Through visual analysis of satellite imagery, our team found Russian military vehicle losses in Avdiivka between October 10 and October 20. The total number exceeded 109, indicating a significant loss of approximately aligning to a brigade-sized force in just ten days.🧵Thread:
2/ The actual count of destroyed vehicles is notably higher. We excluded about a dozen vehicles with low to medium confidence due to inconsistent imagery coverage. In some cases, it was impossible to determine if a vehicle had remained in place for a while or was in motion
3/ All new lost vehicles are indicated by a red square on the imagery, while old losses that were already present at the end of September are marked with a white square.
4/ The overwhelming majority of losses were primarily Armored Fighting Vehicles, including BMP-1 and BMP-2 of various configurations, T-72, T-64, and T-80 tanks in different variations, MT-LB, BTRs, and transport vehicles. In total, these losses amount to 109 vehicles.
5/ The operation's scale and the involvement of multiple brigades strongly indicate that it is being conducted at the army level. We also see some evidence about additional reinforcements being deployed to the Avdiivka area, but further details cannot be disclosed at this time.
6/ Despite reports of old equipment use, our team identified a significant presence of modern vehicles and equipment in coordinated battalion-level assaults, further underscoring the operation's importance for Russian command.
7/ Upon analyzing the initial phase, our team concluded it was a long-planned, not a reactionary, operation. The observed patterns suggest Russians invested substantial time and resources, expecting significant losses to achieve their objective
8/ Despite large losses, the enemy persisted in employing more mechanized forces to develop the limited success they had achieved, with the aim of securing dominant positions, disrupting logistics, and controlling waste heaps.
9/ The Russian vehicle losses have now surpassed those incurred during the Siversky Donets crossing in 2022. It's likely that these losses have already exceeded or will surpass the vehicle losses sustained by the Russians in the Vuheldar area between November 2022 and April 2023.
10/ Two independent sources on the ground estimate Russian vehicle losses at around 200. Our current assessment is primarily focused on geospatial evidence, hence, we have chosen not to include this number, as we currently lack supporting satellite imagery for it.
11/ However, the situation is far from stable. Russian forces continue to extensively use guided air-dropped bombs and artillery strikes, along with deploying LMUR (Light Multipurpose Guided Rockets). Multiple indicators point to active efforts to sustain the operation.
12/ In conclusion, we want to emphasize several key points. This army-level operation, conducted through battalion or battalion-tactical groups, signifies not only the gravity of the operation but also shows an attempt to shift the strategic initiative to the Russian side.
13/ The sustainability of these losses is in question, although this approach mirrors what we've observed in previous battles like Mariupol, Vuhledar, and Bakhmut when the Russians committed significant human and material resources and were willing to accept enormous losses
14/ The operation originally aimed for a faster outcome and the advancement of Avdiivka through its flanks, but the resistance and skills exhibited by Ukrainian defenders have proven to be far more formidable than the Russians had anticipated in their plans.
15/ To access the complete set of imagery, additional information, and a detailed methodology for this assessment, please visit our website:
Russia's response to electronic warfare wasn't a single solution. It evolved along two major paths: fiber-optic drones and mesh networks. This thread summarizes Frontelligence Insight analysis based on OSINT data and a report by the Center for Defense Reforms. Thread🧵
2/ One of Russia's first successful adaptations to counter-UAV measures was the adoption of fiber-optic drones. Replacing the radio link with a wire made it EW-resistant. Per Russian sources, fiber-optic FPVs accounted for up to 60% of FPVs in some frontline areas by early 2026
3/ Take the "KVN" - Russia's widely used fiber-optic FPV drone. Produced at around 50,000 units monthly, the Center for Defense Reforms (CDR) estimates it requires 6–12 million km of optical fiber annually. Including other drones, demand could exceed 50 million km per year.
When it comes to the AFU estimates of Russian losses, they're not far from reality, at least in 2026. Russia's own internal reporting indicates close to ~1,000 casualties per day on average, with roughly half or more being KIA (we classify most MIAs as KIA).
🧵Short thread:
2/ We think Ukraine's 2022-2023 reporting undermined the credibility of its figures. By 2026, however, its estimates are much closer to reality. Ukraine's reported RU personnel losses generally align with the combined Russian KIA, WIA, and MIA totals, usually within 10-20% margin
3/ In some cases we've observed a 30-35% gap between Russian reporting and Ukraine's official figures. However, when averaged over year, the overall picture aligns more closely. It's not perfect, but for a belligerent party reporting enemy loss, it's quite accurate
Ukraine has just struck multiple Wildberries logistics hubs. One of them, in St. Petersburg, is engulfed in flames, disrupting Russia's second-largest city.
Here's one of Russia's largest 24/7 news websites (auto-translated). This is the virtual reality many Russians live in.
2/ The only mention of the attack is a brief report claiming that drones were shot down. Here's the auto-translated version:
The crisis in Crimea continues, with conditions worsening. After Crimea's occupation head, Sergey Aksyonov, claimed steps were being taken to address the situation in a recent Telegram post, hundreds of locals flooded the comments, challenging his narrative. 🧵Translations:
2/ "Please, just do something! Have you forgotten about northern Crimea? Have you abandoned the people? Soon people will be starving, and we are already close to breaking down! At least say something! Declare an evacuation, do anything at all! This is not life, this is suffering"
3/ "I wonder if Aksyonov (governor) would be willing to bring his family and come stay with us in Dzhankoy, sitting through the complete blackout that has already lasted a week, while telling us to hold on until mid-August."
The situation in Crimea is becoming critical. As authorities remain largely silent, residents are flooding the Telegram channel of the head of Crimea with complaints about power outages, communication disruptions, fuel shortages, and water supply issues. Thread with translations:
1/ "Why is gasoline so expensive? It's twice the price compared to the mainland! Are people here supposed to be twice as rich or something? 😳"
2/ "The city of Dzhankoy has been without electricity for more than 24 hours. If the situation does not improve in the near future, a collective complaint will be drafted and sent to Moscow tomorrow."
The grooming of Orban's regime as a Trojan horse inside the EU and NATO is no longer speculative: it's now evidence-based, confirmed by leaked Budapest-Moscow communications. Agentstvo reports that roughly half of all Russian embassy staff maintain ties to intelligence services:
2/ The EU officially identifies Russia as one of its primary security threats. Yet Orban has been systematically distancing Hungary from both the EU and NATO, deteriorating relations with neighbors including Ukraine, while growing increasingly reliant on Russian influence.
3/ Moscow has no genuine interest in Hungary itself, or in the country's long-term wellbeing. What it wants is a lever - to undermine EU institutions, erode European support for Ukraine, and seed distrust between member states toward one of their own EU members and NATO allies