After extensive research and analysis of North Korean deliveries to Russia using various sources and calculations, we estimate that Russia has received around 2,000 cargo containers containing over half a million artillery shells. The article link is at the end of this 🧵thread:
2/ This estimate, which leans toward the conservative side, suggests that the actual number likely surpasses 500,000. These artillery shells encompass predominantly both 152mm and 122mm calibers.
3/ We measured containers, identified types, gathered data on the crates, and used basic mathematical calculations to arrive at what we think is a reliable estimate. To validate our findings, we applied different approaches to calculations and arrived at nearly identical numbers
4/ We decided to explore multiple scenarios because we lack precise data on the distribution of delivered ammunition, resulting in our report containing 4 variants. Nevertheless, it's highly likely that at least 50% of the total deliveries consist of 152mm ammunition.
5/ The White House confirmed 1,000 container shipments from September to October. October 27th, satellite images show a cargo ship at Rajin port. This proves continuous shipments, extending almost a month beyond the White House's announcement of 1,000 containers in early October.
6/ The substantial ammunition supply is a concern for Ukraine, given the war's reliance on artillery. Though there were occasional shortages and decreased artillery fire, Russian forces partially retained their ammunition stocks, now augmented by North Korean deliveries.
7/ This also raises questions about whether Russia provided financial support to the cash-strapped North Korean regime or shared other military technologies, potentially affecting the security environment of the Korean peninsula.
8/ For detailed information and a more in-depth exploration of our sources, calculations, and verifications, please refer to the full article available here: frontelligence.substack.com/p/counting-the…
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Most know Kirill Dmitriev as the Russian president’s envoy. But to more than 200 investors in Ukraine, he is known for taking part in a Kyiv real estate project that ended in a fraud and criminal case. Using articles from 2011, I was able to find more details. 🧵Thread:
2/ The story begins in 2000s, when N. Lahuna and A. Dmitriev (Kirill Dmitriev’s father) planned the elite suburban “Olympic Park.” Construction was to be carried out by Traverz-Bud, a subsidiary of "Evropa", in which, according to "Argument," Kirill Dmitriev held a majority stake
3/ Based on court documents cited in the media, in 2011 (links at the end), a prosecutor’s audit found that construction of the properties, which under agreements with the developers of the “Olympic Park” was due to be completed by the end of 2008, has not been carried out
The Financial Times, a media outlet I respect and one of the few that consistently produces exceptional reporting on Ukraine, has released a new editorial opinion. Many, including myself, agree that changes are needed. However, I believe the timing is extremely problematic:
2/ The situation on the frontlines is currently very difficult. At the same time, Kyiv is facing external pressure from Washington, where many are echoing Kremlin-style “capitulation” narratives. In moments like these, the President must stand on solid ground.
3/ This is not about Zelensky personally - it is about the institution of the Presidency. Completely overhauling the government and appointing untested figures in the name of transparency could create a situation where we might end up with no state and government at all
Financial Times reports that, under the draft plan, Ukraine would be required to cede full control of the Donbas region and halve the size of its armed forces. The plan would also require Ukraine to give up certain types of weaponry:
2/ The plan would also require Ukraine to recognize Russian as an official state language and grant official status to the local branch of the Russian Orthodox Church, provisions that echo long-standing Kremlin political objectives.
3/ Officials in Kyiv briefed on the plan said it closely aligns with the Kremlin’s maximalist demands and would be a non-starter for Ukraine without significant changes, according to @ChristopherJM with @FT
A clear video showing a Kh-family cruise missile descending, releasing flares and striking a residential building in Ternopil this morning indicates the attack was deliberate, contradicting claims by Russian propaganda and bot networks that it resulted from air-defense.🧵Thread:
2/ In the first second of the video, the sound of the cruise missile is clearly audible, and flares can be seen deploying before impact. Russians started to use flares on their missiles as countermeasures against air-defence systems, including MANPADS around 2023.
3/ The missile’s silhouette, with its relatively short, swept-back wings and boat-shaped fuselage, closely matches the Kh-series of cruise missiles
In November, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs reported that 44 Indian nationals were serving in the Russian army. Frontelligence Insight obtained and reviewed data that shows the real number is higher. At least 146 Indian citizens have signed contracts. 🧵Thread:
2/ Thanks to data provided by @hochuzhit_com and our own investigation, we found that Russia, working through local recruiters in India, actively targeting Indian nationals and pulling them into military service despite the Indian government’s attempts to reduce such activities.
3/ We identified more than a dozen ongoing or recently concluded advertising campaigns targeting Indian citizens. In the image below, you can see examples from Facebook, YouTube, and other social-media platforms promotions. Notably, some advertisements directly mention Alabuga
A year and a half ago, in April 2024, I warned (the section is highlighted in the auto-translated text) that aid to Ukraine would continue to dwindle, and that without proper changes we would find ourselves in a poor position. What we’re seeing now was set in motion a while ago.
2/ Besides Europe, which I was mostly addressing in that post, Ukraine has also fallen short, mainly in strategic-level organization, despite several successes such as expanding and deploying unmanned forces and improving long-range strikes that have hurt the Russian economy.
3/ The winning strategy, as my team outlined after the 2023 counteroffensive, can be summed up as “stall the enemy while destroying the rear,” meaning inflict maximum socio-economic damage while preventing the enemy from making real gains and making the war plainly too costly.