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The @UKikaski account brings up a good point here that the Russian S-400 SAM went after the biggest radar target, ATACMS the rocket motor, and not the cloud of M74 APAM bomblets it dispensed
The S-400 has some of the issues US Army Patriot had in 1991 & other unique to ATACMS
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The S-400 has some of the issues US Army Patriot had in 1991 & other unique to ATACMS
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https://twitter.com/UKikaski/status/1717858613568377068
There are reasons for this.
The cloud of M74 explosive fragmentation death covers up to a square kilometer of area in an oval or circular shape depending on missile trajectory and speed of rotation at the moment of dispensing.
The larger the intended area of coverage...
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The cloud of M74 explosive fragmentation death covers up to a square kilometer of area in an oval or circular shape depending on missile trajectory and speed of rotation at the moment of dispensing.
The larger the intended area of coverage...
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...the higher the altitude this happens.
The ATACMS being a highly non-ballistic missile target means the S-400 cannot really get a good reciprocal intercept track until the ATACMS trajectory settles down for warhead dispensing.
To get a S-400 hit before ATACMS warhead
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The ATACMS being a highly non-ballistic missile target means the S-400 cannot really get a good reciprocal intercept track until the ATACMS trajectory settles down for warhead dispensing.
To get a S-400 hit before ATACMS warhead
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...dispensing means the S-400 crew has to make an early low percentage engagement using more missiles.
It's clear neither or both the VKS missile crews and their S-400 engagement software are up to this task.
This is nothing new. The 1991 example of the "Dhahran Scud"...
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It's clear neither or both the VKS missile crews and their S-400 engagement software are up to this task.
This is nothing new. The 1991 example of the "Dhahran Scud"...
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...stands out here.
The U.S. General Accounting Office report (GAO IMTEC-92-26) titled “Patriot Missile Defense: Software Problem Led to System Failure at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia" gives a detailed technical analysis of why the Patriot software failed.
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gao.gov/products/IMTEC…
The U.S. General Accounting Office report (GAO IMTEC-92-26) titled “Patriot Missile Defense: Software Problem Led to System Failure at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia" gives a detailed technical analysis of why the Patriot software failed.
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gao.gov/products/IMTEC…
A far more readable account of this failure can be found at the Barr Group site titled "Lethal Software Defects: Patriot Missile Failure".
The BLUF:
Patriot software developed a fault after more than 8 hours of continuous operation that made it...
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barrgroup.com/software-exper…
The BLUF:
Patriot software developed a fault after more than 8 hours of continuous operation that made it...
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barrgroup.com/software-exper…
...look at the wrong place in the digital data stream for a target.
The Barr report also mentions there were six different software upgrades upgrades to the Patriot during the Gulf War.
One of which would have cured the "Dhahran Scud" issue that was, literally, a day late.
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The Barr report also mentions there were six different software upgrades upgrades to the Patriot during the Gulf War.
One of which would have cured the "Dhahran Scud" issue that was, literally, a day late.
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Brig Gen. Neil's Scud comment above 'parameters where it could be attacked' was an oblique reference to a couple of issues.
First was the fact that the Patriot fuze was still an aircraft fuze, AKA not sensitive enough for very high closing rates for a Scud.
The kinematic
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First was the fact that the Patriot fuze was still an aircraft fuze, AKA not sensitive enough for very high closing rates for a Scud.
The kinematic
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...performance of the original SAM-D specification to intercept IRBM's was still in the 1991 Patriot PAC-1 missile.
The substitution for a lower sensitivity fuze on Patriot PAC-1 was a result of the 1972 ABM Treaty.
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en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-Ball…
The substitution for a lower sensitivity fuze on Patriot PAC-1 was a result of the 1972 ABM Treaty.
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en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-Ball…
The other issue was the software bias towards the "Centroid" of the strongest radar return in a Scud debris cloud rather than the leading edge of the fastest radar return, AKA the warhead.
This was the basis of ...
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This was the basis of ...
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...the flawed 2014 criticisms by MIT physicist, media talking head, and so-called ‘missile-defense expert’ Ted Postol of Israel's Iron Dome Tamir interceptors.
I did a long thread in May 2021 on Twitter - now X - on why the man was technically wrong.
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web.archive.org/web/2014071710…
I did a long thread in May 2021 on Twitter - now X - on why the man was technically wrong.
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web.archive.org/web/2014071710…
...and this post are the most relevant ones in my critique thread. Prof. Postel's arguments were a tarted up version of the Late Cold War ABM debate with nuclear weapons.
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https://twitter.com/TrentTelenko/status/1396980711559675908
That is, only destroying the warheads counted and anything less than 100% perfection was failure.
It was a brain dead argument in the Cold War and is more so with conventional weapons.
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It was a brain dead argument in the Cold War and is more so with conventional weapons.
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The Israelis between 2014 and 2021 instituted a software change in their Iron Dome Tamir interceptors to go for the leading edge of the fastest radar return.
Theoretically both the S-400 and the Pantsir-M had similar software upgrades.
Russian arms show brochures said so.🙄
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Theoretically both the S-400 and the Pantsir-M had similar software upgrades.
Russian arms show brochures said so.🙄
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Pantsir performance in Libya, Syria, Armenia and Ukraine for the 1st year of the Russo-Ukraine war showed this was not the case.
Recent improved Pantsir performance against GMLRS implies the the leading edge of the fastest radar return software update was finally made.
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Recent improved Pantsir performance against GMLRS implies the the leading edge of the fastest radar return software update was finally made.
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It's doubtful the S-400 has such a software update right now, given the failure to intercept these late Cold War submunition ATACMS before dispensing, but it will soon.
This is a problem in that it makes unitary warhead ATACMS & it's successor PrSM, less able to suppress...
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This is a problem in that it makes unitary warhead ATACMS & it's successor PrSM, less able to suppress...
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...S-400 anti-tactical ballistic missile capable SAM batteries than the so-called "obsolete" M39 & M39A1 ATACMS they are supposed to replace.
This another example of the "Death of Expertise" we are seeing in America's national security policy making space...
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This another example of the "Death of Expertise" we are seeing in America's national security policy making space...
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...that prides virtue signaling signatures on conventional arms control treaties like the Convention on Cluster Munitions over hard weapons systems technical analysis of what works on a modern battlefield.
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clusterconvention.org
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clusterconvention.org
The battlefield firepower inferiority of unitary munitions was a major reason the Cold War US military deployed cluster munitions, the other reason being it was cheaper, easier and safer to fill a cargo shell/bomb with cluster munitions than with liquid explosive.
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This 30 October 2019 Phil Karber AUSA professional development speech titled "Strategic Competition with Russia and China: Implications for U.S. and Allied Ground Forces" underlines how far US national security expertise has fallen since 1989.
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