A 🧵on ceasefires. In my experience, 3 elements are normally needed. Readiness by both sides to stop fighting (on conditions). A broker to negotiate a deal. And int supervision to give confidence that both sides will respect the terms. Gaza conflict is not at this point yet 1/6
On readiness to stop fighting, Netanyahu seeks destruction of Hamas (impossible - he will have to settle for enough damage done to its mil power) + release of all hostages. Hamas demands release of all Palestinian prisoners in Israel in return. Tough negotiation lies ahead 2/6
The honest broker role has usually been the US using mix of diplomatic weight and mil muscle. Think Kissinger (1973 ME war), Habib (1982 Lebanon), Holbrooke (1995 Bosnia). Sometimes a group can work (Ahtisaari/Chernenko forced Milosevic to accept a G8 plan on Kosovo in 1999) 3/6
In Gaza, no single broker w’d have confidence of both sides. It will need a group involving eg US, Egypt, Qatar. There will have to be arm-twisting to get both sides to the table. Only US can pressure Israel: the rift over a humanitarian pause is a first public sign of this 4/6
On int supervision of a ceasefire, in the past this has often been UN blue-helmets or a UN-authorised US-led peacekeeping force. Neither looks feasible given state of Israel/UN relations and risks to Western troops in Gaza. Some form of multilateral force from Arab states? 5/6
Finally, is there any point in calling for a ceasefire? Depends on your objective. If you want to take a principled position, then yes, absolutely. If your interest is in practical proposals as a first step to a ceasefire, then a humanitarian pause has to be the priority 6/6
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Rather than finding something new to say on Israel/Gaza, here is a memory, with a message. The memory is that I was the FCO Arab-Israel desk officer in 1982 at the time of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. At the time this felt like a major crisis. There are some parallels 1/
One parallel was the objective: to destroy the HQ and military infrastructure of the PLO in Lebanon after years of x-border attacks inflicting civilian casualties in N Israel (tho nothing like the mass terrorism of Hamas). Another was the mil tactic: a major ground operation 2/
Result: the IDF occupied S Lebanon and besieged Beirut. With PM Begin promising this w’d lead to 40 years of peace, and 14,000 PLO fighters leaving Lebanon for Tunis, it looked as if military force c’d achieve the political goal. But there was no real plan for the next stage. 3/
Some thoughts on the IR refresh. The tone is strikingly different. Gone is the bombastic rhetoric of IR2021 about world-leading Global Britain being a superpower in every domain. It is a more sober document, reflecting the reality of war in Ukraine. 1/ gov.uk/government/pub…
The importance of the UK’s role European security is rightly prominent. There is much stress on working with partners incl NATO and the G7, and a new emphasis on joining up Atlantic and Pacific alliances (reflecting the new fact of AUKUS). 2/
The refresh highlights cooperation with France, Germany and other Europeans. There is also a more positive tone about working with the EU, to ‘sustain the positive trajectory’ set by the Windsor framework. Unsurprisingly, nothing tho’ about structured cooperation with the EU. 3/
This came out last year unnoticed, but it treats a big issue: the role history can play in helping leaders make better decisions. It has chapters by real historians like Margaret Macmillan, Philip Bobbitt @KoriSchake + @andrewehrhardt and an amateur, me! 1/5
You won’t find it in airport bookshops! If you wanted to make an investment, it’s here bloomsbury.com/uk/applied-his…. Or find a friendly library. As a taster, my chapter takes three case studies from my own experience of how history can be applied to the practice of foreign policy 2/5
First, the UK/China negotiation on Hong Kong 1982-4. Professional historians made no real input to this ‘problem left over from history’ since there was little scholarship then on Deng’s China, the FCO’s China hands didn’t want advice and Mrs Thatcher demanded total secrecy. 3/5
I hope you are right. And it is certainly a good thing that Truss is going to the first meeting. But I would add a couple of notes of caution. First, this grouping was launched by Macron in his May Strasbourg speech as a response to the Ukraine/Georgia/Moldova bid to join the EU.
And I see the EU have decided that the second meeting will be in Moldova not UK. So there is still a strong flavour of the EPC as a forum for EU countries to mitigate the impatience of candidate countries, as well as a place to talk European security with a wider group.
And when I say wider it’s a pretty unwieldy gathering of 44. A one day meeting means that each leader will get one intervention. And think of the tensions between eg Turkey/Greece, Azerbaijan/Armenia, Serbia/ Balts and Poles etc. The risk is that it rapidly becomes unmanageable.
A thread on how Ukraine crisis diplomacy has revealed longstanding differences between UK and French approaches to Russia. Both are valid, only time will tell which was shrewder. They aren’t incompatible if they are part of a well-coordinated deterrence/diplomacy strategy 1/7
French leaders since de Gaulle have prized their own channel to Moscow, independent of US. Since the 2014 Ukraine crisis, Fr/Ge kept talking to Putin and negotiated the Minsk accords. Macron seeks a stronger EU global role so it’s natural he should try to negotiate with Putin 2/7
French leaders since de Gaulle have prized their own channel to Moscow, independent of US. Since the 2014 Ukraine crisis, Fr/Ge kept talking to Putin and negotiated the Minsk accords. Macron seeks a stronger EU global role so it’s natural he should try to negotiate with Putin 3/7
Couple of extra thoughts on the après-Frost. He secured Johnson’s flank with the Brexit ultras, and could be counted on to stick to the most ideological line with the EU, first in the WA and TCA negotiations, then in trying to get out of the realities of the NI Protocol. But..1/4
Now the politics have changed. Johnson is weakened by scandals and beset by the omicron crisis. He can’t afford a trade war with the EU over the Protocol. Hence the signals of a new openness in London to cutting a deal. It seems Frost was unwilling to show the necessary flex 2/4
Now others have to sort out the mess he leaves behind. This will need more than simply replacing Frost. Johnson should take this opportunity to end the anomaly that the Minister responsible for relations with our nearest neighbours operates as a lone ranger in the Cab Office 3/4