By popular demand (ok maybe not popular demand but @alphaarchitect asked), here's a thread on how active US stock funds have fared against their style-specific indexes (i.e., Russell index family) *before* fees over various rolling periods (i.e., 3, 5, 10 years) since 2003...
Let's start with rolling three-year periods since 2003. On average, 42% of funds beat their BM before fees (by avg margin of 2.74% p.a.), 39% lagged (by -2.62% p.a.), and 19% died before reaching the end. All told, the average fund beat its index by 0.19% p.a. before fees.
Here's the same thing but for rolling five-year periods since 2003. On average, 38% of funds beat their BM before fees (by avg margin of 2.12% p.a.), 34% lagged (by -1.99% p.a.), and 28% died before reaching the end. All told, the avg fund beat its index by 0.21% p.a. before fees
And here it is for rolling 10-year periods since 2003. On average, 32% of funds beat their BM before fees (by average margin of 1.48% p.a.), 24% lagged (by -1.32% p.a.), and 43% died before reaching the end. All told, the average fund beat its index by 0.26% p.a. before fees.
Before looking at how types of active US stock funds did before fees, here's a few charts that summarize everything (i.e., the averages I cited in the three previous tweets). Tldr, as you elongate the measurement period, fewer funds survive, fewer beat, and outperf margin shrinks
Now let's look at types of active US stock funds, focusing on large-cap funds and the rolling 10-year periods since 2003. On average, 26% of funds beat, 27% lagged, and 46% died. Remarkably, <10% of Large Growth funds beat their index *before* fees over the decade ended 10/31/23
Next, let's take a look at active mid-cap funds, again focusing on rolling 10-year periods since 2003. On average, 31% of funds beat before fees, 24% lagged, and 45% died. These success rates slightly exceeded those of active large-cap funds.
Now, active small-cap funds, focusing on rolling 10-year periods since 2003. On average, 47% beat before fees, 14% lagged, and 39% died. In other words, the avg active small-cap fund was almost 2x more likely to beat its index before fees than the avg active large cap fund.
Here's the same thing but this time focusing on value, blend, and growth styles over rolling 10-year periods, irrespective of market-cap (i.e., large, mid, small). On average, 42% of value funds beat their benchmark before fees vs. 29% of blend funds and 29% of growth funds.
These charts provide a little more detail on % of funds that beat or lagged before fees, or died, by category as well as major style (i.e., market cap, value/blend/growth). Small Value boasts highest average pre-fee success rate (57%) while Large Growth has the lowest (22%).
In summary, with only a third of active U.S. stock funds beating their index before fees over the average 10-year period and with the average fund outperforming by just 0.26% p.a. (excluding dead funds), one thing seems pretty clear: Active U.S. stock funds charge too much. /end
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ARK Innovation had one of the most blistering hot streaks we've ever seen, notching a 365% gain off the Covid bottom to Feb. 13, 2021, when it peaked. But the selloff since then has wiped out ~87% of the gains it had amassed during the 3/20-2/21 run-up. It's a study in extremes.
But this is what makes $ARKK a unicorn: Assets *poured* in during the run-up and, remarkably, have largely stayed put since then, despite the brutal selloff. Take the two together, and it is maybe the biggest, fastest destruction of shareholder capital in fund history.
By our estimates, ARKK saw ~$12.7B in mkt losses from 1/31/21-3/31/22. It had $22.6B in AUM as of 1/31/22. So it lost >=~55% of capital invested in it on/around the time it peaked. We've seen large $ losses in big funds (by AUM) before, but this is big $s *and* big % of the AUM.
I *highly* recommend reading the SEC complaint against James Velissaris, mgr of Infinity Q Diversified Alpha Fund. I don't know if this would be the biggest fraud ever in a US mutual fund, but the brazenness and scale kind of puts it in a class of its own. spr.ly/6010KpQ4O
The whole complaint is bonkers--the lengths to which he went to re-code the pricing model, enter fake swap terms, select incorrect pricing models, concoct a fake audit trail to cover his tracks. It's all there.
But this is the passage that really stood out to me: When faced w/an avalanche of margin calls in 3/20, he massively mismarked several positions to the tune of a $400MM+ mis-valuation. Because this mis-mark boosted returns, it attracted new flows w/which to meet the margin calls.
"SEC Charges Infinity Q Founder with Orchestrating Massive Valuation Fraud | Defendant Overvalued Fund Assets by More than $1 Billion, Pocketing Millions" !!! spr.ly/6010KplCg
"The complaint alleges that at times during the pandemic, the funds’ actual values were half of what investors were told." 😬
The complaint itself is quite a read. Here is a morsel:
A dozen questions on ESG I ask myself, in no particular order. 1) I’m investing in a total stock market index fund. It doesn’t intentionally incorporate ESG. If ESG is essential to investing, is my strategy incomplete?
2) I’m investing in a total stock market index fund. It doesn’t intentionally incorporate ESG. But if the market is pretty good at pricing in risks, including ESG, isn’t that what matters?
3) If the market isn’t good at pricing in risks, making it necessary to invest in intentional ESG strategies that tilt away from firms that court more unmanaged material ESG risk, why is this?
This week on The Long View podcast, @christine_benz and I sit down with researcher Laura Carstensen, who is the director of the Stanford Center on Longevity. This was a very eye-opening discussion of work, retirement, longevity, and happiness. A thread... spr.ly/6012y4kN6
We often define retirement ‘success’ in arithmetic terms—future returns, spending rates, etc. But Laura reminds us that fulfillment can often boil down to very basic, tactile factors like feeling we are living with purpose or enjoying meaningful social connections...
We discuss why older adults have fared better emotionally during the pandemic than younger people; how social relationships are vital to happiness (and how social networks change over time); why life expectancy has risen so dramatically; the link between wealth and longevity...
These four funds had ~$9.7B in AUM as of 6/30/21. Of that, ~$7.1B was held by other JPM funds (tgt date, tgt risk; ex 529s). So at least 73% of the assets were held by other JPM funds. This makes conversion much more feasible but is not a garden variety scenario in the fund world
Though the article makes some comparisons to ARK, these funds slated for conversion are nothing like ARK. The Market Expansion Enhd. Idx Fund for instance recently spread its AUM across 666 names. The other equity fund has 205 holdings, biggest weight a scant 2.7%.
One irony here is reason these funds are held by other JPM funds is prob bc they aren’t go-for-broke, mega-high-tracking-error. That is, their un-ARK’ness is what makes them acceptable holdings in these other JPM funds. And those funds’ big stake makes conversion more feasible.