Through visual analysis of satellite imagery, our team found Russian military vehicle losses in Avdiivka between October 10 and October 20. The total number exceeded 109, indicating a significant loss of approximately aligning to a brigade-sized force in just ten days.🧵Thread:
2/ The actual count of destroyed vehicles is notably higher. We excluded about a dozen vehicles with low to medium confidence due to inconsistent imagery coverage. In some cases, it was impossible to determine if a vehicle had remained in place for a while or was in motion
3/ All new lost vehicles are indicated by a red square on the imagery, while old losses that were already present at the end of September are marked with a white square.
4/ The overwhelming majority of losses were primarily Armored Fighting Vehicles, including BMP-1 and BMP-2 of various configurations, T-72, T-64, and T-80 tanks in different variations, MT-LB, BTRs, and transport vehicles. In total, these losses amount to 109 vehicles.
5/ The operation's scale and the involvement of multiple brigades strongly indicate that it is being conducted at the army level. We also see some evidence about additional reinforcements being deployed to the Avdiivka area, but further details cannot be disclosed at this time.
6/ Despite reports of old equipment use, our team identified a significant presence of modern vehicles and equipment in coordinated battalion-level assaults, further underscoring the operation's importance for Russian command.
7/ Upon analyzing the initial phase, our team concluded it was a long-planned, not a reactionary, operation. The observed patterns suggest Russians invested substantial time and resources, expecting significant losses to achieve their objective
8/ Despite large losses, the enemy persisted in employing more mechanized forces to develop the limited success they had achieved, with the aim of securing dominant positions, disrupting logistics, and controlling waste heaps.
9/ The Russian vehicle losses have now surpassed those incurred during the Siversky Donets crossing in 2022. It's likely that these losses have already exceeded or will surpass the vehicle losses sustained by the Russians in the Vuheldar area between November 2022 and April 2023.
10/ Two independent sources on the ground estimate Russian vehicle losses at around 200. Our current assessment is primarily focused on geospatial evidence, hence, we have chosen not to include this number, as we currently lack supporting satellite imagery for it.
11/ However, the situation is far from stable. Russian forces continue to extensively use guided air-dropped bombs and artillery strikes, along with deploying LMUR (Light Multipurpose Guided Rockets). Multiple indicators point to active efforts to sustain the operation.
12/ In conclusion, we want to emphasize several key points. This army-level operation, conducted through battalion or battalion-tactical groups, signifies not only the gravity of the operation but also shows an attempt to shift the strategic initiative to the Russian side.
13/ The sustainability of these losses is in question, although this approach mirrors what we've observed in previous battles like Mariupol, Vuhledar, and Bakhmut when the Russians committed significant human and material resources and were willing to accept enormous losses
14/ The operation originally aimed for a faster outcome and the advancement of Avdiivka through its flanks, but the resistance and skills exhibited by Ukrainian defenders have proven to be far more formidable than the Russians had anticipated in their plans.
15/ To access the complete set of imagery, additional information, and a detailed methodology for this assessment, please visit our website:
One of the biggest problems of this war is that Ukraine and the West haven’t clearly defined what "winning" looks like. This has allowed the Russians to present the "Istanbul Agreements" as the only viable negotiation framework, due to the absence of a well-defined alternative.
2/ The "Victory Plan" presented by Zelensky is not a true negotiation framework, and it didn’t resonate with the previous administration, let alone the current White House administration. Of course, there are alternative options, such as Russia retreating to 1991 borders
3/ The problem is that Russia won't do that, and there is no realistic enforcement mechanism, short of intervention. The United States isn’t going to bomb Russia. This raises the question: what does a "desired outcome," based on the realities on the ground, actually look like?
Almost every day, we hear about strikes against targets inside Russia, but we rarely get the full picture of their actual impact on the war. Radio Liberty and Frontelligence Insight have joined efforts to analyze hundreds of data points to answer this question.
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2/ Our research covered the period from September 2024 to February 2025, divided into two sections: strikes on military targets, infrastructure, and on the energy sector. We found that strikes on Russia’s energy sector caused at least $658 million in damage over ~6 months
3/ The real damage to the Russian energy sector and the economy as a whole may be higher. In at least 67 out of 100 cases, Ukrainian strikes were successful, while in another 33 cases the result of the attacks remains unknown or it is impossible to prove Ukraine's involvement.
Kursk Offensive: A Preliminary Assessment by Frontelligence Insight.
A condensed version of report for X. 🧵Thread:
1/ With Ukrainian forces withdrawing from Sudzha, the operation is clearly approaching its conclusion though it is not yet entirely over.
2/ To assess the operation, not in isolation, but within the broader context of the war, we broke down the Kursk operation into 3 key questions: whether its geopolitical objectives were met, whether the attrition rate was favorable, and whether it achieved battlefield success
3/ To determine equipment attrition, we analyzed data from OSINT analyst @naalsio26, who tracks losses across multiple frontlines. Our graphs show losses from August to March but are not exhaustive, as they exclude some retreat-related losses. The cut-off date was March 10.
Frontelligence Insight Special Report: AWOL Trends and Casualty Ratios in Russia and Ukraine
In assessing overall manpower casualty ratios, we analyzed Russian AWOL figures alongside Ukrainian estimates, factoring in KIA, MIA, and recruitment rates to assess the war’s prospects
2/ Thanks to @InformNapalm, a Ukrainian OSINT community, we analyzed a screenshot of a Russian presentation slide detailing desertion numbers. The percentage and corresponding figures allowed us to calculate the total number of AWOL cases across all Russian military districts.
3/ As shown in the translated graph, the Southern MD has the highest number of desertion cases. This is unsurprising, as it includes the former 1st and 2nd Army Corps (now the 51st and 3rd CAAs), which are largely composed of forcibly mobilized residents from occupied territories
One of the most critical yet unresolved questions of this war is the true impact of drone attacks inside Russia. Our team has been working with media organizations and volunteers to tackle this. But finding the answer isn’t easy, and we need your support. Here’s how you can help:
2/ The simplest and most effective way to support our investigation is through donations. This helps cover essential expenses like satellite imagery, expert analysis, and time. You can donate via BuyMeaCoffee:
3/ We’re also looking for volunteers to assess the damage, particularly those with expertise in damage surveys, industrial building damage assessments, and the oil and gas industry: especially in evaluating potential refinery damage. Feel free to contact us at
frontel@proton.me
As we move into the second month of the year, Frontelligence Insight has prepared an early assessment report covering recent developments on the frontlines and within both Ukrainian and Russian military forces. Below are some key highlights from the report. 1/ 🧵Thread:
2/ The frontline dynamics for Ukraine remain challenging, with setbacks in Pokrovsk, Chasiv Yar, Kupyansk, and Toretsk. While leadership is working to address organizational and recruitment issues, it will take time for these changes to be implemented and impact the battlefield.
3/ Russian forces are facing high losses, with tens of thousands of AWOL cases and a significant depletion of armored vehicles, which are being replaced by civilian transport. Nevertheless, they continue advancing in areas where Ukrainian defenses are stretched with few people