Writing about the frontline situation and changes in Ukraine is hard, because I feel there has been very little new to say for a long while.

The same patterns repeat.

The Russians creep forwards at varying rates, the Ukrainians suffer from manpower issues. Sometimes a flank gets weakened enough that the Russians form a pocket or threathen a city.

Ukrainians use up resources to withdraw from an area they should've left a while ago.

The Russians won't create larger operational success.

Ukrainian counterattacks remain tactical.

SITREP 13.03.2025: Ukraine withdraws from Kursk.

Over the past 10 days, a Russian offensive pushed Ukrainian forces out of the Kursk salient, ending a 7-month operation.

What happened? Why did Ukraine withdraw? What’s next? 🧵

You can read a longer version on our Substack

1/ In August a Ukrainian offensive captured over 1200 km² of Russia's Kursk oblast.

The claimed goals were to draw Russian forces from Pokrovsk, capture leverage for negotiations and spoil a Russian operation from Sumy. It was likely also meant to shift the discourse.

2/

I think there is some flawed logic here. In general the article fail to compare and contrast the Ukrainians and the Russians on similar grounds.

To an outside observer it feels like picking and choosing talking points instead of a completely honest assessment of the situation. For example, the authors engage with assessments of Russian casualty numbers, yet fail to mention how Ukrainian officials have multiple times now published UA casualty numbers that indicate, at best, a 1:2 overall casualty ratio.

Current ratios may, naturally, differ from that.

With the recent Russian advances, two dangerous salients are emerging in Southern Donetsk.

In Velyka Novosilka and Kurakhove, the Ukrainian supply routes are under significant threat.

A quick thread on the situation in South Donetsk. 1/

1/ General situation:

Although the Russian pace of advance slowed in December they've continued their advance in southern Donetsk.

Pictured in darker red is the situation at the beginning of December, light red is Russian advances.

2/

SITREP: South Donetsk

After breaching Selydove and Hirnyk early in the week, the Russians started offensive operations in the Vuhledar direction on Friday..

Due to these developments the situation on the South Donetsk frontline has turned very difficult.

Dark red = 20. OCT

1/ Vuhledar front:

On Friday the Russians began large scale attacks towards Shakhtarske and Bohoiavienka.

They gained ground quickly, advancing almost 7km towards Shakhtarske.

These attacks were supported by large scale artillery and air bombardments.

2/

After a few weeks of (relatively) lower intensity actions, the Russians have resumed offensive operations in the Selydove-Hirnyk area, south of Pokrovsk.

In the past few days, we've seen the Russians make tactical gains throughout the AO.

Selydove direction, a thread.

1/ As said, after an operational pause and transfer of reinforcements, the Russians have restarted offensive operations.

They are taking advantage of Ukrainian lack of manpower and using infiltration tactics, sending small infantry units through gaps in the Ukrainian line.

2/

Just a reminder, at least a part of the 59th is in the salient north of Krasnohorivka.

We've repeatedly seen the willingness of the Ukrainians to spend lives over territory, but in recent months these sort of complaints from the front have become increasingly common

https://twitter.com/RyanO_ChosenCoy/status/1834707671179497827

With the experienced brigades being drawn to Kursk and getting replaced with greener ones, and with increased pressure, it seems the UA high command is expecting to do more with less. If the line doesn't hold it seems the blame is pinned on the soldiers, not the orders.

Some thoughts on today's tragedy in Poltava.

Many Ukrainians are justifiably angry due to the strike at the 179th training centre with more than 250 casualties

As has been the case lately, the anger is directed not just at the Russians but at their own leadership as well. Many Ukrainians have pointed out that this isn't first time something like this happens. There have been multiple mass causalty events caused by the Ukrainians housing large numbers of soldiers in pre-war military facilities.

Yavoriv, Mykolaivka, Desna...

I usually try not to engage with Tendar, but I've seen this shared so many times that I think I need to say something.

This is not good analysis. Instead it's the kind of analysis we want to believe in, the kind that, when written by Russians, we would laugh at.

https://twitter.com/Tendar/status/1824882454651343074

It's overtly positive and completely uncritical, failing to take into account the risks of the operation, or the unclear operational and strategic goals.

It conflates tactical success of the first two-three days with operational success.

It fails to assess long term unknowns.

Some thoughts on what's happening in Kursk.

The Russian border defences were most likely prepared to slow down and stop smaller-scale raids. Looking at the Russian telegram channels it seems that the Russian high command may have also ignored the Ukrainian buildup.

1/ As a result, Russia has to scramble the QRF's and local forces to respond to this. This gives the Ukrainians time and ability to joyride in the area to their souls content.

Reconnaisance groups are largely moving far ahead of the main force to sow more confusion.

2/

"Russia is burning Ukrainian troops to exhaustion"

The situation around the village of Prohress is deteriorating.

Russia is advancing at a rate of up to a kilometre per day. It has advanced 8km in two weeks.

The Pokrovsk front is buckling.

Some thoughts on the situation.

1/ A week ago Ukraine lost the village of Prohres after just 48 hours of fighting.

Defending Ukrainian units fled, while the reinforcing troops from the 47th also had to withdraw due to lack of infantry.

After the loss of the village the Russians have advanced up to 1km a day.

2/

"In many ways, the battle is the war in miniature."

A few thoughts on Krynky in light of recent reports of Ukrainians pulling out of the village.

I wrote a short piece on the battle for my employer. It's in Finnish but it translates nicely.

1/

hs.fi/maailma/art-20… "Hell along the river"

On both sides the battle ends up looking like a political objective made military neccesity.

For Ukraine, the initial river crossing didn't create the kind of a unified bridgehead that was needed for follow on operations.

2/

I think here are multiple reasons why the 150-series of brigades are not being committed.

First of all, Ukraine has precious few units that have not been battered in this years fighting. Yes some have been moved to R&R but it's unclear how well they've been replenished.

1/

https://twitter.com/dillonrpayton/status/1808994834625278390

Some of the brigades floating around in our internal ORBAT tracking have likely had battalions moved to support other brigades with individual battalions (especially tank brigades), or have likely had at least some manpower siphoned away to replenish casualties.

2/

I've waited over the weekend for more information to make hard statements about the Avdiivka withdrawal.

By now it's safe to say that the worst case scenario of encirclement was avoided. Ukraine clearly managed to pull its formations out of the city bit by bit during the nights. However, it does seem that the ultimate decision for abandoning the city was made quite late, judging by Ukraine holding the extreme positions within the perimeter, Zenit and the Pump station until the last possible moment.

I wrote an article for @hsfi about Zelenskyi replacing Zalushnyi and how it might indicate a lack of coherent strategy in Kyiv.

You can read it from the link, but I'll share some thoughts in this thread.

hs.fi/ulkomaat/art-2… My main problem with Syrskyi isn't necessarily the man himself, but rather the very apparent conflict and contradiction between the political and strategic goals as outlined by the Zelenskyi admin, and the actual military reality on the ground.

A quick example of the minor mistakes in narratives having large implications.

I'm currently reading "The Battle for Kyiv" by Christopher Lawrence. It's an excellent book. There's however a minor mistake that seems to find its way into every story of the battle.

Ivankiv.
1/ Early on the morning of the 25th of February the Ukrainian General Staff reported that the withdrawing Ukrainian troops had managed to destroy the bridge over the Teteriv river and halt the Russians.

This was then repeated in the international media.

2/

ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/341…

Reports of first F-16's in Ukraine.

Not surprising, considering the Estonian Defence Ministry idea paper mentioned that the first F-16's would reach Ukraine before the end of the year. Rybars report on the first squadron of 12 (+3) in Ukraine.

If we assume that they are correct and "by mid-spring" means 4 months from now, and that they are delivered in even batches with even intervals, Ukraine could have up to 60 F-16s + trainers, by the end of the year.

While I do agree that Ukraine's ultimate victory is dependent on continued and increased Western support, I still think that the hyperfocus on technology and equipment is problematic.

Ukraine has a lot of training and command issues that hamper the effective use of material.

1/

https://twitter.com/TheStudyofWar/status/1724849825319924034

If it was simply a question of material, Ukraine should have achieved more during this year's offensives. In fact, many Western commentators hyped up the aid received and expected a quick breakout with the equipment that had already been donated to Ukraine before June.

2/

The discourse on Ukraine's counter-offensive often oversimplifies Soviet doctrine as rigid mass warfare and NATO- as flexible maneuver warfare.

The truth is far more nuanced, and needed for future discussions.

Thus: Soviet tactical and operational doctrine, a thread.

1/ To keep things simple, I'll stick to the operational and tactical elements of Soviet doctrine during the late Cold War—the most relevant period for us and Ukraine.

Soviet operations were conducted by Armies and Fronts. Division and below would belong in the realm of tactics
2/

I saw someone mapping the Ukrainian supply routes into Avdiivka in a rather lacklustre way. So I decided to do my own, more informative, map.

To talk about the logistics of Avdiivka we also need to talk about the terrain west of it.

So Avdiivka, a thread:

1/ Let's start with the roads. To do this we need to differentiate between Main- and secondary supply routes. I'll define them as follows:

SSRs (brown): unpaved roads leading from MSRs into the city of Avdiivka.

MSRs (orange): Paved roads

2/

If the land bridge could be cut with long range fires, why even go for the offensive and not just wait for the GLSDB and save troops for much better offensive environment that brings?

I'm seeing a lot of smart people get aboard this narrative shifting.

1/

https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1695777892779655244

It's frustrating to watch the Ukrainian offensive struggle, and realise that the expectations of a quick victory, that many had, are not coming to fruition.

Being dishonest with ourselves and reframing the narrative however helps no-one.

2/