabilities the PLA practiced using.
Moving on to the PLA Navy (always a source of developments in recent years).
The report puts the PLAN’s hull count at 370 this year, up from 340, and 140 surface combatants, up from 125.
(Where appropriate, I’ll put the ’23 report on the last, ’22 report on the right.)
That 30-hull jump is more than I expected, as well as the 15-hull jump in surface combatants. I knew they were building, but not that they were building THAT fast.
On this page we also have DoD confirmation that:
more Type 055 Renhais cruisers are under construction, and…
DoD this year makes a point to call out the PLAN’s hypocrisy: how it claims to have the right to regulate naval activities within its EEZ (which it doesn’t), and then feels free to operate as it pleases in other nations’ EEZs.
In terms of future PLAN growth, DoD estimates 395 ships by 2025 and 435 by 2030. This is actually down by 5 hulls from the 2022 report. However…
Estimates of future PLAN submarine force go up a bit, with an expectation of growth to 80 boats by 2035:
DoD estimates that the PLAN has now built 21 Yuan Class submarines in the last year, up from 17 in 2022. I’d seen a few at the piers at the Wuchang shipyard, but didn’t know they’d built 4 in the last year. 😯
We also have confirmation that the Huludao shipyard did in fact launch TWO new Type 093B VLS-equipped SSGNs.
The report also indicates that construction of the new, larger Type 096 SSBN is likely to start “in the near future”. This statement didn’t exist in previous reports, so I guess it’s finally happening.
On the PLAN’s Type 094 SSBNs, DoD goes from characterizing it as “likely” that they’re conducting at-sea deterrence patrols (i.e., carrying mated nuclear warheads) to a more definitive statement that they ARE doing so.
Moving on to the PLA Air Force: this year’s report indicates that the PLAAF now has 1300 4th-gen fighters out of 1900 total (I assume that 1300 includes 5th-gen too), up *500* from the previous year.
Of note, by my count that 1300 4th-gen-fighter total outnumbers the total number of 4th- (and a few 5th) gen fighters operated by the air forces of the UK, France, Italy, Spain, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Poland, Canada, Sweden, and Finland combined.
Ok, enough for tonight. In our next installment, I’ll take a look at sections that discuss the PLA Rocket Force, PRC nuclear forces, the PLA’s (dangerous) operational shenanigans, and of course one of my (and apparently now one of DoD’s) faves: China’s dual-use RO/RO ferries.
I’m excited to share that @ChinaMaritime has just released a short paper I co-wrote with Mike Dahm titled “Flooding the Zone: The Use of Civilian Landing Craft (LCTs) in PLA Amphibious Operations”.
This paper follows the surprising observation last year that the PLA appears to be using civilian “LCTs” - a civilian derivative of WWII landing craft - to go straight to the beach in practice landing exercises.
...first up, China's nuclear warhead totals. This year's report says that warhead production has slowed, with a total in the low 600s, but that the PLA is still on track to have 1000+ warheads by 2030.
Regarding China's early warning capability, we get a lot more specificity than I've seen before: that China now has IR warning satellites that can detect and warn of an incoming ICBM within minutes.
Last week saw the release of the 2025 China Military Power Report (CMPR). For those not familiar, this is DoD’s Congressionally-mandated unclassified update on the Chinese military. It’s an annual feast of open-source data.
So, here are few thoughts (Part 1) on the report:
I'll focus on those things that I thought were most noteworthy: significant changes from previous reports, reveals of information not previously seen in the open-source world, etc.
Where there is a point of comparison I'll have the new report on the left, older on the right.
The new report is fairly different: for one thing, it clocks in at 100 pages to the previous report's 182.
From the top, the preface differs: the 2024 report's reads mostly like an intel product, where there's more proclamation of administration policy in the new one.
PRC SEALIFT UPDATE: based on a review of satellite imagery & AIS data from recent landing exercises, it appears China is practicing using dual-use civil-military landing craft for direct beach assault.
Of note, while info is sparse, these ships appear to exist in large numbers.
To the details: for a few years now, we've seen what've been known as "deck cargo ships" being used in PLA military transport exercises.
This has been making the rounds—another article calling for U.S. conventional submarines—so I suppose it's time to weigh in. In this case, the article is written by someone personally knowledgeable of submarine operations—a U.S. submariner.
...the article seems to be missing consideration of two key factors that IMO continue to make the idea of U.S. (manned) diesel-electric submarines a bad idea: advances in autonomy, and the PLA Rocket Force.
First, autonomy: he explicitly calls for these diesel boats as cruise missile platforms (SSGs), making a point to separate them from the multi-mission capabilities of U.S. SSNs.
No need for ISR, ASW, or torpedo capability. Ok, great—this sounds like a perfect job for an XXLUUV.
She's pretty clear about how we got where we are: close to a US-PRC war, that the problem started with Taiwan.
She says the situation is not pre-ordained, and that the best way to avoid a war is to restrain US military posture in the region and tell Taiwan they may be on their own.
(I'd say she's half-right: it didn't have to be this way; but I'd place the blame elsewhere.)