...twice the number of Stugna ATGM Ukraine's military can give her two launchers per month.
And Ukraine builds Stugna for $20,000. That is 1/5th that of a US Javelin missile doing the same job.
The Stugna Launcher can be remote fired, but her crew still has to recover it. 2/
Taking insane risks from Russian return fire because there are no replacement launchers.
FPV drones don't require launchers.
They don't require exposing yourself to enemy direct fire to use them.
3/
This makes FPV drones logistically superior to Stugna's per unit weight and volume of lethality because the munition is disintermediated from anything carrying or firing it.
Precision guided firepower detached from launch platform is new in warfare.
Even if the guidance tech
4/
...for the FPV drones is over 50 years old.
Television guidance was used in combat in 1969 on the GBU-8 HOBOS bombs to drop N. Vietnamese bridges.
Eighty years of electronic advancement under the Moore's Law curve - which isn't slowing down - means FPV's becoming equipped with low light level cameras or even cheap thermal sensors are a battlefield reality in numbers already.
Baba Yaga was the wicked witch used to scare children.
And that seems to be what is happening with the Russians as, if Baba Yaga has Starlink, then it does not need other data channels.
And jamming Starlink is hell.
9/
Anything that uses a pencil beam with very low sidelobes forces you to put the jammer inside the beam mainlobe.
Starlink's cheap active electronically scanned array (AESA) antenna on both ends do exactly that with a sky filled with dozens of AESA satellites to an AESA...
10/
...receiver. I have been trying to explain that technological fact of life for years on Twitter/X & the wall of stupid about it still stands.
This is literally Electronic Warfare 101 level knowledge.🙄
And techies have published teardowns of the Starlink AESA antennas...
11/
...on Youtube, so there are no excuses.
The link below is the result of my typing in "starlink antenna teardown" on the Youtube search engine.
Ukraine's General Staff is now publishing weekly data on it's mostly FPV drone kills.
On the week ending Nov 13, 2023, "...among the destroyed equipment units are 39 tanks, 57 artillery systems, 51 trucks, 34 armored fighting vehicles, & many other
units that have been successfully turned into scrap," said the deputy prime minister.
The Reporting from Ukraine channel has an outstanding report on how mostly FPV plus the Baba Yaga drones are dominating the battlespace at Avdiivka [Not Stugna's]. 14/
In fact, the conclusion we can draw right now from Ukraine's General Staff Army of drone numbers & OSINT counts is that drones are not only the leading cause of RuAF vehicle kills.
They are at or more than all other direct fire arms combined.😱🤯
Rodra Hascaryo on over on the Quora social media platform posted this on why the direct fire 16-inch guns of the USS Iowa (Black circle) are obsolete versus missiles and the F-18 (Green circle) going over the horizon.
FPV's have that F-18 advantage over Stugna's & T-64's. 16/
Each FPV drone is a PGM - with guidance modelled on the GBU-8/GBU-15 concept with TV/IIR seeker, but powered.
Yes this is revolutionary battlefield effect, but also evolutionary in that the underlying technologies have been there for decades, evolving for the moment.
17/
Awaiting the moment of a chaotic mix of a existential total war, for a civil society with a large enough computer literate middle class, using a conscript-cadre military, with rampant shortages of traditional artillery shells to make the FPV drone a survival need.
18/
We are in the midst of a Drone "Revolution in Military Affairs" the likes of which only August Cole and P. W. Singer have barely touched upon in the opening Okinawa raid in their their book "Ghost Fleet: A Novel of the Next World War"
I'm tempted to say the difference between military flag ranks who are competent at 2026 peer to peer warfare, and those who are not, is the understanding and application of attritional loss curves to combat loss rates, electronic warfare and logistics.
The set of curves I had an AI produce for me above have been used for air warfare many times starting at the end of WW2, in the USSBS after WW2 and by many classic RAND airpower studies from the 1950's to 1980's.
2/
All post 9/11/2001 Western flag ranks are counter-insurgency (COIN) trained & experienced.
They have no gut feel at all to statistical attrition models at all.
These "COIN-head" flags may prove to be highly resistant to changing this. Which is required to deal with drones.
2/
The effectiveness of drones is directly affected by the electronic warfare competence of the drone users.
The fact that the US Army defenestrated every EW practitioner in the 2000's and has compete "EW virgins" as flag rank leadership means it will fail with mass casualties in its first major drone war combat.
1/3
3. The shooter arrived at the hotel the day before the event.😯
4. TSA rules require firearms to be transported in checked baggage, unloaded, and locked in a hard-sided container, declared to the airline at check-in.
2/
5. Local DC law requires firearms in vehicles to be inaccessible from the passenger compartment and unloaded.
6. Washington DC is not a "safe passage" jurisdiction for non-residents without a license. The shooter lacked this license.
3/
USN flag ranks & their staffers have been fighting the idea of distant economic blockade of China tooth an nail as a response to China invading Taiwan for 30 years.
They really don't want a recent precedent of a successful blockade...
...to prevent their Carrier fleet Pickett's charge into the South China Sea.
Specifically distant blockade as a strategy against China makes having/regaining 100 Cold War era
2/3
...frigates and destroyer tenders supporting them on distant blockade stations outside the 2nd Island chain, "budget relevant" for a military strategy of conducting three years of blockade enforcement.
I was calling out two dead for every three Russian wounded in Sept 2022 as the more realistic Russian casualty ratio in Ukraine because it was taking more than 24 hours to get to the equivalent of a battalion aid station.