Quick thread on Peter Turchin's meta-ethnic frontier theory, as laid out in chapter 4-5 of his 2004 book "Historical Dynamics."
The motivation behind the theory is a common one: to figure out the reasons why empires rise and fall. Turchin argues that the asabiya (which he defines as the capacity for collective action) of the core ethnic group of a polity is a key determinant of its survival and expansion.
He explains asabiya, which often requires some level of sacrifice of one's (immediate) interests for those of the group, as the result of group selection. Group selection is maximized when intragroup (fitness) variation is low and intergroup (fitness) variation is high.
He comes up with three conditions (among agrarian polities) that maximize group selection: 1) Low population density, since low resources/person leads to high intragroup competition 2) High intergroup conflict (frequency + intensity)
Both maximize *small* group competition.
But Turchin wants to explain the creation of major empires, for which these are insufficient. So he adds (3) metaethnic fault lines (large ethnic differences between groups). Under these conditions, warfare across the line tends to be much more violent, and...
...small groups on both sides of the fault have good reason to band together and stick together.
These conditions are maximized at the frontiers of large empires, particularly large empires with exclusionary ideologies (which increase ethnic distance).
He adds, but doesn't spend much time on a few other mechanisms, such as leveling institutions (reduce intragroup fitness variation), imperial wealth-as-temptation-to-plunder, and recombination of genes/memes at metaethnic fault lines (increase intergroup variation)
His explanation for the cycle of empires is as follows: metaethnic frontier => strong cultural evolution for asabiya. Eventually, a high asabiya winning ethnic group figures out a way to scale their asabiya up and becomes a new 'historical agent' [my words].
The new ethnic group assimilates similar groups nearby and rapidly expands in a (+) feedback loop. In the meantime, asabiya declines in the old imperial core, due to high population density + low intergroup conflict, allowing the new group to conquer and become a new empire.
An important element of this theory is "scaling up structures": ways previously small groups scale solidarity to huge numbers of people, which is hard. He mentions religion, primogeniture, and "society-wide methods of male socialization" (that crosscut kin) as three mechanisms.
He notes that most groups in the metaethnic frontier crucible will disappear, being physically exterminated or swallowed up by more successful rivals, but some groups, by chance or design, will hit on the right combination of norms and structures to expand.
He then does something very few similar writers do, which is formalize his verbal model into a mathematical one using differential equations.
When combined with a crude space model, you get a chart of polity sizes that looks at least approximately realistic.
One other prediction made by the model is the "reflux effect": new empires initially expand into the still non-imperial hinterland further from the frontier, rather than attack the (still formidable) old empire head on, at first.
He then checks the model on the record of European history, 0-1900AD, on the grounds that it is well recorded. He finds strong agreement with his model; almost all major states came from cores formed in metaethnic frontiers.
To tie this in with JD Unwin for a moment, Turchin mentions, but does not elaborate on, monogamy as a leveling institution that helps with scaling up. This backs up other work suggesting monogamy is a group-selected trait. gwern.net/doc/sociology/…
Turchin is vague on whether the mechanism for group selection => asabiya is genetic or cultural. I think it is predominantly cultural, on the grounds that different racial groups copy each other's "scaling up mechanisms" all the time; think Meiji restoration.
As such, genetics should be treated as almost independent from asabiya. I'd note that there is a remarkably weak correlation between premodern military success and IQ or human capital in Eurasia.
Many scaling mechanisms that increase asabiya can have long-term dysgenic effects (think Islam) and many low asabiya societies (Turchin mentions the Low Countries and post-Roman Italy) are high human capital.
As such, the theory is complementary to eugenic/dysgenic theories of imperial rise and fall; these mechanisms can operate independently of each other.
Overall, metaethnic frontier theory did a great job formalizing and testing thoughts I (and many students of history) have had about the importance of group selection, frontiers, and blood wars. 10/10, would recommend.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Employers hiring people and then training them in the specific skills they require has declined as a hiring model for decades, in favor of a hiring market where employers look for people who already have those skills.
In the training/internal labor markets model, a company struggling to find specific skills will train promising entry-level employees. In the hiring market model, they can raise wages or otherwise improve conditions. In both, they can also substitute technology for labor.
Neither a hiring market nor training model for matching jobs to seekers is compatible with "skill shortages" as a concept, which implicitly assumes skills are fixed and once people with those skills run out employers can do nothing (except through immigration or schooling).
"Fire and Blood: A History of Mexico" (TR Fehrenbach, 1973/1995) thread of threads. Mesoamerican civilization was horrifying and very backwards by Old World standards, but unique.
Excerpts from TR Fehrenbach's "Fire and Blood: A History of Mexico" (1995). The PRI had massively expanded higher education. These universities were entirely 'free'/self-governing and became locuses of left-wing organizing.
In 1968, security forces fired upon a massive student demonstration/riot against the Olympic Games.
By 1970 Mexico had made enormous progress; the national income increased sixfold while the death rate dropped by half. But Mexico was still struggling with foreign-exchange; the govt pursued import-substitution to improve balance-of-payments.
Thread with excerpts from the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR) section of TR Fehrenbach's "Fire and Blood: A History of Mexico" (1995). Calles created the PNR in 1929 to institutionalize the govt and Revolution, creating a Mexican party-state.
The Calles/Obregon governments were corrupt, but never succumbed to paranoia; there was no equivalent to the Soviet or Chinese liquidations of class enemies, the press was free, and the average Mexican had nothing to fear from the govt (Red Terror against the Church aside).
Roughly 19M acres were redistributed through 1933; most land remained with latifundios. But the new latifundios were not like the old ones, they were commercial enterprises rather than social systems. The clerics, army, and latifundistas were all tamed by Calles/Obregon.
Thread with excerpts from TR Fehrenbach's "Fire and Blood: A History of Mexico" (1995), on post-Revolutionary Mexico. To justify land reform, the revolutionaries revived the principle that expropriation was justifiable if the national interests demanded it.
The Constitutionalists defeated the Villistas in battle and assassinated the leader of the last revolutionary faction, Zapata, by treachery.
Carranza, the erstwhile leader of the victorious Constitutionalists, dug his own grave by trying to promote someone other than Obregon to the presidency after him; he was forced to flee the capital, run down, and murdered.
Excerpts from TR Fehrenbach's "Fire and Blood: A History of Mexico" (1973). The Porfiriato gave Mexico a generation of stability and development for the first time since independence. This left Mexico overdue for another civil war: the Mexican Revolution.
One problem was that the Porfirian school system had created a large, literate middle structure (not class). These educated mestizos became dissatisfied due to lack of opportunity; growth was rapid but not rapid enough to absorb them all.
The Revolution kicked off in 1910, when Diaz announced he'd won reelection with 99% of the vote. This kicked off an insurgency in Chihuahua, in the mestizo, frontier north.