Thread by @FRHoffmann1

It's time to reassess Ukraine's consumption of Storm Shadow/Scalp-EG missiles and the sustainability of its remaining land-attack cruise missile arsenal. The analysis shows that in order to ensure a robust long-range strike capability, 🇺🇦 requires Taurus cruise missiles. 1/14

In August 2023, roughly three months after first receiving Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG cruise missiles from France and the UK, I estimated that Ukraine had received between 250 to 500 cruise missiles and was using around 75 per month. 2/14

https://twitter.com/FRHoffmann1/status/1688579209004761088

I now believe that Ukraine has likely received between 400 and 500 Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG cruise missiles from France, the UK, and possibly Italy. It is also possible that Ukraine has been promised more, potentially up to 600, but I consider this scenario unlikely. 3/14

In terms of consumption, there is no doubt that Ukraine has significantly reduced its usage of Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG cruise missiles. Considering the initial high usage, the average monthly consumption has now decreased to an estimated range of 30 to 50 missiles per month. 4/14

Taking into account the initial arsenal size of 400-600 missiles and an average monthly consumption rate of 30-50 missiles, I now assess that Ukraine will likely run out Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG cruise missiles somewhere between January and December 2024. 5/14

This estimate assumes that Ukraine retains an operational reserve of around 30 missiles, meaning the overall stockpile likely wouldn't reach zero. Note also that if Ukraine would get close to this minimum reserve number, its consumption would most likely decrease further. 6/14

This means that under the most optimistic scenario -- purely in terms of arsenal sustainability, NOT in terms of military effectiveness -- Ukraine retains a credible land-attack cruise missile capability until the end of 2024. 7/14

Please take note of the fact that you cannot fight an effective missile campaign with only 30 strikes per month, especially if you are barred from engaging the most critical targets like Kerch Bridge in Crimea, or important facilities inside Russia. 8/14

In these low usage scenario, individual strikes may have localized effects or offer symbolic value, but likely contribute little to the overall balance of power on the battlefield and are even more unlikely to achieve strategic-level effects. 9/14

Ukrainian Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG scarcity is the number one reason why Ukraine needs Taurus. Without resupply of land-attack cruise missiles, Ukraine will be forced to llimit its consumption further, drastically undermining its ability to take back territory. 10/14

German politicians must realize that Taurus is not a luxury; it is a necessity. While increasing overall military aid is commendable, it is equally important to provide the specific resources required for achieving victory. 11/14

https://twitter.com/deaidua/status/1723811760627495127

Ukraine's indigenous missile industry cannot fill the gaps left by the absence of Western cruise missile resupplies in 2024. While ATACMS and GLSDB provide stand-off strike capability, they do not possess the same capability profile as Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG and Taurus. 12/14

Unlike ATACMS, Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG and Taurus have the ability to fly along complex trajectories in order to evade missile defenses. They are also capable of successfully engaging hardened and buried targets with a high probability of success. 13/14

Note also that neither France nor the UK have started a Storm Shadow/SCALP-EG production line for Ukraine (at least not according to open-source data). This means that the two countries will not be able to resupply Ukraine beyond their own stockpiles, which are running low. 14/14