Through visual analysis of satellite imagery, our team found Russian military vehicle losses in Avdiivka between October 10 and October 20. The total number exceeded 109, indicating a significant loss of approximately aligning to a brigade-sized force in just ten days.🧵Thread:
2/ The actual count of destroyed vehicles is notably higher. We excluded about a dozen vehicles with low to medium confidence due to inconsistent imagery coverage. In some cases, it was impossible to determine if a vehicle had remained in place for a while or was in motion
3/ All new lost vehicles are indicated by a red square on the imagery, while old losses that were already present at the end of September are marked with a white square.
4/ The overwhelming majority of losses were primarily Armored Fighting Vehicles, including BMP-1 and BMP-2 of various configurations, T-72, T-64, and T-80 tanks in different variations, MT-LB, BTRs, and transport vehicles. In total, these losses amount to 109 vehicles.
5/ The operation's scale and the involvement of multiple brigades strongly indicate that it is being conducted at the army level. We also see some evidence about additional reinforcements being deployed to the Avdiivka area, but further details cannot be disclosed at this time.
6/ Despite reports of old equipment use, our team identified a significant presence of modern vehicles and equipment in coordinated battalion-level assaults, further underscoring the operation's importance for Russian command.
7/ Upon analyzing the initial phase, our team concluded it was a long-planned, not a reactionary, operation. The observed patterns suggest Russians invested substantial time and resources, expecting significant losses to achieve their objective
8/ Despite large losses, the enemy persisted in employing more mechanized forces to develop the limited success they had achieved, with the aim of securing dominant positions, disrupting logistics, and controlling waste heaps.
9/ The Russian vehicle losses have now surpassed those incurred during the Siversky Donets crossing in 2022. It's likely that these losses have already exceeded or will surpass the vehicle losses sustained by the Russians in the Vuheldar area between November 2022 and April 2023.
10/ Two independent sources on the ground estimate Russian vehicle losses at around 200. Our current assessment is primarily focused on geospatial evidence, hence, we have chosen not to include this number, as we currently lack supporting satellite imagery for it.
11/ However, the situation is far from stable. Russian forces continue to extensively use guided air-dropped bombs and artillery strikes, along with deploying LMUR (Light Multipurpose Guided Rockets). Multiple indicators point to active efforts to sustain the operation.
12/ In conclusion, we want to emphasize several key points. This army-level operation, conducted through battalion or battalion-tactical groups, signifies not only the gravity of the operation but also shows an attempt to shift the strategic initiative to the Russian side.
13/ The sustainability of these losses is in question, although this approach mirrors what we've observed in previous battles like Mariupol, Vuhledar, and Bakhmut when the Russians committed significant human and material resources and were willing to accept enormous losses
14/ The operation originally aimed for a faster outcome and the advancement of Avdiivka through its flanks, but the resistance and skills exhibited by Ukrainian defenders have proven to be far more formidable than the Russians had anticipated in their plans.
15/ To access the complete set of imagery, additional information, and a detailed methodology for this assessment, please visit our website:
The Financial Times recently published a report on Ukraine’s mobilization problems. While the article offers a broad and insightful overview, especially for those who are not familiar with the topic, I believe some additional context can help complete the picture:
2/ First, let's start with the fundamentals. One of the core underlying issues is timing. Nationwide mobilization efforts would have been most effective during the initial phase of the war. That window has closed, but that doesn't mean the situation can't be improved
3/ Second, while the Ukrainian government may have overused claims of insufficient Western aid to deflect criticism and maintain internal support, the point isn’t without merit. For example, the 2023 summer counteroffensive was pitched as a turning point to secure big aid package
A few observations drawn from insider insights, open-source data, information from russian internal documents, and conversations with senior officers, frontline soldiers, and volunteers - based on developments from Spring through Summer 2025. Thread🧵:
2/ Since early 2025, Russia's personnel losses have remained among the highest since the war began. But at the same time, Ukraine has faced a sharp rise in desertion and AWOL cases. The pace of Russian territorial advances is higher than during the same period in 2024.
3/ Each year follows a similar pattern: Russian forces form a pocket around a town, Ukraine cites manpower shortages and lack of aid, Russia takes heavy losses but advances, Ukraine inflates already high Russian casualty figures, while Moscow grossly downplays them
Penza Military Plant “Elektropribor”: Preliminary Damage Assessment
🧵Thread:
1/ In the early hours of August 2, Ukrainian UAVs struck multiple targets in Russia, including refineries and military-industrial sites. Here’s what’s known so far about the strike on Elektropribor
2/ First, we verified the strike by geolocating both the recording’s POV and the impact site. The location matches satellite imagery, confirming social media reports that the Elektropribor plant in Penza was targeted by a drone. Impact coordinates: 53.224696, 44.966005
3/ Elektropribor supplies a range of electronic products to both the Russian military and law enforcement: automated control systems, encrypted communications equipment, radar technology, and more. Construction of the targeted facility began around 2018.
What we know about today's ambush on Russian mercenaries in Mali.
🧵Thread: 1/ The attack likely took place on August 1st in the Mopti/Segou region, central Mali. At least 3 mercenaries were killed, though the actual toll is likely to be 4 KIA and 8 WIA from the African Corps:
2/ The perpetrators are JNIM, an Al-Qaeda branch in Sahel. There are currently no indicators suggesting Tuareg separatist involvement.
Equipment was damaged as well. In the video, our team identified what appears to be a Ural-4320 MTP-A2.1, delivered to Mali earlier this year
3/ In January 2025, our team documented hundreds of Russian vehicles moved to Mali via Guinea. Since then, at least two more shipments have followed. Based on visual comparison, we’re confident is the same Ural MTP - a mobile workshops that helps to recover and repair vehicles
Early Damage Assessment of Drone Attack on Penza Radio Plant - July 31, 2025
Preliminary analysis of imagery reveals multiple buildings suffered damage ranging from light to severe. One building appears likely to be completely inoperable. Frontelligence Insight reports. Thread:
2/ Based on high-resolution imagery, unavailable for public release due to license, our team concluded: at least one building sustained severe damage; another has signs of penetration and fire, a third likely suffered penetration but no fire; and a fourth appears lightly damaged
3/ Overall, this attack appears to have been more successful than several others on larger facilities, primarily due to the significant fire damage inflicted on at least one building. The strike’s depth is also notable - approximately 600 km from Ukrainian-controlled territory.
In July, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte claimed Russia produces 4 times more artillery ammo than the NATO. To assess this, RFE/RL and CIT analyzed data on Russian vs. NATO ammo production and concluded that the situation is not as nearly dramatic. Thread with key findings🧵:
2/ According to the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), Russia produced 250,000 152mm rounds in 2022, one million in 2023 and planned to produce 1.325 million in 2024. In practice, however, researchers note that Russia produced slightly more than 1.3 million 152mm rounds
3/ Ukrainian military intelligence offered a higher estimate. According to the Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine's Ministry of Defense, Russia produced a total of 2 million 152mm and 122mm artillery rounds in 2023 and planned to produce 2.7 million rounds in 2024