I saw someone mapping the Ukrainian supply routes into Avdiivka in a rather lacklustre way. So I decided to do my own, more informative, map.
To talk about the logistics of Avdiivka we also need to talk about the terrain west of it.
So Avdiivka, a thread:
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Let's start with the roads. To do this we need to differentiate between Main- and secondary supply routes. I'll define them as follows:
SSRs (brown): unpaved roads leading from MSRs into the city of Avdiivka.
MSRs (orange): Paved roads
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These definitions are important. MSRs can, obviously, carry much more supplies and more consistently regardless of the weather.
Meanwhile, the SSRs are sometimes mere dirt paths susceptible to weather, especially during the mud season.
Pictured: April roads in Bakhmut
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We can immediately see that only one MSR is leading all the way into Avdiivka, the O0542.
The rest of the roads leading into Avdiivka are SSRs, or as I said, varying quality of dirt roads. It takes anything from 3 to 6 kilometres of driving on these SSRs to reach Avdiivka.
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For comparison, the Ivanivske - Bakhmut route last spring, the video of which is above, was around 3km long. Ukraine also had to haul supplies over some other dirt paths or fields, amounting to maybe some 7km of non-paved driving at maximum.
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Taking this into account, supply through the SSRs is certainly possible, although a lot harder than doing it over an MSR would be.
However, the O0542 is a relatively safe route that runs directly to the west of the city. There is no immediate threat of it being cut.
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Indeed the challenges to supplying the city's defence come from the terrain surrounding the city, and the shape of the city itself.
First of all, the terrain west of Avdiivka is a shallow bowl with the MSR running at the bottom of it.
Shown here on topo heatmap.
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The Russian attacks on the flanks of the city are aimed at the edges of this bowl. If Russia manages to gain a hold on Stepne and Berdychi on the northern- and Severne on the southern flank, would mean that Russia can easily observe much of that lowland.
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This wouldn't likely be enough to cut the MSR, knowing how fire control is generally overrated in this war, but it would make its use much more challenging.
More challenges would follow if Russia started pushing south from Stepove and managed to fire directly on the MSR
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This is for a good reason. with the city being spread along the ridgeline, cityg
This is for a good reason. Gaining a large enough of a foothold in the industrial area would put immense pressure on the MSR. (Urban area in yellow)
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The terrain of Avdiivka is unfortunate as well. The city is spread along the ridgeline and is very long and narrow.
If Russia manages to advance to the industrial area or south of the waste heap, there is a danger of Avdiivka getting cut in two.
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Loss of the industrial area or the MSR would mean that the southern part of the city, the main urban area, could only be supplied via SSRs or even tertiary roads over fields. What is worse is that these routes would be very close to current Russian lines.
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The southern part of Avdiivka could be nearly surrounded like this.
This is why the northern advance around Avdiivka is much more dangerous than the southern advance, where the Ukrainians have more room to operate.
Both the Russians and Ukrainians clearly know this.
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Despite immense losses, the Russian pressure on Avdiivka doesn't show major signs of easing up. Their advance is slow, and further slowed by Ukrainian reinforcements.
There is a clear possibility that the Russian offensive peters out before these risks are realised.
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Even in the scenario where Russia can keep up the pressure and manage to advance, it's likely the action on the flanks or near the industrial area will take a long time for significant gains.
Avdiivka is not in immediate danger of collapsing.
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Ukraine has also shown signficant ability of supplying its forces through bad roads and in bad condition. The defence of Avdiivka can be kept up for a time even if the Russians close in on the MSR. At least for a time and in parts of the city.
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However, the risks are there. This is why Ukraine has expended a lot of resources to defend Avdiivka. It has moved parts of the 47th into the area, and maybe parts of the 1st tank brigade.
These units are fighting against the northern pincer.
The Russian advance may peter out as it has before. However, these resources are away from somewhere else.
With the movement of reserves, the Russian offensive around Avdiivka has likely forced the culmination of the Ukrainian summer offensive in Zaporizzhia.
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Analytical note: MSRs and SSRs are drawn based on a study of Google Earth and various maps. Sometimes making out what is paved and what is not is quite hard on satellite imagery alone.
Some roads shown in Google Maps/Earth are more like trails over fields.
Not Stepne. Stepove*
Sorry for the typo.
Honestly I have to start proofreading these better.
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If the land bridge could be cut with long range fires, why even go for the offensive and not just wait for the GLSDB and save troops for much better offensive environment that brings?
I'm seeing a lot of smart people get aboard this narrative shifting.
It's frustrating to watch the Ukrainian offensive struggle, and realise that the expectations of a quick victory, that many had, are not coming to fruition.
Being dishonest with ourselves and reframing the narrative however helps no-one.
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You know what's the worst part?
If the Russians were on the offensive and did the same kind of narrative shifting as their offensive struggled to meet expectations and reach strategic goals we would rightfully call that cope.
To add on to what Tatarigami says here, while there are legitimate criticisms with the deliveries of Western aid, blaming the failures of the counteroffensive simply on that aspect is counterproductive and often full of weird tech-utopianism. 1/
Many of the expectations for the counteroffensive were set by Ukrainians themselves focusing so heavily on Crimea and, for example, talking about war being over this summer.
Yes, more reasonable voices also said it's going to be hard, but UA messaging was mixed at best. 2/
On the technology side, Ukraine received long-range missiles to hit Russian rear and supply areas. Coordinating these strikes with ground action has been difficult.
C3 of even battalion sized action is still lacking as is coordination of supporting fires on tactical level.
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I've been asked about this enough and considering the developments of today on the Tokmak axis, it's good to get it out of the way.
Information presented here is mostly based on satellite data from monday as well as Russian video and reports.
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Do note, all of this is at least two days old in terms of satellite imagery, and the rest is based on things the Russians themselves have published on various channels.
It's very unlikely that any of what I am going to say is new to the Russian forces in Ukraine.
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US officials have claimed that Ukraine has penetrated 5-10km into the Russian depth. This can be true according to Russian reports as well as satellite imagery from Monday.
Remember: Russians losing ground is often implied by glorious defensive successes moving south.
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Tretyaks thread has a problem in its smoking gun: the Rybar message.
It's not talking about the Dam being blown a little last night, but rather references the video of the bridge demolition from last November when the Russians withdrew from the right bank of the river.
Careful reading of the Rybar message makes that explicitly clear:
"A small area was blown up during the withdrawal of the RF Armed Forces from the right bank of the Dnieper."
The video in question is here.
With the Rybar message not being a smoking gun the rest of the Russian response outlined in Tretyaks thread just looks like the Russians scrambling to come up with any explanations for the event.
As I said earlier this morning: The Russian media response seems confused.