A couple days ago I posted this about the geopolitical context of the Israel-Gaza war. I promised to answer question in another thread and here it is. This will also be another a pretty long thread, here we go:
I want to start by thanking everyone for their engagement & their questions. I'm particularly grateful that the thread *did* change some minds. I try not to preach to the choir and to write so that everyone, pro-Palestinian or not, will read. I hope others take note, this isn't a popularity contest where you try to say whatever is most extreme in order to get followers. You speak in order to be heard.
Several asked for sources (they didn't doubt the info but wanted sources for additional research). There are some in the thread, but I'm afraid going back and sourcing every single claim is prohibitive. The amount of info we have to consume daily is immense and esp under these circumstances it's very hard to keep track. I'm not saying I'm 100% sure of every fact I cite and I'm happy to be corrected.
Several asked about US posture and whether the carrier strike group will sufficiently deter Hezbollah & Iranian allies. Umm, difficult concept for some - the US isn't as intimidating as it used to be 20 years ago. The US simply doesn't have as much leverage in the region as it used to have. Militarily everyone knows that whatever the US does, it'll eventually leave. Even regional countries (other than Israel) that used to be closely allied don't trust the US as before. This isn't 2003.
Some asked about Hezbollah's capabilities. Well they're estimated to have 100k fighters, and they have the strategic depth (via Syria, Iraq, and Iran) to bring in more soldiers & supplies. They've spent the last 17 years rebuilding & stacking up weapons, many of them pretty advanced and accurate missiles. I believe their capabilities to be significant. But I'm happy to defer on this to experts watching the group more closely.
There were questions about Netanyahu and his ideology. Reminder, in politics, consistency is a liability. There are certain ideas Netanyahu always held - prevention of a Palestinian state a main one - but otherwise he's less an ideologue and more a slimy, populist, but also skilled politician. He's very good at building coalitions and he's often the most secular & liberal member of the coalitions he builds (which are mostly people further to the right than him).
Questions about Netanyahu strengthening Hamas etc coz some people were shocked. Well Ha'aretz did this job for everyone because now they have a pretty detailed article, "A Brief History of the Netanyahu-Hamas Alliance". Yup you read that right, the Netanyahu-Hamas alliance. haaretz.com/israel-news/20…
There were people casting doubt about the "genocide" claim (that Israel's actions amount to the crime of genocide under international law). On this me and many others are relying upon actual genocide scholars (such as @Rrrrnessa & others). Maybe someone can post a thread about all the genocide scholars who took this position. Also a reminder that ethnic cleansing and genocide aren't always separate things; they're a continuum of each other.
Someone asked why my very, very long thread didn't also analyze the mass protests, rallies, citizen mobilization in the West, deep polarization in institutions & society, radicalization etc. Well, that's because it was an already very, very long thread and it was about geopolitics. I am preparing another thread looking at this other angle but it may take a few days.
Someone asked about Russian involvement alongside Hamas. The question shows a lack of understanding of the Russia-Israel relationship and what Israel means for the modern Russian psyche.

Many of the founders of Israel were born in the Russian empire or the USSR. The USSR was the very first country to recognize the state of Israel. And "defeating Nazism" is almost a moral foundation of the modern Russian national identity. About 1/6th of Israelis today are Russian speakers.

Russia may get pissed with Israel now & then but it'll always maintain friendly relations. This also explains why Israel was rather slow/reluctant to take Ukraine's side or supply it with weapons vs Russia. Russia may use this crisis to attack/criticize the West but it will *not* back Hamas.
There was a question about whether Palestinians would rather "leave" than get bombed and whether they'll leave Gaza if it's damaged beyond repair. How do I explain the Palestinian concept of "sumud صمود" (staying put)?

Like I said elsewhere Palestinians are survivors of erasure. After the Nakba, Palestinians adopted a popular attitude of "staying put" (sumud), this is ingrained in our psyche. Perhaps this song can explain?

Lyrics:
"I'm staying put
In my land, I'm staying put
They can take my livelihood, I'm staying put
They can kill my children, I'm staying put
They can blow up my house, and in its ruins, I'm staying put"

A few asked about the Biden-Netanyahu relationship. A lot of my insight came from this reporting from Axios. Basically, Biden and Netanyahu don't get along, and while Biden declares strong support in public, in private he's been trying to rein him in.
axios.com/2023/10/21/isr…
There were questions about my conclusion that we're more likely to see a limited incursion that doesn't go as far as everyone initially thought. I think since I posted the thread, more people are seeing it this way.

There's also this thread that talks about how the US keeps asking for delays to the ground invasion, but also how the IDF is now walking back the imminence of the invasion. Read it, it has more
There were questions about whether Hamas political leadership would have known about the attack.

On this I generally deferred to this interview by a respected researcher who thinks the political leadership did not know and were only informed shortly before:


There was also this illuminating additional context by a Palestinian commentator who talks about how the military wing of Hamas has really been the one in charge since 2006.

There were questions about Qatar's role - well, Qatar is in a mediation role because Hamas political bureau members live there. But also, would be remiss not to mention that Netanyahu wanted Qatar to be an in-between long ago, and convinced it to continue to send money to Hamas.

In fact, in 2019, Qatar considered walking away from this deal, so Netanyahu sent his Mossad chief + an IDF officer to convince them to continue to send money to Hamas.
haaretz.com/middle-east-ne…
There was a question about Hamas and the hostages. Well, it seems that Hamas is playing an interesting game with the hostages, releasing a few every few days to forestall a ground invasion and to increase political pressure on Netanyahu and the pro-Israel coalition. You can't start a ground invasion when hostages are being released every few days.

In fact there's reporting that Netanyahu and the IDF have been very frustrated by this. There was also reporting that when Hamas said it would release some hostages, Israel initially ignored them.
Several questions about the atrocities committed on Oct 7. I'm preparing another thread on this but there are now many reports by credible journalists that make it impossible to deny that horrific atrocities were committed on that day.

Israel says Hamas planned every single atrocity from the start. Hamas says some of the worst atrocities were done by other opportunistic parties from Gaza that used the border fence breach to go on a rampage. They also say that at least some of the civilian deaths were due to a disorganized and heavy-handed IDF response.

Like I said I have another thread coming on this but at this point I don't think anybody who's objective can doubt that Hamas committed serious war crimes that day.
Questions about Turkey's role. Funny, this reminded me of this article (published a week before Oct 7) in Israeli media talking about a "Turkey-Azerbaijan-Israel coalition" (really)


Turkey won't get involved in the conflict directly or diplomatically and has lost leverage over Hamas when it agreed to expel its members in order to re-normalize relations with Israel last year


There's another report that says more Hamas members were asked to leave Turkey after Oct 7


Erdogan is a geopolitical opportunist and will use any chaos to secure Turkey's southern border; he's also a domestic populist who'll praise Hamas as Palestinian resistance but acts opposite to this.haaretz.com/israel-news/20…
newarab.com/news/turkey-de…
timesofisrael.com/report-hamas-c…
Someone asked whether Israel's electorate want Gaza ethnically cleansed. The answer is actually no, the Israeli electorate were largely satisfied with the pre-Oct 7 status quo and thought it was manageable (Palestinians of course were not, it was just relentless and escalating violence and pain).

Did they change their minds after Oct 7? We don't know, but I don't think so. The ethnic cleansing push is coming from certain people in Israel but I don't think it's a mainstream opinion, not yet at least.
Someone asked, how should Israel defend itself if not with a ground invasion?

Reminder that the pre-Oct 7 status quo was supposed to be "the solution". Hamas was caged & blockaded, but Netanyahu kept sending them money (via Qatar) and they eventually broke out of the cage in a dramatic and devastating way.

But really, the problem is the assumption that this is a security-only problem with a security-only solution. This is the kind of thinking that failed explosively on Oct 7. Without a long-term political solution, there will be Palestinian militancy in some form or another.
Someone asked if this is an existential threat to Israel.

Well, a regional war which drags in the full force of Iran's proxies, with Egypt and Jordan staying neutral (or secretly hoping Israel doesn't win), and Saudi Arabia remaining neutral, and with the US kinda iffy - well that can be catastrophic for Israel's security.

But I don't think it's an existential threat. I do think however that the stance of Western powers is bad for Israel long term. They need to be pushing Israel towards a political solution, not coddling the worst of its right-wing impulses in a way that makes a solution impossible.
Question about whether the Palestinian Authority can take over Gaza's administration after/if Israel "dismantles Hamas".

Well given the mass murder and potential ethnic cleansing, it would be a poisoned chalice, and any Palestinian faction that agrees to "take over Gaza" after will be seen as collaborators in their own people's genocide.

But also, remember that Bibi strengthened Hamas *explicitly* in order to weaken the PA. Not to just hand them over Gaza and allow them to administer all territories under Palestinian control for the first time since 2006.
Someone asked about Iran and its nuclear program.

Some experts believe that Iran has developed its program to the point where it can, if it wanted, develop a nuclear weapon within weeks or months, but it will hold that off until a time of serious crisis.

I do think that if there is a serious escalation that becomes an open war, Iran could take that step. Noting also that Iran has put its entire army on alert and started military drills, more here
People also asked about the two-state solution (2SS) and whether if we have a de-escalation we can see a return to that. The short answer is no.

There is no path to a 2SS under current conditions and there hasn't been for at least a decade. I posted about this here, but I think I'll post more about it in the coming days.


The fact that after this carnage we'll just return to the same/worse impasse is depressing, but we have to face the truth. Bibi could be gone but his project to make sure the 2SS is impossible has succeeded.
Someone pointed to additional reasons why Iran will likely stick by Hamas: Among their network of allies, Hamas is the only major *Sunni* force.

This allows Iran to project itself not as a "Shia" power but as a pan-Islamic power. To lose Hamas is to retreat back into being a sectarian network of extremist organizations, which would deal a heavy ideological & soft power setback.

Also "supporting Palestine" will give them a huge popularity boost across the region that they can leverage politically. They had lost an enormous amount of soft power for their stance on Syria/Bashar since 2011.
Someone asked if Hamas is good for Gaza or for the Palestinian cause. I kinda talked about this earlier here


I have another thread coming on this but Hamas does not really see itself as an admin but as a resistance movement, and through its 16 years running Gaza never took steps to mitigate or reduce Palestinian civilian casualties. Also since 2017 they never really put forth any political proposal or initiative.
Some people got miffed at my Biden vs Trump comment. Here's the thing, Trump isn't a fascist. He has no ideology. He's a populist kleptocrat who's out for himself. But he's a battering ram for a movement of explicit white supremacism to take over.

Meanwhile Biden's foreign policy represents a continuation of the same old - ensuring US strategic & geopolitical supremacy. That is, the preservation of the US empire.
Someone asked about Biden's political calculations. Well, taking a very strong position on Israel will ensure that he can't get criticized by the GOP for being insufficiently invested in Israel's security. In fact right-wingers went nuts over this (can you believe Tucker Carlson actually called for de-escalation?


But it's really more likely Biden is acting on political impulse/instinct. He's a Zionist through & through, he said so himself.
A few people triggered me by cheering for this side or that or talking about "winning" or "losing". Do you see anyone winning? These are human beings being killed and human lives being shattered, destroyed.

I hate geopolitical-centric thinking even though I have to engage in it (and as you see I'm pretty good at it). It trains you to look at the world as a game of chess and almost ignore the human lives.

Reminder of my comment here. I'm sorry but cheering for war either way is disgusting.
People asking how representative I am of Palestinians. I am extremely Palestinian and I represent only myself. Palestinians are a diverse people with diverse opinions. My comment here (from 2021) stands
Some people were complaining about inaccuracies here & there. Guys, it's a thread. I gave you more info in a single thread for *free* than you'll find by reading 100 Western op-eds so give me a break?

But seriously most people were grateful and I'm grateful for them too.
And since I said that please do realize that I have a team and we still have to eat & pay rent so please support us

Here: (one-time donations)
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Thank you, and I'm ready for any more questions/commentspaypal.me/kawaakibi
patreon.com/kawaakibi
An update/correction regarding Russia's involvement. Many have responded and made me realize I've made a mistake. You can read their responses under the tweet here:


While the facts in my tweet are correct, I made the mistake of confusing the ideological/cultural with the geopolitical. Geopolitically yes, in case of an escalation it makes sense for Russia to stand against the collective "West", that is against the pro Israel alliance.

Putin's relations with Israel have been worsening. He has relations with Hamas and has criticized the West for its response so far but there's no indication he's giving any sort of material support to Hamas and I don't think he will, even in case of an escalation.

But I do think in case of a regional escalation, Russia would give material support to the Iranian axis.
Another important update. Overnight it seems that Israeli projectiles fell into Egyptian territory injuring several people. Unlike the Israeli strikes that injured several Egyptian workers near the Gaza border, these projectiles were in a whole different area (to the south). See attached image.

This is coming a few days after USS Carney operating in the northern Red Sea (second image) shot down missiles & drones supposedly fired from Yemen towards Israel.

Egyptian commentators very pissed with Sisi and seeing this as an attack/provocation by Israel. The attacks near the Gaza border are probably deliberate but those projectiles likely interceptors. Again the fact that Houthis in Yemen (see map) have this range & sophistication of drones is astounding.Image
Image

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More from @iyad_elbaghdadi

Dec 16, 2024
Here's a personal thread about the very strong, complex emotions that I struggled with all of last week, since we watched Assad fall and Syria rise:
(I've been working with my team on building systems that would enable me to post new content consistently & sustainably, and on multiple platforms. But I couldn't focus. I had to stop & check-in with myself. So let me acknowledge these emotions)
1. There's a nostalgic disorientation (or disoriented nostalgia?) - it's 13 years of our lives. The Syrian uprising & civil war has been a 13-year trauma. It started with immense hope and love, then tragedy, then an anger bordering on hate.
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Israel's immediate reaction to the fall of the Assad regime is mass bombardment of Syrian army bases and expansion into Syrian territory. This tells you two things:
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Second, Israel and its allies (primarily the US) has/have no political or diplomatic leverage whatsoever over the emergent forces in Syria, and considers them a hostile threat.
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Dec 17, 2023
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I'm starting to become convinced that many movements will not survive this and will have to be mourned and laid to rest, and new movements built out of what remains. Built on better principles, with more moral courage and clearer-eyed vision.
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Dec 6, 2023
Here's a thread about the concept of indigeneity in historical Palestine and its implications in light of Zionist settler-colonialism and the persecution of the Palestinians. You may want to bookmark this for whenever someone screams "but Jews are indigenous to the land!" 🧵
Note: This thread is not an attack on Jewish life in the Middle East. It's an analytical critique of the narratives used. My argument is that indigeneity is not an appropriate framing to use in the Israel-Palestine context, but especially when used (aggressively) by Zionists
"Indigenous populations" is a term used to refers to the survivors of settler-colonialism, particularly in contexts where settlers overpowered and nearly eradicated the natives. The text below is from a factsheet by the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII) Image
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A long thread about colonialism, decolonization, what models can & can't work, and why the Israel-Palestine context is unique. I wish people would slow-read this because many are walking around with outdated models, and may be causing damage 🧵
Caveat: I wrote this as a stream of consciousness with minimum editing so please forgive me if this ends up being meandering or repetitive or choppy. I just find that I write more powerfully and authentically when I'm not trying to edit anything or make it sound good
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Read 47 tweets
Nov 27, 2023
A lot has been said recently about what Islam allows or prohibits in war so I thought I'd clarify this: In Islam the distinction is not "civilian vs military"; it's "combatant vs non-combatant". Here's a quick explanation
In the classical Islamic era, the distinction of civilian vs non-civilian didn't exist. Neither the Prophet nor his tribal adversaries had standing armies made up of full-time soldiers. Armies at the time were made of men of fighting age who otherwise were traders, farmers, etc.
Rather, the distinction the Prophet established was combatant vs non-combatant. One of the clearest examples is narrated in a hadith that describes the scene after a battle (the battle itself isn't named)
Read 9 tweets

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