🧵This week The Economist spoke to Valery Zaluzhny, Ukraine’s commander-in-chief, on the state of the war. It’s a fascinating & important interview. “Just like in the first world war we have reached the level of technology that puts us into a stalemate.” economist.com/europe/2023/11…
We also published an opinion piece by Zaluzhny on what he thinks is needed to break out of "positional" war. He says "air superiority" is key to ground operations & emphasises technology: drones, EW, new sorts of mine-breaching & counter-battery tech. economist.com/by-invitation/…
Finally, you can read a full-length essay by Zaluzhny in which he elaborates on these ideas over 4,000-plus words. "The need to avoid...a positional [war], such as the "trench war" of 1914-1918, necessitates the search for new & non-trivial approaches." infographics.economist.com/2023/ExternalC…
First, on the interview. Zaluzhny expresses the four hypotheses I circulated yesterday. He says the war is in stalemate ("тупик"). He says: “There will most likely be no deep & beautiful breakthrough.” And he largely blames the state of military technology
Zaluzhny's view of the battlefield is a familiar one: that modern sensors & precision weapons can make it prohibitively hard & costly for ground forces to concentrate, move and attack. See my writing here () and here () for instance. economist.com/technology-qua… economist.com/special-report…
Zaluzhny suggests the key issue is not just more arms. "This war cannot be won with the weapons of the past generation & outdated methods." It is technology. He is enthusiastic about his meetings with Eric Schmidt, the ex-CEO of Google, on AI, drones & EW. economist.com/europe/2023/11…
Zaluzhny's essay shows the influence of the likes of Eric Schmidt (). Air superiority, Zaluzhny argues, requires "simultaneous en-masse use of cheap unmanned aerial [decoys] & attack UAVs...to overload the enemy's air defence system" time.com/collection/tim… infographics.economist.com/2023/ExternalC…
Zaluzhny's emphasis on electronic warfare cannot be overstated. It is key to the drone war, he suggests. He speaks highly of Russian performance. And says Ukraine needs more Western ELINT & more EW conducted from drones "during assault operations" infographics.economist.com/2023/ExternalC…
For more context on electronic warfare in the Ukraine war, see the relevant chapter in my special report from July: economist.com/special-report…
In my view, Zaluzhny's view of technology is too simple. What tends to be more important than technology is how it's adopted in tactics, concepts and doctrine. And the impact is often incremental, not revolutionary. See, inter alia, @mchorowitz's book. press.princeton.edu/books/paperbac…
Zaluzhny's view on air power is pessimistic. He says air superiority is vital to ground ops. But Ukraine is not going to achieve that. He plays down the role of F-16s (doesn't get a mention in his essay) & says Ru air defence is adapting & improving fast. economist.com/europe/2023/11…
Zaluzhny, to his credit, is brutally honest about the offensive & his efforts to come to terms with its shortcomings. This is more than can be said for certain pro-Ukr types, who call people vatniks & pro-Russians for expressing what the general has said. economist.com/europe/2023/11…
Finally, kudos to my brilliant colleague @ArkadyOstrovsky for conducting this interview with Zaluzhny. economist.com/europe/2023/11…
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"In the coming weeks, Israeli generals expect international pressure will force them to revert to a more limited presence inside Gaza. The war will shift to raids against specific targets. These, they predict, will take months, perhaps even a year." economist.com/middle-east-an…
Israeli plan is clearer: a slower, longer ground offensive; an ebbing & flowing of ground ops, which might revert to raids. But tension is this: stay in Gaza for a year & you're into long-term occupation. But sporadic raids are unlikely to destroy Hamas.
"More than half of Gaza’s population—1.4m people—has been displaced. Shelters are overflowing: one un facility in Khan Younis, the first city south of the evacuation line, now houses 22,100 people, more than ten times its intended capacity." economist.com/middle-east-an…
Urban warfare is always destructive & harmful to civilians. But the war in Gaza is unusually destructive for a variety of reasons. A comparison with the anti-IS coalition’s battle for Mosul in 2016-17 & other recent urban campaigns is instructive. economist.com/middle-east-an…
An insane & unworkable plan. “Continuously use firepower on Hamas all over the Strip…The residents of Gaza stay in the southern half of the Strip or outside the Strip until the end of the war”, which he says could be five years. And Israel occupies large tracts as a buffer.
On v v rough calculation - 2km deep buffer across Gaza Isr border - this would imply Israel claiming control (if not physically occupying) over around a fifth of Gaza territory, apparently in perpetuity?
Bennett doesn’t explicitly say that Palestinian civilians wouldn’t be allowed to return to their homes in the north for the duration of this up-to-five-year war, but his plan certainly implies it. That seems to me to cross line from evacuation to illegal displacement.
I confess I am baffled by this story. A week ago most officials & insiders thought Russia was most likely responsible for the recent Baltic pipeline & cable sabotage: Now growing evidence that a Chinese-owned ship was behind it. How do we interpret this? economist.com/europe/2023/10…
CIA “has provided Ukraine with advanced surveillance systems, trained recruits at sites in Ukraine as well as the US, built new HQs for departments in Ukraine’s military intelligence agency, and shared intel… on a scale that would have been unimaginable” washingtonpost.com/world/2023/10/…
“Ukraine’s affinity for lethal operations has complicated its collaboration with the CIA, raising concerns about agency complicity and creating unease among some officials in Kyiv and Washington.” washingtonpost.com/world/2023/10/…
“We are seeing the birth of a set of intelligence services that are like Mossad in the 1970s,” said a former senior CIA official…Ukraine’s proficiency at such operations “has risks for Russia,” the official said, “but it carries broader risks as well.” washingtonpost.com/world/2023/10/…
I've been asked, repeatedly, and by serious people, why the media circulated "disinformation" around Hamas beheading babies. It was not disinformation. There was first-hand evidence from the start. You just didn't want to see it.