Government statistics do not seem to be capturing how weak the economy is. Many companies are reporting shockingly weak revenues. UPS’s US delivery volume growth is worse today than in 2007-2009. After falling for nearly two years, it dropped another ~11% last quarter.
At first I thought that Amazon still was taking share and causing problems, but this chart suggests that market share has changed very little since 2020.
This week, another economic bellwether, 3M, reported that global organic sales dropped more than 3% year over year on a local currency basis last quarter. The services side of the economy is unlikely to escape the global monetary tightening that is gripping these companies.
In a strong third quarter report, Meta Platforms mentioned that Chinese advertising focused on consumers in the developed world was material to its 21% increase in constant currency revenues. We believe that, in response to domestic weakness, China is exporting deflation.
Also reporting this week, two life sciences companies that have managed earnings and delighted both the sell-side and the buy-side of the Street for years - Thermo Fisher and Danaher - hit air pockets and corroborated that China may not be the world’s growth engine any longer.
So, why is US employment still so strong, supporting the government’s point of view? In our view, labor hoarding after two years of vacancies is a reason on the demand side, while loss of purchasing power - especially food and energy - is a reason on the supply side, BUT…
…if we are right that prices are about to unravel and crush margins, then companies will be forced not only to lay off excess labor but also to harness AI and other automation to salvage margins. Innovation solves problems and gains traction during tough times!
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China is exporting deflation in a more profound way than I believe many economists and strategists appreciate. All else equal, the 15% depreciation in the yuan relative to the dollar in the last year should have increased its PPI inflation rate by 15%. Instead it has dropped 4%.
In other words, the deflationary vortex emanating from China is approaching 20% (15%+4%), highlighted by the burgeoning defaults in Chinese real estate and trust companies.
After it entered the World Trade Organization in 2001, China’s real GDP grew at a double digit rate for nearly 20 years. Rapid growth can cover many economic sins, typically excessive debt and associated leverage. Those excesses are surfacing in China now.
Ironically, as crypto assets soared during the Silicon Valley Bank meltdown, this administration suggested that investors in regional banks - equity and bond holders - should prepare to be “wiped out” in the aftermath of an unprecedented 20-fold increase in the Fed funds rate.
Now we are hearing anecdotes not only that businesses and individuals are hedging their fiat assets with some crypto assets but that they also are lowering risk and increasing returns by shifting from low yielding bank deposits into higher yielding money market funds, a win-win.
As a result, now that they can borrow at will from a government facility at ~4.5%, regional banks seem to be moving from a liquidity crisis to a slower moving solvency crisis.
If you are correct, Congressman, then the FDIC and others will prevent the US from participating in the most important phase of the internet revolution. Like you, I believe regulators are using crypto as a scapegoat for their own lapses in oversight of traditional banking.
Despite a yield curve that inverted last July - and credit default swaps that started flashing red - the Fed continued to vote UNANIMOUSLY to jack rates up in 75 basis point increments. They paid no heed to commodity prices and other inflation indicators that were unwinding.
Many banks made two assumptions that are haunting them now. The first was that interest rates would remain low for an extended period of time, and the second, that deposits would continue to increase. After all, they had not declined on a year-over-year basis since the 1930s.
The echo is more like the early 1920s, after a pandemic and a war - the Spanish Flu and WWI - as three major innovation platforms were evolving into mass market opportunities - electricity, telephony, and the automobile, contributing to the breathtaking “Roaring Twenties”
In response to a supply chain- and war-related surge in inflation, the gold standard forced the newly formed Fed to drain money from the economy, pushing pricing from a 24% inflationary peak in June 1920 to a -15% deflationary trough one year later in June 1921.
Now, inflation - which peaked in the 8-10% range last year - is likely to surprise on the low side of expectations this year, dropping below 2% and perhaps turning negative. The banking crisis could lead to “bad deflation” while innovation generates “good deflation”.
US demand deposits - which make up the vast majority of M2 - have been falling since last August. Now we are seeing the consequences of the yield curve inversion that began last July, which I feared last September and described in the thread below. The inversion has worsened.
Many banks parked the COVID stimulus gusher in long term bonds at record low 1-2% interest rates, never expecting the Fed funds rate to surge a record-breaking 19-fold to 4.75% in less than a year. Now deposit outflows are forcing them to sell “safe” securities at losses.
Deposits are leaving banks to take advantage of higher yields in money market and other funds. At Silicon Valley Bank, start-ups were responding to a drought in venture capital funding by draining deposits to fund their operations.
The bond market seems to be signaling that the Fed is making a serious mistake. At -80 basis points (as measured by the 10 year vs 2 year Treasury yields), the yield curve is more inverted now than at any time since the early ‘80s when double-digit inflation was entrenched.
I am wondering why economists are not highlighting that an 80bp inversion in the Treasury yield curve today is much more of a red flag for the Fed today than it was in the early ‘80s. As a percent of the 3.5% 10 year Treasury yield, it is ~23% today vs ~5% of 15% in the ‘80s
Typically, an inverted yield curve is pointing to a recession and/or lower than expected inflation than expected. In our view, deflation is a much bigger risk than inflation. Commodity prices and massive retail discounts are corroborating this point of view.