...twice the number of Stugna ATGM Ukraine's military can give her two launchers per month.
And Ukraine builds Stugna for $20,000. That is 1/5th that of a US Javelin missile doing the same job.
The Stugna Launcher can be remote fired, but her crew still has to recover it. 2/
Taking insane risks from Russian return fire because there are no replacement launchers.
FPV drones don't require launchers.
They don't require exposing yourself to enemy direct fire to use them.
3/
This makes FPV drones logistically superior to Stugna's per unit weight and volume of lethality because the munition is disintermediated from anything carrying or firing it.
Precision guided firepower detached from launch platform is new in warfare.
Even if the guidance tech
4/
...for the FPV drones is over 50 years old.
Television guidance was used in combat in 1969 on the GBU-8 HOBOS bombs to drop N. Vietnamese bridges.
Eighty years of electronic advancement under the Moore's Law curve - which isn't slowing down - means FPV's becoming equipped with low light level cameras or even cheap thermal sensors are a battlefield reality in numbers already.
Baba Yaga was the wicked witch used to scare children.
And that seems to be what is happening with the Russians as, if Baba Yaga has Starlink, then it does not need other data channels.
And jamming Starlink is hell.
9/
Anything that uses a pencil beam with very low sidelobes forces you to put the jammer inside the beam mainlobe.
Starlink's cheap active electronically scanned array (AESA) antenna on both ends do exactly that with a sky filled with dozens of AESA satellites to an AESA...
10/
...receiver. I have been trying to explain that technological fact of life for years on Twitter/X & the wall of stupid about it still stands.
This is literally Electronic Warfare 101 level knowledge.🙄
And techies have published teardowns of the Starlink AESA antennas...
11/
...on Youtube, so there are no excuses.
The link below is the result of my typing in "starlink antenna teardown" on the Youtube search engine.
Ukraine's General Staff is now publishing weekly data on it's mostly FPV drone kills.
On the week ending Nov 13, 2023, "...among the destroyed equipment units are 39 tanks, 57 artillery systems, 51 trucks, 34 armored fighting vehicles, & many other
units that have been successfully turned into scrap," said the deputy prime minister.
The Reporting from Ukraine channel has an outstanding report on how mostly FPV plus the Baba Yaga drones are dominating the battlespace at Avdiivka [Not Stugna's]. 14/
In fact, the conclusion we can draw right now from Ukraine's General Staff Army of drone numbers & OSINT counts is that drones are not only the leading cause of RuAF vehicle kills.
They are at or more than all other direct fire arms combined.😱🤯
Rodra Hascaryo on over on the Quora social media platform posted this on why the direct fire 16-inch guns of the USS Iowa (Black circle) are obsolete versus missiles and the F-18 (Green circle) going over the horizon.
FPV's have that F-18 advantage over Stugna's & T-64's. 16/
Each FPV drone is a PGM - with guidance modelled on the GBU-8/GBU-15 concept with TV/IIR seeker, but powered.
Yes this is revolutionary battlefield effect, but also evolutionary in that the underlying technologies have been there for decades, evolving for the moment.
17/
Awaiting the moment of a chaotic mix of a existential total war, for a civil society with a large enough computer literate middle class, using a conscript-cadre military, with rampant shortages of traditional artillery shells to make the FPV drone a survival need.
18/
We are in the midst of a Drone "Revolution in Military Affairs" the likes of which only August Cole and P. W. Singer have barely touched upon in the opening Okinawa raid in their their book "Ghost Fleet: A Novel of the Next World War"
The statistical comparison in the FBI data from pre-1961 is invalid as the underlying medical systems have so changed as to utterly pollute the "murders per 100,000" data.
Violent crime data pre-1961 and post 1961 are apples to oranges comparisons.
2/
-Trauma care centers (1961),
-Standardized trauma procedures (1978),
-Adoption of military Korea/Vietnam medical emergency treatment & air transport procedures,
-Improved triage (1986)
-And (since 2011) widespread adoption and use of blood clotting bandages...
3/
Chairman Xi suffers from the traditional dictator's trap of believing his own sh*t because he has made it too dangerous for his cronies and underlings to tell him the truth.
Thanks to that, Chairman Xi's Regime has pretty much no resilience in adversity because it's so kleptocratic and it's all about what the guy in charge can do for his next set of corrupt cronies today.
2/
This 1970's comment about the Shah of Iran is so historically on point in 2026 because it shows how Xi's regime is failing "The dictator on the wall test."
This map of 124 Russian railway electric traction stations and the 40K OWA drone fired in 2025 demonstrates the political-military leadership failure of the Zelinskyy government.
Like Stalin's failed winter 1941-1942 counter offensives against Nazi Army Group Center,
...Ukraine is penny packing OWA drones everywhere to no great effect based on which military "Union" faction was last in the room with President Zelenskyy before a decision
Even Ukraine's vaunted oil offensive is a bare plurality of total drone strikes 2/
The latest @RyanO_ChosenCoy thread detailing the bureaucratic issues of Ukraine's military in targeting Russian logistics makes clear Ukraine's military has inter-service and intra-service union/factional disputes that are positively American in scale.
If the target of a US "rapid strike" was either the Kharg Island oil export facility or Iran's banking/financial system with a combination of explosives and non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse munitions, the Mullahs will fall.
There are two real courses of action (COA) for an American air campaign if Regime Change is the goal.
The Schwerpunkt - political center of gravity - of the Mullah regime is its ability to pay for the use Regime Security Forces & foreign hired mercenaries.
This is one of the 3 major strategic mistakes of the Zelenskyy Government.⬇️
Putin has shown better, more consistent, and more effective leadership in the strategic bombing of Ukrainian electrical infrastructure than Zelinskyy has in striking Russia's railways.
Russia remains uniquely vulnerable to a focused drone strike campaign on it's electrical railway traction step down transformers.
Zelenskyy's leadership not only ignored hitting that unique Russian vulnerability since Feb. 2022.
See the figure below⬇️
2/
To give you an idea of the abject political-military failure of the Zelenskyy government in this regard one has to look at the industrial supply chain for those traction substations.
The Soviet Union had two major transformer factories: Tolyatti and Zaporozhye.
3/