There are usual 9-to-10 battalions of tanks, infantry, & reconnaissance in a division.
In addition, there are usually 3-to-4 battalions of artillery with 18-to-24 guns each in 3-to-4 batteries of 4-to-8 guns.
Gun batteries will need a minimum of 2 jammers each while using
2/
..."shot & scoot" tactics to avoid counter battery fire.
Plus all artillery fire direction centers will need at least 2-to-3 active jammers so a mass MLRS *blarf* doesn't simply eliminate the grid square they are in.
Then how many are going to be needed with logistics?
Either there will be a jammer moving with every truck convoy and ammunition resupply point
_OR_ you will have to plant a continuous line of jammers along your main supply routes.
If you have three MSR, 24 km long to stop FPV drones, at one jammer per Kilometer for overlap.
3/
That is 72 jammers as a minimum for truck logistics in a divisional supply area.
9 btn X 14 = 126 Jammers
12 Artillery batteries X 2 = 24 jammers
14 fire direction centers X 3 = 42 jammers
4/
The total number of those jammers to cover a divisional sector is going to be a minimum of 264 jammers.
Who is going to properly site, take care and relocate of all of those jammers to support divisional operations?
How well do they have to be trained to do their jobs?
5/
Basically, these jammers will need a platoon for every tank/infantry/artillery battalion.
Plus a jammer company for every divisional main supply route.
We are talking two highly trained/expensive electronic warfare battalions for every division to counter the FPV threat.
6/
People on X making cracks about 'how expensive jam resistant FPV drones will be' demonstrate their technological, procurement & force structure innumeracy.
They are utterly clueless when it comes to deploying a large, skilled, signals trained jamming force structure.🤦♂️
7/7 End
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"Knock 'em All Down:" The Reduction of Aachen, October 1944
Christopher R. Gabel, Ph.D.
"The battalion's catchphrase for this operation was "Knock 'em all down." There was no attempt to avoid collateral damage; in fact, the troops displayed ... 2/ globalsecurity.org/military/libra…
...a degree of enthusiasm in wrecking a German city."
Warfare with the Japanese in buildings or caves was a form of civil engineering with direct and indirect fire high explosive.
The level of threat ignorance and institutional delusion here is just awe inspiring.
BLUF:
When it comes to procuring electronic attack (EA) jamming systems. US Army leadership has the same level of competence as a young man who can't get laid in a wh*rehouse with a... 1/
...pocket full of $100 bills and condoms.
Col. Jeffrey Church laid those facts out in the following article:
Army Wrestles With SIGINT vs. EW
By SYDNEY J. FREEDBERG JR.
on July 31, 2018 at 6:33 PM
The US Army's dysfunctional E.A. procurement structure that Col. Church described in 2018 still exists.
In Oct 2023 at the Association of the US Army's (AUSA's) annual symposium, US Army General Randy George told reporters of the US Army's continued EA procurement dysfunction 3/
There are reasons that I'm concerned about Chinese PLA/CCP satellite coverage of US Navy Carrier groups after the US Defense Department ordered a THAAD battery to the Middle East.
Very good reasons having to do with the possibility of Chinese anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) tech being on Iranian/Houthi medium range ballistic missiles.
The battlefield vulnerability of the BMPT is easily proven.
There are visuals of a BMPT being engaged by Ukrainian 152mm/155mm artillery shells showing it to be as vulnerable as any other ex-Soviet tank design to modern weapons.
I am really hoping I'm wrong about this prediction of mine regarding THAAD being there to protect US Carriers from Chinese tech anti-ship guided warheads on the Toufan (Iranian Ghadr).
Because if there are Chinese tech ASBM warheads...