Unfortunately both people inside&outside of UA mostly concentrate on specific personalities analysing war dynamics instead of giving a thought to objective conditions. By this people miss really important things and how they shape limits of possible. Thread 🧵 The major problem for UA mil strategy that in 2023 campaign (unlike in 2022 campaign) political goals, military capabilities and combat performance have not been in balance. Moreover there was a tension between political&military dimension. Let’s see this contrast in detail.

A quick thread on idea raised privately by some US officials that should UA be more forceful in penetration phase early in South offensive it might have lost more but in the end accomplished a breakthrough of RU tactical depth quicker instead of being bogged in tactical depth. But first some important facts to consider this issue.
1 Trent Maul, director of analysis at DIA, admitted in The Economist interview that “US officials failed to appreciate the depth of Russia’s defences”.

Недавно пан @anthony__cba попросив скласти список того, що перечитав із книжок по воєнним і стратегічним питанням. Даю перелік книг, які прочитав із жовтня 2018 до 24.02.22 року.

1Еріх фон Манштейт “Втрачені перемоги”.
2Безіл Ліддел Гарт “Стратегія непрямих дій”. 3Александр Свечин “Клаузевіц”.
4Toshi Yoshihara, James R. Holmes “Red Star over the Pacific: China's Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy”
5Андрей Кокошин “Армия и политика. Эволюция советской военно-политической и военно-стратегической мысли (1918—1991)”

US-UA relations after 1991 can be described as UA desire to attain US security guarantees given RU threat while US were mainly ready to build partnership in field of security with UA avoiding risks of direct confrontation with RU. So current tussle over Vilnius NATO summit wordings related to UA is nothing new except circumstances which progressively deteriorate given past restraint to idea of UA NATO membership.

@viddavaj Там трохи цікавіше чим запамʼятав. Вибачаюся. Дійсно США тисли щоб ніяких ракет більше 300 км якщо виробляти плануємо відповідно до політики 1993 року. Але дід Горбулін відстояв право якщо що створювати то до дальності 500 км. Держдеп сказав ок, бо розуміли що ніц не втягнемо. @viddavaj armscontrol.org/act/1998-03/ar…

Another bunch of my humble thoughts on current and prospective UA-NATO relations. Thread. Prologue. I am definitely not a big fun of John Mearsheimer who is a moral bankrupt as his so called realism is just appeasement of revisionist states.

Some thoughts on recent discussions on future of Ukrainian-NATO relations on the eve of Vilnius Alliance summit. Thread. Recently some UA officials&experts publicly and privately tried to provide such a reading of NATO Article 5 which in their opinion will bring us close to Alliance membership.

In last two month US promised/delivered to Ukraine following number of ammo/equipment based on DOD factsheets published on 4.04 and 31.05

What the Americans gave us or promised to give us during the last 2 months.

+100 Stinger MANPADS.
+2000 anti-armour systems. + ~500,000 155 mm rounds.
+ ~500 precision guided 155 mm rounds.
+ ~50,000 105 mm artillery rounds.
+4 bridging systems.
+1,200 missiles for the TOW II ATGM.
+8 air defense system Avenger.
+2000 Zuni Missiles.
+24 trucks and trailers for heavy equipment.

wsj.com/articles/ukrai… But Mykola Bielieskov, research fellow at the Kyiv-based National Institute for Strategic Studies, a government-backed think tank, said the long fight for Bakhmut had depleted the Russians, potentially giving Ukraine a chance to make progress.

Some quick thoughts on latest British Intelligence update that Russia is rationing its artillery munitions consumption. Thread. 1. Without any relation to UA capabilities&capacities RU’s rationing of munitions consumption is a major watershed as RU’s way of war envisions reliance disproportionately on artillery as we’ve most recently seen during April-June 2022.

Year of such a high intensity combat between Ukraine and Russian made clear two important things that will prove to be decisive no matter how 2023 campaign end. 1. Despite problems UA&RU can mobilise resources to sustain fighting. But simultaneously both sides can’t mobilise such amount of resources proportional to each side way of war to attain quickly declared political goals despite the fact that scale of those goals has diminished.

rferl.org/a/ukraine-war-… Bakhmut's "major strategic importance, of course, is in the question who [can] attrit whom to a greater extent in this big battle for Bakhmut, as it will have major impact on 2023 campaign,"
@MBielieskov an analyst at the government-backed @NISS_ua, told RFE/RL in a message.

Story that one successful offensive might end in negative strat results. Thread.
But first some present day discussions - to remind on situation to be treated from historical context below. So most important question now of UA-RU big war with long term strategic repercussions is that who attrit whom more in the course of battle around Bakhmut. The answer to this question will have a major impact on 2023 campaign results.

Beginning of March 2023 is the time of contradictory reports out of frontline for Ukrainian citizens. Thread. On the one hand UA defenses around Bakhmut are slowly ebbing as the result of RU actions. At the same time UA forces are successfully repelling RU strikes at Kupyansk, Lyman, Avdiivka and Vuhledar directions inflicting huge damage.

Why situation has been developing this way?

So calendar winter 22/23 is finally over and it’s good time to take stock of some discussions/predictions as to how fighting between UA and RU would unfold in winter 22/23. Quick reminder. Discussions at end of Autumn/beginning of Winter 2022 concentrated on two major topics - winter weather impact on war-fighting and high expectations of further UA advances.

«Крім того, російські окупанти продовжують утримувати в оточенні українські міста Суми, Лебедин та Охтирка, противник здійснює перегрупування з метою продовження наступу у напрямку Києва».

Це з повідомлення ГШ ЗСУ про оперативну обстановку на 12:00 1.03.22 А ти про це все знаєш не лише із повідомлень ГШ, а і безпосередньо напряму, бо в тебе в Лебедині батьки і бабуся.

Just some quick thoughts after latest Western decisions with regards to modern tanks for Ukraine. Main battle tanks (MBTs) are the type of heavy weaponry associated most with offensive action in popular psychology.

rfi.fr/en/internation… Fears in some capitals -- especially Berlin -- that the front-line battle tanks could be seen as a new step in escalation appear to have been soothed, not least in light of taboos that have already fallen since the Russian invasion.

theglobeandmail.com/world/article-… “The Russians are not ready to admit that they can’t solve and attain political goals by military methods, and since they are not ready to admit it, they are trying to improve their hand by raising another army,” said @MBielieskov, a military analyst at the Kyiv-based @NISS_ua.

В угарі побєдобєсія московити обіцяли повторити як діди. І нарешті вирішили повторити - під Соледаром. В WWII Робітничо-селянська червона армія теж вирішувала завдання прориву тактичної глибини оборони за рахунок тактики людських хвиль. В першій хвилі атаки йшли або штрафні батальйони або нещодавно мобілізовані - тобто кидали тих кого було жаль найменше.

Let’s recap how things have changed/not changed which might influence UA-NATO relations. First, after 24.02.22 no one would question UA’s contribution to Euro-Atlantic security and it’s a huge contrast compared with 2000s/2010s when UA was treated more like liability when its prospective membership in NATO was discussed.