Thread by @MassDara

It appears that the Russians may be losing multiple brigade elements from the 2nd CAA and DNR forces in their assault on Avdiivka. Gerasimov strikes again, this time with no pushback on his bad ideas (so far). Yet there are some troubling issues to consider. A thread. (/1)

If you’ve followed me for a while, you know that I don’t give Gerasimov’s command in this war high marks, to say the least. /2

https://twitter.com/massdara/status/1613249626538389504

He and Shoigu have personality conflicts with their subordinates when (presumably) they were advocate for different ways forward more appropriate to the damaged status of the Russian army (like assuming defensive postures or relieving forces on time)/ 3

https://twitter.com/massdara/status/1679528301054812165

But Shoigu and Gerasimov are loyal to the end and so they are kept in their jobs regardless of their command deficiencies /4.
nytimes.com/2023/07/19/opi…

So now the Russians have launched another localized offensive and are losing elements of three brigades from the 2nd CAA (central MD), DNR, and possibly one from 41st CAA near Avdiivka, if this account is accurate. /5.

https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1716361754546995456

Russian forces have lost over a hundred vehicles in their attempts in the last two weeks. Their assaults are straining UAF forces in the area, but UAF units are holding. /6
forbes.com/sites/davidaxe…

Gerasimov prefers to go on the offensive, bc that’s what he thinks is needed and/or what the boss wants. I believe this was a factor for why Surovikin was demoted — who at the time was taking a different defensive approach and constructed multiple defense belts. /7

Within weeks of Gerasimov taking over in February, the Russians launched an offensive that fizzled. /8.
rferl.org/amp/ukraine-ru…

Prigozhin is dead. Surovikin is excited or suspended indefinitely. Who else remains who could push back on Gerasimov’s bad ideas now? /9

https://twitter.com/massdara/status/1679528311741988865

Handpicked Aleksei Kim won’t be the one to push back on Gerasimov. Rudskoi (below left), and the Rostov crew (below right) won’t be the ones either. Teplinskiy keeps a low profile or goes to the field, and is perhaps trying to shield the VDV where possible (his service). /10

I’m not sure after the prigozhin affair that anyone in the command at Rostov feels sporty enough to push back on Gerasimov anymore when events go poorly. He has Putin’s confidence anyway. /11

There’s a reason why some milbloggers seethe about Surovikin being sidelined/exiled, as some did last week on his birthday. Some passed around his pictures, said we don’t forget their heroes, he is needed on the front, etc. /12

So what does this all mean so far? Troubling because the Russians are throwing vehicles and bodies at Avdiivka at great cost. This the largest attack since mid-2022. These methods strain the UAF who are defending well, but face large volumes of Russian fires and assaults. /13

Gerasimov made brigades available for Avdiivka and other locations, Russians rotated some in the south suggesting there is a padding in manpower. I don’t want to over-interpret availability beyond these 4-5 or so brigades yet (10-20k depending on staffing levels) w/o more info.

Recent deliveries in artillery munitions from the DPRK and Russian domestic production going up this year and next could make Gerasimov feel confident that he can brute-force his way through this with shells and sacrificing storm z or regular units. /15

Russian advantages in mass are partially undercut by UAF precision fires, DPICM and ATACM use, deep strikes on logistics, prudent planning, and better ISR. Yet, the quantitative imbalance of available artillery shells will not improve in the near term. /16

Gerasimov can look at his spreadsheets and tell himself a (true) story that he will have artillery advantages in the months ahead and may think he has manpower to spare. But spreadsheets don’t fight as @KofmanMichael says /17

Russian losses are high at Avdiivka. Gerasimov and the Russian command are likely to continue to burn resources until he is stopped also by someone internally. The situation is fluid around Avdiivka. /18

Gerasimov still cannot see that the offensive potential of his force remains deeply degraded. However, the fact that they launched this assault during the UAF counteroffensive suggests they feel confident in their chances. it’s important to check assumptions on potentials. /19

I remain concerned about the possibility that the Russians are stockpiling long-range missiles (large salvos have not been not fired for a few months now), for future attacks this winter. /20

Its key to stay vigilant for signs of continued personnel regeneration in occupied Ukraine and vehicle availability in rear staging areas. The Russian command may be an incompetent one, but it is very dangerous. /end

Exiled. Bah typos!!!!