In my opinion, and not minimizing the part played by other branches:
Nasrallah's speech has confirmed beyond a reasonable doubt America's conventional deterrent. Deploying 2 carrier strike groups to an international crisis has historically been our tool for expressing national..
intnet. And with crisis in Israel and the Middle East at large, the surge in posture (and subsequent retaliatory strikes) has cemented, in my mind, that the United States is still MORE than capable of rapidly deploying military forces into a region to signal to an adversary that
"Hey, we have a very serious interest in the stability of this region. We are trying to convey to you that if you fuck around, you will find out. We don't want you to fuck around, which is why we have surged so many forces into this the region to convince you that you will find..
Out, incase you fuck around too much"
Simultaneously, in the "priority theater' of the DoD we have 2 CSGs on the verge of second dual CSG/DCSF exercise while we sailed through the Taiwan Strait with our ally who consistently rides shotgun with us during these transits.
Long stort short, don't doubt American detterence. You can be "skeptica"l of political leadership in enacting our deterrence;but the lever is there to pull. If you fuck around, you will find out, and our alliances are marching to our drum beat, as recent developments have proved.
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Now that the semester is over and I can breathe, this is a short(?) thread on a presentation I did for my China class. I was able to pick any topic, so naturally, I wanted to investigate how the China views the United State's reorientation back to interstate-strategic competiton
My career aspirations are to assist in navigating US national security policy in the Indo-Pacific in whatever capacity I am afforded. I have a real good grasp on what *we* are doing but my understanding of China's reaction/interpretation were quite lacking (and still are, mostly)
So, the Indo-Pacific is our priority theater, China is our pacing challenge. Most people in the West that follow this field are well aware, but I'm of the belief that most people aren't well aware of how China is perceiving renewed US engagement. I am one of these people.
Ground launched NSM, OpFires, PrSM, SM-6 Blk 1B, LRHW, surface/ground launched Maritime Strike Tomahawk, NSM, SM-6 Blk 1B, air-launched AGM-158A/B/B-2/C/D, OSuW 2.0/HALO, and subsurface launched CPS/MST/whatever the hell Rapid Dragon is dotted throughout the first island chain
helps me sleep at night.
It seems that a lot of the mainstream narrative wrt a Pacific conflict is stuck in pre 2018, still believing that the US will operate in WESTPAC in the same manner that brought the last 2 decades of PLA modernization when.. that just isnt the case anymore
The US is well into the walk phase of introducing new doctrine and capabilities to operate within the "great wall at sea". INDOPACCOM exercises for the past half-decade at this point have been actively rehearsing Distributed Maritime Operations, Litoral Operations in a Contested
The infamous "Gotland exercises" are heavily misinterpreted. Thread.
It's not a secret that the USN puts a pretty heavy emphasis on training with allies, it's been a lynchpin in our naval operations for the better part of a century at this point. It makes the USN better at doing
Navy things, alliances are amazing.
Now, to the Gotlands credit, it is/was at the time probably the most advanced European SSK, a buddy put it as:
"the Gotland is the darksouls of finding an SSK"
That said, these exercises don't, and aren't supposed to simulate 1 to 1 real world
conditions. A US CVN can cover an INSANE distance in a short period of time. Hence the 700 mile a day reference in the OP. The Gotland exercise, by virtue of forcing an engagement so each side can learn, limited the exercise area. Taking away one of a CSGs biggest advantages
Went to my first event today! @CSIS and @NavalInstitute set such a high bar for what I expect from something like this. Posting some of the main themes I gathered from the Commander of U.S. 7th Fleet. VADM Karl Thomas.
Not 100% accurate, missed a few things, please correct!
Started off with being asked about general trends on Chinese and Russian behavior in 7th Fleets AOR.
-VADM Thomas commented that for the past few years it was very common for the PLAN to "operate with"(shadow) USN vessels in the SCS/within China's 9 Dash Line claim.
Typically when a USN vessel would transition outside of the 9 dash line PLAN vessels would break off, but recently PLAN vessels would continue trailing after USN vessels would transition outside of 9 Dash Line claims. Didn't go into further detail.