Great to see the 120th anniversary of the 🇬🇧🇫🇷 Entente Cordiale marked by the participation of the Coldstream Guards in a ceremony at the Elysée at the same time as 1/

https://twitter.com/ukdefencefrance/status/1777272806486479295

French troops join the Changing of the Guard at Buckingham Palace. But what were the documents signed in London on 8 April 1904? I was surprised when I found out the difference between the historical importance of the entente and the substance of the documents themselves 2/

https://twitter.com/lbc/status/1777294087671972329

My appeal @BBCr4today yesterday for the UK to suspend arms exports to Israel seems to have generated some interest. It was not a knee-jerk reaction to one awful incident. The deaths of the 7 aid workers brought into sharp focus a deep underlying problem. This was my argument 1/6 Israel takes pride in the professionalism of the IDF. They dominate the land, sea and airspace of Gaza. They have a duty as occupying power to protect and provide for civilians, including the special status under international humanitarian law of aid workers and medical staff 2/6

75 years ago tmw, Bevin signed the Washington Treaty he had done so much to shape. What is the secret of NATO’s longevity? Has it responded effectively to Ukraine and what are its prospects? Join us online for this @RUSI conference with @David_Cameron speaking around 1700BST 1/6

https://twitter.com/rusi_org/status/1775443141685903414

I’ve known NATO since joining the UK Del in 1978. For me, its relevance for 75 years comes from its adaptability. That stems from its terse Treaty, pared down to 14 articles of principles and objectives. NATO’s strength is not based on Treaty text but on trust between allies. 2/6

A short 🧵on the Cameron effect, 3 months in as Foreign Secretary. The impact of one person representing a middle-sized power will of course be limited. But in my view, he has shown that foreign policy influence = effort + ideas + confidence to go beyond orthodox positions 1/6 On effort/stamina, Cameron scores highly: four trips criss-crossing the Middle East, plus Kiev, Washington, the main European capitals, several international conferences like Munich + next week the Americas from Falklands to NY via Brazil for G20. Showing up isn’t everything…2/6

A🧵on the start of the EU accession process for Ukraine. This is a turning point for European security. Even if the Russian invasion ends in stalemate and a truce and Ukraine divided, getting 80% of Ukraine into NATO then EU makes a further war much less likely. Here’s why. 1/10 In March 2022, a month after the invasion I wrote a blog for Prospect on How Wars End. I predicted that this one would not end in a victory for either side, but a stalemate with an armed truce à la Korea. I still think that’s the most likely outcome 2/10 prospectmagazine.co.uk/politics/38472…

A 🧵on ceasefires. In my experience, 3 elements are normally needed. Readiness by both sides to stop fighting (on conditions). A broker to negotiate a deal. And int supervision to give confidence that both sides will respect the terms. Gaza conflict is not at this point yet 1/6 On readiness to stop fighting, Netanyahu seeks destruction of Hamas (impossible - he will have to settle for enough damage done to its mil power) + release of all hostages. Hamas demands release of all Palestinian prisoners in Israel in return. Tough negotiation lies ahead 2/6

Rather than finding something new to say on Israel/Gaza, here is a memory, with a message. The memory is that I was the FCO Arab-Israel desk officer in 1982 at the time of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. At the time this felt like a major crisis. There are some parallels 1/ One parallel was the objective: to destroy the HQ and military infrastructure of the PLO in Lebanon after years of x-border attacks inflicting civilian casualties in N Israel (tho nothing like the mass terrorism of Hamas). Another was the mil tactic: a major ground operation 2/

Some thoughts on the IR refresh. The tone is strikingly different. Gone is the bombastic rhetoric of IR2021 about world-leading Global Britain being a superpower in every domain. It is a more sober document, reflecting the reality of war in Ukraine. 1/ gov.uk/government/pub… The importance of the UK’s role European security is rightly prominent. There is much stress on working with partners incl NATO and the G7, and a new emphasis on joining up Atlantic and Pacific alliances (reflecting the new fact of AUKUS). 2/

This came out last year unnoticed, but it treats a big issue: the role history can play in helping leaders make better decisions. It has chapters by real historians like ⁦Margaret Macmillan, Philip Bobbitt ⁦@KoriSchake⁩ ⁦+ ⁦@andrewehrhardt⁩ and an amateur, me! 1/5 You won’t find it in airport bookshops! If you wanted to make an investment, it’s here bloomsbury.com/uk/applied-his…. Or find a friendly library. As a taster, my chapter takes three case studies from my own experience of how history can be applied to the practice of foreign policy 2/5

I hope you are right. And it is certainly a good thing that Truss is going to the first meeting. But I would add a couple of notes of caution. First, this grouping was launched by Macron in his May Strasbourg speech as a response to the Ukraine/Georgia/Moldova bid to join the EU.

https://twitter.com/mij_europe/status/1577546084175552512

And I see the EU have decided that the second meeting will be in Moldova not UK. So there is still a strong flavour of the EPC as a forum for EU countries to mitigate the impatience of candidate countries, as well as a place to talk European security with a wider group.

A thread on how Ukraine crisis diplomacy has revealed longstanding differences between UK and French approaches to Russia. Both are valid, only time will tell which was shrewder. They aren’t incompatible if they are part of a well-coordinated deterrence/diplomacy strategy 1/7 French leaders since de Gaulle have prized their own channel to Moscow, independent of US. Since the 2014 Ukraine crisis, Fr/Ge kept talking to Putin and negotiated the Minsk accords. Macron seeks a stronger EU global role so it’s natural he should try to negotiate with Putin 2/7

Couple of extra thoughts on the après-Frost. He secured Johnson’s flank with the Brexit ultras, and could be counted on to stick to the most ideological line with the EU, first in the WA and TCA negotiations, then in trying to get out of the realities of the NI Protocol. But..1/4

https://twitter.com/cer_grant/status/1472355060755611656

Now the politics have changed. Johnson is weakened by scandals and beset by the omicron crisis. He can’t afford a trade war with the EU over the Protocol. Hence the signals of a new openness in London to cutting a deal. It seems Frost was unwilling to show the necessary flex 2/4

Johnson and Biden are to issue a 'New Atlantic Charter' at their mtg today. Will it live up to the impact of its great 1941 Churchill/Roosevelt predecessor? The first Chapter of Hard Choices analyses the AC , which shaped the postwar peace. (Here with Churchill amendments) 1/ UK politicians love to invoke the symbolism of the Atlantic Charter as the foundation of the 'special relationship' or whatever we are now to call it. Theresa May even gave Trump a facsimile in 2019. Why does this document exercise such fascination? 2/6 dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7…

In April @MarkLowcock and I warned that the abrupt aid cuts would damage Britain’s reputation and ability to spur global action. Now on the eve of the G7 summit we have the humiliating spectacle of the Gov’t opposing efforts from senior MPs to reaffirm its legal commitment 1/2

https://twitter.com/lordrickettsp/status/1385156488017190914

The case for scrapping the cuts is overwhelming. UK is the only G7 member cutting aid. France and Germany are increasing to 0.7%. No other part of UK public spending is being cut. The world’s poor are the only victims of the hard choices the Gov’t says it’s compelled to make 2/5

In coming days I will delve into more detail on aspects of the IR. Today, setting priorities. The US historian John Lewis Gaddis defined strategy as ‘the alignment of potentially unlimited aspirations with necessarily limited capabilities’. How does the IR measure up to that? 1/9 I wouldn’t claim that the Nat Sec Strategy and Strategic Defence Review I oversaw in 2010 was perfect. But we did for the first time set out a prioritied set of national security risks. We listed 15, in 3 tiers. In the 2015 NSS, that had grown to 20 but was still manageable 2/9

The Review is a carefully-crafted document, balancing precariously key policy continuities and eye-catching new themes. Overall, less of a radical shift than advertised. But there are important unresolved tensions. How these play out is what will the shape the new strategy 1/8 On the continuities, welcome reaffirmation of UK leadership in NATO and euro-Atlantic security, the alliance with the US, commitment to multilateralism, and upholding human rights and open economies. 2/8

The decision not to participate in #Erasmus is short-sighted and mean-spirited. The programme transformed the life-chances of thousands of Brits, many from disadvantaged backgrounds. The proposed UK alternative from a standing start will not be a full substitute. Here’s why. 1/7 Erasmus is often misunderstood as ‘just’ about uni student exchanges. That’s hugely important. But it also promoted vocational education and training placements and youth exchanges for schoolchildren. It gave extra grants for those with disabilities. All this = levelling up. 2/7

Initial take on the security/justice parts of deal, based on summaries. May be useful when studying the full text. Overall, better than I had feared. Will reduce gap in capability from 1 Jan if applied immediately. BUT cooperation will be still be slower/more clunky than now. 1/7 Data sharing. Looks like a good outcome: UK can continue to exchange fingerprint and DNA data through Prum (though not in real-time, so it will be slower) and vehicle reg. data in future. Exchange of Passenger Name Records continues, on precedent set by EU/US and AUS deals. 2/7

10 years ago today, UK and France signed two landmark Treaties on defence cooperation, which I coordinated as National Security Adviser. Here’s my view of what has been achieved (a mixed picture) and the prospects (much of the momentum has been lost) 1/4 rusi.org/commentary/fra… One Treaty made a 50 year commitment to nuclear cooperation. The two countries are sharing a single facility (in Burgundy) for testing their warhead designs using advanced simulation. Saves each side money, and sends a powerful message of confidence in long-term partnership 2/4