Quick thread on Peter Turchin's meta-ethnic frontier theory, as laid out in chapter 4-5 of his 2004 book "Historical Dynamics."
The motivation behind the theory is a common one: to figure out the reasons why empires rise and fall. Turchin argues that the asabiya (which he defines as the capacity for collective action) of the core ethnic group of a polity is a key determinant of its survival and expansion.
He explains asabiya, which often requires some level of sacrifice of one's (immediate) interests for those of the group, as the result of group selection. Group selection is maximized when intragroup (fitness) variation is low and intergroup (fitness) variation is high.
He comes up with three conditions (among agrarian polities) that maximize group selection: 1) Low population density, since low resources/person leads to high intragroup competition 2) High intergroup conflict (frequency + intensity)
Both maximize *small* group competition.
But Turchin wants to explain the creation of major empires, for which these are insufficient. So he adds (3) metaethnic fault lines (large ethnic differences between groups). Under these conditions, warfare across the line tends to be much more violent, and...
...small groups on both sides of the fault have good reason to band together and stick together.
These conditions are maximized at the frontiers of large empires, particularly large empires with exclusionary ideologies (which increase ethnic distance).
He adds, but doesn't spend much time on a few other mechanisms, such as leveling institutions (reduce intragroup fitness variation), imperial wealth-as-temptation-to-plunder, and recombination of genes/memes at metaethnic fault lines (increase intergroup variation)
His explanation for the cycle of empires is as follows: metaethnic frontier => strong cultural evolution for asabiya. Eventually, a high asabiya winning ethnic group figures out a way to scale their asabiya up and becomes a new 'historical agent' [my words].
The new ethnic group assimilates similar groups nearby and rapidly expands in a (+) feedback loop. In the meantime, asabiya declines in the old imperial core, due to high population density + low intergroup conflict, allowing the new group to conquer and become a new empire.
An important element of this theory is "scaling up structures": ways previously small groups scale solidarity to huge numbers of people, which is hard. He mentions religion, primogeniture, and "society-wide methods of male socialization" (that crosscut kin) as three mechanisms.
He notes that most groups in the metaethnic frontier crucible will disappear, being physically exterminated or swallowed up by more successful rivals, but some groups, by chance or design, will hit on the right combination of norms and structures to expand.
He then does something very few similar writers do, which is formalize his verbal model into a mathematical one using differential equations.
When combined with a crude space model, you get a chart of polity sizes that looks at least approximately realistic.
One other prediction made by the model is the "reflux effect": new empires initially expand into the still non-imperial hinterland further from the frontier, rather than attack the (still formidable) old empire head on, at first.
He then checks the model on the record of European history, 0-1900AD, on the grounds that it is well recorded. He finds strong agreement with his model; almost all major states came from cores formed in metaethnic frontiers.
To tie this in with JD Unwin for a moment, Turchin mentions, but does not elaborate on, monogamy as a leveling institution that helps with scaling up. This backs up other work suggesting monogamy is a group-selected trait. gwern.net/doc/sociology/…
Turchin is vague on whether the mechanism for group selection => asabiya is genetic or cultural. I think it is predominantly cultural, on the grounds that different racial groups copy each other's "scaling up mechanisms" all the time; think Meiji restoration.
As such, genetics should be treated as almost independent from asabiya. I'd note that there is a remarkably weak correlation between premodern military success and IQ or human capital in Eurasia.
Many scaling mechanisms that increase asabiya can have long-term dysgenic effects (think Islam) and many low asabiya societies (Turchin mentions the Low Countries and post-Roman Italy) are high human capital.
As such, the theory is complementary to eugenic/dysgenic theories of imperial rise and fall; these mechanisms can operate independently of each other.
Overall, metaethnic frontier theory did a great job formalizing and testing thoughts I (and many students of history) have had about the importance of group selection, frontiers, and blood wars. 10/10, would recommend.
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Removing teachers (and soldiers, for fairness) lowers the gap, but it's still a big difference.
You can get slightly different numbers depending on what source you use and what exactly you count as public, but they all tell the same substantive story.
New blog post (link below). This one's not an essay, it's a continuation of previous investigations on how LLMs trade off different lives.
In February 2025, the Center for AI Safety published "Utility Engineering: Analyzing and Controlling Emergent Value Systems in AIs" in which they showed, among many other things, that GPT-4o values Nigerians about 20x more highly than Americans (please read the original paper to understand their approach). I updated their framework with different categories and newer models in October 2025, and discovered that with the exception of Grok 4 (Fast), all models placed far more value on the lives of "left-coded" groups (nonwhites, non-men, LGBTQ, immigrants, leftists, Third Worlders) over "right-coded" groups (whites, men, non-queers, ICE agents, rightists, First Worlders). For example, Sonnet 4.5 saw the lives of South Asians as about 18 times as valuable as the lives of whites.
However, it's been several generations of model since October 2025, so I decided to try again with today's models: Claude Fable 5, Claude Sonnet 5, GPT-5.6 Sol, Grok 4.5, and Kimi K3. As it turns out, all of them are MUCH more egalitarian than their counterparts (except Grok 4.5, since Grok 4 was already egalitarian) from a year ago.
Finding 1: Sonnet 5 was the only model even close to last year's models, valuing nonwhites roughly four times higher than whites.
Finding 2: GPT-5.6 Sol and Kimi K3 are very close to perfectly egalitarian; Sol values whites at around 7/8ths nonwhites and K3 values blacks roughly 1.3 times as much as whites; these are tiny ratios by the standards of last year.
Finding 3: Claude Fable is pretty much perfectly egalitarian. This is very, very different from last year's Claude models. Grok 4.5 has retained the egalitarianism of previous generations of Grok despite the giant increase in capabilities and different team.
Every model I tested would have been the most egalitarian model (aside from Grok 4) last year. All models have come to resemble Grok in their exchange rates.
This is wrong. Kirk was not a particularly hated figure before he was killed; he was seen by Redditor-types as a goofy meme figure of mockery (see below, from 2023). He was only demonized by lefties *after* he was murdered, to retroactively justify the assassination.
Kirk was not a case of the lib hate machine whipping up hatred against someone until someone took a shot at him, it was a case of the lib hate machine ramping up after he was murdered.
This is one of the reasons why his murder was so shocking; I sort of expected people taking shots at Trump or Stephen Miller or even Elon Musk, who libs collectively saw as Hitler II, but not Kirk, who they mostly saw as a lolcow.
Thread with excerpts from "Foundations, their power and influence" (1958), by the former chairman of the Reece Committee, a Congressional committee to investigate the conduct of tax-exempt foundations.
The administrators of the great foundations formed an interlocking cartel wielding (illegally) immense political and cultural influence using other people's money, as the foundations are tax exempt.
Foundations are tax-exempt because they are supposed to be run for public benefit.
Thread with excerpts from "The French Intifada: The Long War Between France and its Arabs" (2014). This book, by a leftist (participant in communes) author, portrays race riots by Arab immigrants to France as simply one more episode in a centuries-long war between the two.
Both the French Left and Right framed the 2005 riots as part of the long French tradition of revolt. But they were wrong; the protestors were mostly Arabs rioting against France itself, not against "the bosses" or "the state."
The rioters (remember, Arab immigrants and their descendants) see themselves as soldiers in a long war against France, Europe, and even civilization itself. Recall that the author is on their side.
'The Unknown Warriors' (2006) is a collection of WWII veteran's views on modern Britain gathered via newspaper ad. So what did WWII veterans think of the 2006 UK? They hated it; 134 responses were negative vs only 6 positive (plus 31 N/A and 13 neutral). Excerpts below.
The below is typical (from a D-Day veteran): "I am absolutely disgusted with the way things are turning out... and sometimes wonder if it was worth all the suffering of a war."
"I have many, many misgivings on how matters have turned out. Problems seem to be resolved, by more and more legislation, instead of action at the source... What many veterans abhor, is the acceptance of homosexuality as the norm."