Thread by @MBielieskov

Unfortunately both people inside&outside of UA mostly concentrate on specific personalities analysing war dynamics instead of giving a thought to objective conditions. By this people miss really important things and how they shape limits of possible. Thread 🧵

The major problem for UA mil strategy that in 2023 campaign (unlike in 2022 campaign) political goals, military capabilities and combat performance have not been in balance. Moreover there was a tension between political&military dimension. Let’s see this contrast in detail.

In 2022 UA campaign there was kind of perfect match between political goals, mil capabilities&combat performance. Politically strat defense with counterattacks was just fine. And for this UA had proper capabilities&combat performance. Front dynamics in 2022 reflected this match.

In 2023 campaign politically UA had to do classic offensive operation to liberate its people&territories. Staying just defensive was no more enough. Cause if it’s only defensive mode it means pressure on UA to freeze frontline with first hints on freezing out of US in Nov 2022.

But militarily offensive in this war is a challenge with “offensive-defensive balance” favouring defense. It’s much easier to detect&strike opponent concentration of forces than creating such concentration and applying it which is required for successful offensive action.

This tension between political&military dimension is one of themes in gen Zaluzhniy piece for The Economist. UA Commander in Chief admitted that politically UA needs to advance. But militarily it’s a challenge with number&sophistication of technology UA Forces currently possess.

There is another problem - trap of West expectations UA got into. As partners finally decided in Jan 2023 to establish offensive specific grouping of forces&provided weaponry RU created defense in depth+obstacles which only reinforced defense-offensive balance in defence favour.

So West basically expected things UA Defense Forces would find it hard to deliver with all the negative consequences for sustaining long term military aid for UA.

That’s why in June 2023 UA faced a kind of strat zugzwang. As it happened doing a classic offensive people expected out of UA proved to be a challenge. At the same time it’s hard to imagine that UA would dare to say “We are not going to do offensive as we deem it too risky”.

That’s things we need to accept and in 2024 campaign plan bring into balance political&military considerations while looking technological&tactical solutions which finally change offensive-defensive balance back in offensive favour as gen Zaluzhniy suggested.