This week saw the release of the 2023 China Military Power Report (CMPR). For those not familiar, this is DoD’s congressionally-mandated unclassified update on the Chinese military. It’s an annual feast of open source data.
So, here are few thoughts (Part 1) on the report:
Big flick: the PRC, through the increasing military capability of the PLA, is taking more coercive action against its neighbors in the region (just ask the Philippines & Taiwan).
While improving its ability to fight the U.S., it seems largely uninterested in talking anymore.
On to the details: first up - the PLA Army section (yes, Army is repeated).
We get a bit of news that the PLAA used its new long-range rocket artillery during Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in 2022.
Why does this matter? Well, the PCH191 (one name seen for it) is a multiple rocket system whose open source range covers Taiwan’s west coast (and thus likely landing sites)n from the mainland. militarytoday.com/artillery/phl_…
This means the PLAA can hit those key spots with much large numbers of rockets, requiring less help from the PLAAF or the PLARF and saving those services’ munitions for targets further afield.
It’s just one of a number of invasion-related capabilities the PLA practiced using.
Moving on to the PLA Navy (always a source of developments in recent years).
The report puts the PLAN’s hull count at 370 this year, up from 340, and 140 surface combatants, up from 125.
(Where appropriate, I’ll put the ’23 report on the last, ’22 report on the right.)
That 30-hull jump is more than I expected, as well as the 15-hull jump in surface combatants. I knew they were building, but not that they were building THAT fast.
On this page we also have DoD confirmation that:
more Type 055 Renhais cruisers are under construction, and…
DoD this year makes a point to call out the PLAN’s hypocrisy: how it claims to have the right to regulate naval activities within its EEZ (which it doesn’t), and then feels free to operate as it pleases in other nations’ EEZs.
In terms of future PLAN growth, DoD estimates 395 ships by 2025 and 435 by 2030. This is actually down by 5 hulls from the 2022 report. However…
Estimates of future PLAN submarine force go up a bit, with an expectation of growth to 80 boats by 2035:
DoD estimates that the PLAN has now built 21 Yuan Class submarines in the last year, up from 17 in 2022. I’d seen a few at the piers at the Wuchang shipyard, but didn’t know they’d built 4 in the last year. 😯
We also have confirmation that the Huludao shipyard did in fact launch TWO new Type 093B VLS-equipped SSGNs.
The report also indicates that construction of the new, larger Type 096 SSBN is likely to start “in the near future”. This statement didn’t exist in previous reports, so I guess it’s finally happening.
On the PLAN’s Type 094 SSBNs, DoD goes from characterizing it as “likely” that they’re conducting at-sea deterrence patrols (i.e., carrying mated nuclear warheads) to a more definitive statement that they ARE doing so.
Moving on to the PLA Air Force: this year’s report indicates that the PLAAF now has 1300 4th-gen fighters out of 1900 total (I assume that 1300 includes 5th-gen too), up *500* from the previous year.
Of note, by my count that 1300 4th-gen-fighter total outnumbers the total number of 4th- (and a few 5th) gen fighters operated by the air forces of the UK, France, Italy, Spain, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Poland, Canada, Sweden, and Finland combined.
Ok, enough for tonight. In our next installment, I’ll take a look at sections that discuss the PLA Rocket Force, PRC nuclear forces, the PLA’s (dangerous) operational shenanigans, and of course one of my (and apparently now one of DoD’s) faves: China’s dual-use RO/RO ferries.
1. Everyone involved in reporting this clearly understands that nuclear submarines had not—yet—been built in Wuhan, and that this was a new development: a significant expansion of nuclear submarine production outside of Huludao.
1. cont'd: rumors of a new "auxiliary nuclear powerplant for electricity generation for fitting into conventional submarine designs" (like the subs they've been building at Wuhan) have been circulating for years, so not that surprising of a development.cimsec.org/pla-navys-plan…
2. Everyone also understands the Yangtze is shallow, which is why for years the subs being built there have been taken downriver on barges. The new boat is only ~10% longer than previous classes, nothing like the size of PRC SSNs, so no reason to think it couldn't be so also.
What if I told you that as I type this there was a vessel, associated with the Chinese PLA, that *could* be equipped with many dozens of anti-ship cruise missiles—and was parked less than 4 miles from the bulk of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet.
Well guess what: it's happening—for real.
The vessel in question is a container ship named COSCO Shipping Sakura. It's a massive ship, more than 360m long (~1200 ft), and weighing far more than a U.S. aircraft carrier. Built in 2018, It can carry more than 14000 shipping containers.
The shipyard that built it, Jiangnan Shipyard, in addition to building ships for COSCO (and western, even TAIWANESE companies!) also builds warships for the PLA Navy, including its first full-size aircraft carrier. features.csis.org/china-shadow-w…
This USNI Proceedings article advocates a "trade denial" strategy - though not a blockade - as a "low-cost option" for deterring PRC military aggression against Taiwan.
While I like the idea of finding new ways to deter China, I have some issues with this article, as follows:
My overarching concern is this: for years there's been a strain of thinking that China will never attack because the U.S. & allies could "just cut off their oil" or the like. That kind of thinking undercuts support for the necessary resources to actually deter the PRC militarily.
THIS article doesn't advocate an actual blockade, considering it infeasible in part because of the internationalized nature of modern shipping. Here I agree with the author, retired RADM Khanna, Indian Navy: this factor undercuts the idea of a "blockade" that others advocate.
Imagery update: looking back at some commercial imagery at Wuchang Shipyard (one of China's conventional submarine builders), if I'm not mistaken I believe there may be a new class of Chinese submarine out there.
I recently acquired this interesting image of the shipyard from 26 April 2024.
On the left, you can see what appears to be a freshly-launched Hangor II-class submarine, the 1st of 8 being built for Pakistan.
You can also see the other, possibly new class of boat.
The ID of the Hangor-II is based on separate reporting of its launch in late Apr, matching nicely with what we see.
Comparing the Hangor with images of earlier 039A class boats—and the new boat—the difference is plain to see.
Got some fresh @planet imagery of China's new base at Ream, Cambodia. Looks like they continue to be busy bees, constructing what looks to be a sizable naval base.
First, here's an overall comparo of where things are now-ish (6/2020) to before construction started (3/2020).
They've now completed enough of the drydock & wharf that we can now see their final dimensions: right at 140m from the back of the drydock to where the caisson would go, & a 270m wharf.
Also, there's what looks like a ramp to pull smaller vessels out for maintenance.
You can see pretty clearly that the ramp extends into the water. A facility like this would be useful for working on smaller vessels like Cambodia's patrol boats and other harbor craft, and faster than using a drydock.
So, I recently acquired some updated imagery from Wuchang Shipyard in Wuhan - China's primary shipyard for non-nuclear submarine construction.
It appears there may have been something...odd going on there in June. 🤔
First, an older image from 29 May shows nothing unusual - a presumably new-construction Yuan-class submarine (Type 039 variant) in the usual spot where newly-launched boats are fitted out.
[BTW the patchwork nature of the images is because I buy my own and pay by the area, so..]
More recently I acquired an image from June 13th. In the image, there appears to be what look like crane barges clustered around...something...near where the submarine was earlier.
Also, the floating pier where the submarine was moored appears to have been offset a bit.