John Helin Profile picture
Journalist, Fact checker @ https://t.co/Az426U2OP7 Ukraine war analysis with @black_birdgroup Political history @ Helsinki Uni 📞 +358413106215 ✉️ John.jhelin@gmail.com
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Oct 27 21 tweets 7 min read
SITREP: South Donetsk

After breaching Selydove and Hirnyk early in the week, the Russians started offensive operations in the Vuhledar direction on Friday..

Due to these developments the situation on the South Donetsk frontline has turned very difficult.

Dark red = 20. OCT

1/ Image Vuhledar front:

On Friday the Russians began large scale attacks towards Shakhtarske and Bohoiavienka.

They gained ground quickly, advancing almost 7km towards Shakhtarske.

These attacks were supported by large scale artillery and air bombardments.

2/
Oct 23 24 tweets 7 min read
After a few weeks of (relatively) lower intensity actions, the Russians have resumed offensive operations in the Selydove-Hirnyk area, south of Pokrovsk.

In the past few days, we've seen the Russians make tactical gains throughout the AO.

Selydove direction, a thread.

1/ Image As said, after an operational pause and transfer of reinforcements, the Russians have restarted offensive operations.

They are taking advantage of Ukrainian lack of manpower and using infiltration tactics, sending small infantry units through gaps in the Ukrainian line.

2/
Sep 14 10 tweets 3 min read
Just a reminder, at least a part of the 59th is in the salient north of Krasnohorivka.

We've repeatedly seen the willingness of the Ukrainians to spend lives over territory, but in recent months these sort of complaints from the front have become increasingly common
Image With the experienced brigades being drawn to Kursk and getting replaced with greener ones, and with increased pressure, it seems the UA high command is expecting to do more with less. If the line doesn't hold it seems the blame is pinned on the soldiers, not the orders.
Sep 3 14 tweets 4 min read
Some thoughts on today's tragedy in Poltava.

Many Ukrainians are justifiably angry due to the strike at the 179th training centre with more than 250 casualties

As has been the case lately, the anger is directed not just at the Russians but at their own leadership as well. Image Many Ukrainians have pointed out that this isn't first time something like this happens. There have been multiple mass causalty events caused by the Ukrainians housing large numbers of soldiers in pre-war military facilities.

Yavoriv, Mykolaivka, Desna... Image
Aug 18 8 tweets 2 min read
I usually try not to engage with Tendar, but I've seen this shared so many times that I think I need to say something.

This is not good analysis. Instead it's the kind of analysis we want to believe in, the kind that, when written by Russians, we would laugh at. It's overtly positive and completely uncritical, failing to take into account the risks of the operation, or the unclear operational and strategic goals.

It conflates tactical success of the first two-three days with operational success.

It fails to assess long term unknowns.
Aug 7 10 tweets 3 min read
Some thoughts on what's happening in Kursk.

The Russian border defences were most likely prepared to slow down and stop smaller-scale raids. Looking at the Russian telegram channels it seems that the Russian high command may have also ignored the Ukrainian buildup.

1/ Image As a result, Russia has to scramble the QRF's and local forces to respond to this. This gives the Ukrainians time and ability to joyride in the area to their souls content.

Reconnaisance groups are largely moving far ahead of the main force to sow more confusion.

2/
Jul 28 18 tweets 5 min read
"Russia is burning Ukrainian troops to exhaustion"

The situation around the village of Prohress is deteriorating.

Russia is advancing at a rate of up to a kilometre per day. It has advanced 8km in two weeks.

The Pokrovsk front is buckling.

Some thoughts on the situation.

1/ Image A week ago Ukraine lost the village of Prohres after just 48 hours of fighting.

Defending Ukrainian units fled, while the reinforcing troops from the 47th also had to withdraw due to lack of infantry.

After the loss of the village the Russians have advanced up to 1km a day.

2/
Jul 20 18 tweets 5 min read
"In many ways, the battle is the war in miniature."

A few thoughts on Krynky in light of recent reports of Ukrainians pulling out of the village.

I wrote a short piece on the battle for my employer. It's in Finnish but it translates nicely.

1/

hs.fi/maailma/art-20… "Hell along the river"

On both sides the battle ends up looking like a political objective made military neccesity.

For Ukraine, the initial river crossing didn't create the kind of a unified bridgehead that was needed for follow on operations.

2/
Jul 4 10 tweets 2 min read
I think here are multiple reasons why the 150-series of brigades are not being committed.

First of all, Ukraine has precious few units that have not been battered in this years fighting. Yes some have been moved to R&R but it's unclear how well they've been replenished.

1/ Some of the brigades floating around in our internal ORBAT tracking have likely had battalions moved to support other brigades with individual battalions (especially tank brigades), or have likely had at least some manpower siphoned away to replenish casualties.

2/
Feb 19 12 tweets 2 min read
I've waited over the weekend for more information to make hard statements about the Avdiivka withdrawal.

By now it's safe to say that the worst case scenario of encirclement was avoided. Ukraine clearly managed to pull its formations out of the city bit by bit during the nights. However, it does seem that the ultimate decision for abandoning the city was made quite late, judging by Ukraine holding the extreme positions within the perimeter, Zenit and the Pump station until the last possible moment.
Feb 10 11 tweets 3 min read
I wrote an article for @hsfi about Zelenskyi replacing Zalushnyi and how it might indicate a lack of coherent strategy in Kyiv.

You can read it from the link, but I'll share some thoughts in this thread.

hs.fi/ulkomaat/art-2… My main problem with Syrskyi isn't necessarily the man himself, but rather the very apparent conflict and contradiction between the political and strategic goals as outlined by the Zelenskyi admin, and the actual military reality on the ground. Image
Jan 11 23 tweets 9 min read
A quick example of the minor mistakes in narratives having large implications.

I'm currently reading "The Battle for Kyiv" by Christopher Lawrence. It's an excellent book. There's however a minor mistake that seems to find its way into every story of the battle.

Ivankiv.
1/ Image Early on the morning of the 25th of February the Ukrainian General Staff reported that the withdrawing Ukrainian troops had managed to destroy the bridge over the Teteriv river and halt the Russians.

This was then repeated in the international media.

2/

ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/341…
Image
Dec 22, 2023 4 tweets 1 min read
Reports of first F-16's in Ukraine.

Not surprising, considering the Estonian Defence Ministry idea paper mentioned that the first F-16's would reach Ukraine before the end of the year. Rybars report on the first squadron of 12 (+3) in Ukraine.

If we assume that they are correct and "by mid-spring" means 4 months from now, and that they are delivered in even batches with even intervals, Ukraine could have up to 60 F-16s + trainers, by the end of the year. Image
Nov 16, 2023 15 tweets 3 min read
While I do agree that Ukraine's ultimate victory is dependent on continued and increased Western support, I still think that the hyperfocus on technology and equipment is problematic.

Ukraine has a lot of training and command issues that hamper the effective use of material.

1/ If it was simply a question of material, Ukraine should have achieved more during this year's offensives. In fact, many Western commentators hyped up the aid received and expected a quick breakout with the equipment that had already been donated to Ukraine before June.

2/
Nov 7, 2023 26 tweets 7 min read
The discourse on Ukraine's counter-offensive often oversimplifies Soviet doctrine as rigid mass warfare and NATO- as flexible maneuver warfare.

The truth is far more nuanced, and needed for future discussions.

Thus: Soviet tactical and operational doctrine, a thread.

1/ Image To keep things simple, I'll stick to the operational and tactical elements of Soviet doctrine during the late Cold War—the most relevant period for us and Ukraine.

Soviet operations were conducted by Armies and Fronts. Division and below would belong in the realm of tactics
2/
Oct 27, 2023 21 tweets 5 min read
I saw someone mapping the Ukrainian supply routes into Avdiivka in a rather lacklustre way. So I decided to do my own, more informative, map.

To talk about the logistics of Avdiivka we also need to talk about the terrain west of it.

So Avdiivka, a thread:

1/ Image Let's start with the roads. To do this we need to differentiate between Main- and secondary supply routes. I'll define them as follows:

SSRs (brown): unpaved roads leading from MSRs into the city of Avdiivka.

MSRs (orange): Paved roads

2/ Image
Aug 27, 2023 5 tweets 1 min read
If the land bridge could be cut with long range fires, why even go for the offensive and not just wait for the GLSDB and save troops for much better offensive environment that brings?

I'm seeing a lot of smart people get aboard this narrative shifting.

1/ It's frustrating to watch the Ukrainian offensive struggle, and realise that the expectations of a quick victory, that many had, are not coming to fruition.

Being dishonest with ourselves and reframing the narrative however helps no-one.

2/
Aug 6, 2023 13 tweets 3 min read
To add on to what Tatarigami says here, while there are legitimate criticisms with the deliveries of Western aid, blaming the failures of the counteroffensive simply on that aspect is counterproductive and often full of weird tech-utopianism. 1/ Many of the expectations for the counteroffensive were set by Ukrainians themselves focusing so heavily on Crimea and, for example, talking about war being over this summer.

Yes, more reasonable voices also said it's going to be hard, but UA messaging was mixed at best. 2/
Jun 7, 2023 17 tweets 6 min read
Velyka Novosilka, a thread.

I've been asked about this enough and considering the developments of today on the Tokmak axis, it's good to get it out of the way.

Information presented here is mostly based on satellite data from monday as well as Russian video and reports.

1/ Image Do note, all of this is at least two days old in terms of satellite imagery, and the rest is based on things the Russians themselves have published on various channels.

It's very unlikely that any of what I am going to say is new to the Russian forces in Ukraine.

3/
Jun 7, 2023 4 tweets 1 min read
Russian channels claim that Ukrainians have launched an offensive on the Melitopol axis.

According to their claims there are 10 brigades prepared for this push. Unmentioned but previously reported is another group of 4.

That would make it 14 brigades on this axis. Russian claim for amount of overall brigades in the AO seems to have been pretty OK for Velyka Novosilka, but that means little for now.

We are monitoring the developments.
Jun 6, 2023 4 tweets 2 min read
Tretyaks thread has a problem in its smoking gun: the Rybar message.

It's not talking about the Dam being blown a little last night, but rather references the video of the bridge demolition from last November when the Russians withdrew from the right bank of the river. Careful reading of the Rybar message makes that explicitly clear:

"A small area was blown up during the withdrawal of the RF Armed Forces from the right bank of the Dnieper."

The video in question is here.