I reported another video of this AFU strike, but this one tells us a great deal about RuAF logistical operational patterns.
1. The RuAF tactical trucks were escorted by armored mobility vehicles through Ukraine from Crimea to protect it from Ukrainian partisans/Special Forces 1/
The major problem that I have in _disbelieving_ that opening paragraph are the (in)actions of the Biden Administration with retaliating against Iranian proxy militias.
A Trump vs Wagner mercs in Syria sized curb stomping of Iranian proxies is required. 2/
Instead, the Biden Administration is doing things like asking China for help in getting Iran to stop being on a 1979 and counting mission from G-d against the 'Great Satan' (Mullahese for the USA).🙄
This report from @CovertShores is an extraordinarily important one for what it tells us about Ukraine's expanding anti-access area denial (A2AD) bubble it is building against RuAF logistics to occupied Eastern Kherson.
The Ondatra & Serna-class landing craft are roughly the equivalent of a WW2 era US Navy LCM.
Gen. MacArthur's Engineer Special Brigades use them to move troops 100's of km. in the S. Philippines campaign shore to shore in the Victor & King operations 2/
This graphic from @HamWa07 of an actual S-300 missile sites' radar coverage (left) near the Kerch Straits compared to the claimed S-400 system performance (right), based on drawing circles of missile range and claimed detection range, shows why the human factor matters.
It takes trained human skills to get the best out of any weapons system.
Surface to air missile battery performance is heavily dependent on the staff work in properly placing the radars and telecommunications relaying radar data to missile launchers.
This is always a game
2/
...of compromise with available defenses, terrain, and existing civilian infrastructure that may affect the placement of your SAM battery.
@HamWa07 map shows the S-300 can only cover the east to south east well.
3/
And we are seeing that right now with Russian complaints at #Krynky .
This is because observed artillery fire with precision guided artillery projectiles have in part replaced crewed airpower in retail close air support and battlefield interdiction
There are so few crewed strike jets now compared to WW2, with too many levels of command claiming "Higher Priorities" for a highly expensive & scarce asset, that Field artillery & attack helicopters have taken up the roles.
3/
The simultaneous Ukraine fielding new jammers of Russian FPV drones (below) and new longer ranged, cheap, EW hardened FPV's with a ~30 km range operating in the same electromagnetic battlespace over #Krynky to cover ferry operations is a demonstration of its E.W. mastery.
The map (H/T @secretsqrl123) and the quoted post below will give you the idea of the area of effect Ukraines simultaneous deployment of FPV Drone Jammers and new generation longer range & electronic warfare hardened FPV's to interdict RuAF vehicles.
In watching the current Israeli - Hamas War, very few have tried to analyze Israel's strategic dilemma & what happens to Gaza Palestinians after Israel militarily exterminates Hamas.
I've just found an article that does...and it's going to be a dystopian Sci-Fi horror show.
1/
This section of Holsinger's article makes the right comparison to the US battle to liberate Manila from the Japanese in early 1945 to get reasonable estimates for IDF losses.
I posted on Manila before & hope he's wrong on civilian casualties in Gaza 😱 2/