I don’t think it’s likely that we’re headed to a World War 3 that comes with a big (nuclear) bang. It’s more likely that we could see a cascading series and coincidence of wars in different parts of the world (rather world wars than a World War).
The effect would be, as we already see now: difficulty to focus attention and resources when too many things are happening at the same time.
Much will depend on the US ability to contain this development in the parts of the world where it has extended deterrence obligations.
And that ability, in turn, will depend on the political trajectory in the US, i.e. whether the commitment holds to stick to treaty obligations and other commitments to allies and partners. (See Trump 2.0)
The problem with this potential trajectory of cascading “world wars” is that it likely requires a different containment strategy than one big World War 3 would. Hesitance in countering one adversary (out of fear of WW3) can rather embolden others, hence leading to the world wars.
It’s understandable why many Western leaders, due to their socialisation in the Cold War, still think of one big WW3 as the worst case scenario. But unfortunately, we need to be more creative what comes to possible worst cases, and think outside the old frameworks.
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Wow this is quite something in the promised land of strategic non-communication: Finnish security and intelligence service is giving a presser about Russian disturbance and influence attempts in Finland.
“Russia can endure the war, but it may not be able to endure the peace”
- aim of cyber- and other attacks not so much to cause real damage (partly because Finland has invested in resilience and is a hard target) but to sow fear
- Finland is not a prioritised object of Russian attention but Russia observes how 🇫🇮 NATO membership shapes
- the Kremlin presents its actions as reactions to Western “aggression” to domestic audiences, to obscure culpability
- “whoever is behind the pipeline damage, Russia profits from it most”
- all of this was to be expected
It’s starting, the comments “it’s gonna get messy, there will lots of civilian victims” when the IDF is responding.
That’s also because Hamas has been using human shields as its strategy from the start. See e.g. this NATO report from the period 2007-2014: stratcomcoe.org/publications/d…
“Hamas relies on the Israeli government’s aim to minimise collateral damage, and is also aware of the West’s sensitivity towards civilian casualties […] it is also aimed at gaining diplomatic and public opinion-related leverage…
…by presenting Israel and IDF as an aggressor that indiscriminately strikes civilians”.
Note that these are Palestinian civilians Hamas uses in Gaza as human shields. This has been their strategy from the beginning.
At the annual ambassadors’ conference this week, President Niinistö emphasised in his speech that Russia has been escalating month after month in Ukraine. Important to keep driving home this point.
Some notes about what was said - and what not - in the speeches this year:
President Niinistö also reminded that although diplomatic efforts and staying in conversation is a key feature of Finnish foreign policy, at the moment it’s not possible with Russia because of the enemy narrative the Kremlin is spreading about Finland. presidentti.fi/en/speeches/sp…
Also Foreign Minister Valtonen stated that Russia has broken the previous bilateral relationship and it doesn’t exist anymore on the political level. She reminded that Russia is the sole responsible here and no amount of alternative truths will change that um.fi/current-affair…
Wrote a piece (in 🇫🇮 & unfortunately 💶) about Germany in the second year of Zeitenwende. Short summary:
Germany’s problem isn’t bad faith or unwillingness to play a greater role in European security - but sec pol incompetence in the pol leadership kaleva.fi/epapatevyys-ja…
Zeitenwende is getting on slower than Germany’s partners would’ve liked to see because the challenge is simply enormous. Last year, all 🇩🇪 foreign policy principles fell one after another:
1) “diplomacy first”: diplomatic efforts failed to prevent Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
2) “never again war”: after the failure of diplomacy, large-scale war broke out - which the new government was utterly unprepared for (and they’re not to blame for it)
3) “no going it alone”: as a result of all this, Germany was expected to take on a leadership role !
In Finland, a “post mortem” process has begun re: Finland’s long road to NATO. Several people have been unusually outspoken in their criticism of President Niinistö for “keeping Finland out of NATO” after 2014.
Some thoughts about whether Finland could & should’ve joined before:
First off: there is a deep sense of gratitude towards Ukraine. It was absolutely decisive that Kyiv didn’t fall in the first days of the Russian invasion.
Finland’s NATO process would likely have been much less smooth or potentially even impossible without Ukraine’s resistance
As always in these kind of reflection processes, many people in Finland say now that deep inside they’ve actually been pro-NATO since the 1990s but just didn’t tell anyone… 🌚🌝
I think it’s ok to admit that a great majority changed their minds very recently.