Through visual analysis of satellite imagery, our team found Russian military vehicle losses in Avdiivka between October 10 and October 20. The total number exceeded 109, indicating a significant loss of approximately aligning to a brigade-sized force in just ten days.🧵Thread:
2/ The actual count of destroyed vehicles is notably higher. We excluded about a dozen vehicles with low to medium confidence due to inconsistent imagery coverage. In some cases, it was impossible to determine if a vehicle had remained in place for a while or was in motion
3/ All new lost vehicles are indicated by a red square on the imagery, while old losses that were already present at the end of September are marked with a white square.
4/ The overwhelming majority of losses were primarily Armored Fighting Vehicles, including BMP-1 and BMP-2 of various configurations, T-72, T-64, and T-80 tanks in different variations, MT-LB, BTRs, and transport vehicles. In total, these losses amount to 109 vehicles.
5/ The operation's scale and the involvement of multiple brigades strongly indicate that it is being conducted at the army level. We also see some evidence about additional reinforcements being deployed to the Avdiivka area, but further details cannot be disclosed at this time.
6/ Despite reports of old equipment use, our team identified a significant presence of modern vehicles and equipment in coordinated battalion-level assaults, further underscoring the operation's importance for Russian command.
7/ Upon analyzing the initial phase, our team concluded it was a long-planned, not a reactionary, operation. The observed patterns suggest Russians invested substantial time and resources, expecting significant losses to achieve their objective
8/ Despite large losses, the enemy persisted in employing more mechanized forces to develop the limited success they had achieved, with the aim of securing dominant positions, disrupting logistics, and controlling waste heaps.
9/ The Russian vehicle losses have now surpassed those incurred during the Siversky Donets crossing in 2022. It's likely that these losses have already exceeded or will surpass the vehicle losses sustained by the Russians in the Vuheldar area between November 2022 and April 2023.
10/ Two independent sources on the ground estimate Russian vehicle losses at around 200. Our current assessment is primarily focused on geospatial evidence, hence, we have chosen not to include this number, as we currently lack supporting satellite imagery for it.
11/ However, the situation is far from stable. Russian forces continue to extensively use guided air-dropped bombs and artillery strikes, along with deploying LMUR (Light Multipurpose Guided Rockets). Multiple indicators point to active efforts to sustain the operation.
12/ In conclusion, we want to emphasize several key points. This army-level operation, conducted through battalion or battalion-tactical groups, signifies not only the gravity of the operation but also shows an attempt to shift the strategic initiative to the Russian side.
13/ The sustainability of these losses is in question, although this approach mirrors what we've observed in previous battles like Mariupol, Vuhledar, and Bakhmut when the Russians committed significant human and material resources and were willing to accept enormous losses
14/ The operation originally aimed for a faster outcome and the advancement of Avdiivka through its flanks, but the resistance and skills exhibited by Ukrainian defenders have proven to be far more formidable than the Russians had anticipated in their plans.
15/ To access the complete set of imagery, additional information, and a detailed methodology for this assessment, please visit our website:
1/ Why is Ukraine losing ground? There are many explanations, ranging from a lack of aid to a lack of political will to win. The reality, however, is far more complex. This thread offers a brief excerpt from my recent analysis, with the full link provided at the end.
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2/ Many struggles that the Ukrainian military faces stem from before 2022 and have scaled significantly by 2025. A mobilized force, where teachers, farmers, and IT workers replaced the professional core, turned what began as 'growing pains' into systemic flaws
3/ A damning report on Ukraine’s 155th Anne of Kyiv Brigade grotesquely exposed systematic issues. Despite training in France and sufficient funding and equipment, the unit faced high AWOL rates and fragmentation across frontline units. The issues that lead to it are systematic
When Bashar al-Assad’s regime fell in Syria, a critical geopolitical question emerged: can Russia maintain its foothold in the MENA region, and if so, how? What does this mean for Ukraine? Below are the key points from the latest Frontelligence Insight report:
2/ Maxar satellite images, dated December 17, show an unusual buildup of vehicles at the Tartus Naval Base. Video from site show that most of these vehicles are logistical, with only a few appearing to be combat vehicles. We identified approximately 150 vehicles and 29 containers
3/ It is assessed that the vehicles are likely being prepared for evacuation from the Tartus by naval vessels. Indications suggest that two Russian cargo ships, Sparta and Ursa Major, could be involved in the operation. It could take over a week for them to reach the port
The Pokrovsk direction, once known as the Avdiivka direction, remains one of the most active and difficult areas. After failing to seize the town directly, as in Novohrodivka, Russian forces pushed towards south of the town, creating an increasingly dangerous situation.🧵Thread
2/ The fall of Selydove has allowed Russian forces to advance south of Pokrovsk, opening a path to Shevchenko, a key settlement before the town itself. With this vital position now almost lost, Russian forces can now expand to the south of Pokrovsk.
3/ A particularly bad development reported to our team is the growing Russian effort to target supply routes leading to Pokrovsk with FPV drones. Ground reports to our team confirm that russians have successfully deployed FPV drones with fiber-optic cables along the E-50 highway
Famous YouTuber @johnnywharris, with 6 million followers, released a video titled "Why People Blame America for the War in Ukraine." He presented his argument in it, essentially blaming the West for causing Russia's imperialistic rise. I find it necessary to respond🧵:
2/ In essence, Johnny claims that after the USSR collapse, Russia was excluded from Western society and draws parallels to the treatment of Weimar Germany under the Treaty of Versailles, suggesting that an unjust settlement fueled militarization in both cases
3/ So, what's wrong with that vision? First, shortly after the Soviet Union's collapse, Russia engaged in conflicts and created pro-Russian pseudo-states, a scenario it later replicated in Ukraine in 2014. Specific examples include Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 1992–1993.
With Russia's budget deficit at 3.3 trillion rubles, 21% key interest rate and 2-3 million job vacancies, Russia has to choose between hyperinflation or an economic freeze, says Vladimir Milov, former Deputy Minister of Energy in an interview with Frontelligence Insight
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2/ Vladimir Milov (@v_milov), an economist and longtime ally of Alexei Navalny, explains that Russian markets are gloomy ahead of the Central Bank’s board meeting on Dec 20. The Bank is expected to raise interest rates once again, from the current 21%, possibly to 23% or even 25%
3/ For Central Bank to continue interest rate hikes means to kill the real sector of the economy, where most companies simply don't have sufficient profitability to borrow at current interest rates (Central Bank's 21% rate translates into 25-30% commercial loan rates)
Overnight, Ukraine carried out a series of missile strikes on Khalino Airbase in Kursk Oblast, reportedly using ATACMS missiles. Here’s what we can anticipate based on previous data gathered by Frontelligence Insight:
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2/ In recent months, the airfield had been spotted to home SU-25 close air support jets, helicopters, and UAVs.
3/ For some time, the airfield hasn’t been heavily utilized by Russia in the same way as other air bases. Instead, it has primarily hosted helicopters and Su-25 for close-air support, rather than for KAB deployments like those conducted from bases in Voronezh or Lipetsk.