For background, New York's Tammany Hall was founded as part of the Tammany Societies, which were groups dedicated to celebrating Native American culture, from its titles, to the languages, to the dress.
This group's early meeting locations were, appropriately, called "Wigwams".
Early on, Tammany membership was for "native-born patriots" only. But on April 24, 1817, hundreds of Irishmen broke into a meeting and demanded entry.
A few years later, Tammany let them in and embraced universal manhood suffrage.
Here's how some people saw that idea:
These immigrant groups were eventually leveraged by Democratic New York Mayor Fernando Wood to break Tammany's back by ousting the Bank Democrats from the Hall, elevating his own stature in the organization.
This sort of internal politicking continued and, eventually, William "Boss" Tweed became the hall's Grand Sachem and the man who would earn the hall its reputation for corruption.
Tammany had by now long been focusing on naturalizing immigrants to elect Democrats: immigrants go in, Democratic votes come out, as the picture shows.
But Tweed made earning votes more about patronage: vote for us, earn a cushy job—and don't forget to tell your friends!
That's what the paper is about: the effect of patronage on Democratic party performance and the performance of the NYPD, 1900-16.
To identify patronage hires, Leucht looked at police applicants who did poorly on the department's standardized tests but nevertheless got hired.
The rules say you need a score of at least 70% to get on the force. Anyone hired under that cutoff must have been a patronage hire.
Since this graft often happened on ethnic lines, one way to identify patronage hires above the line is to exploit that fact, to clear effect:
And this strategy worked for Tammany: when a patronage hire happened, the number of registered Democrats in that hire's neighborhood greatly increased.
This probably also matters for politics, because registered voters predict party wins.
But maybe these newly-registered voters don't go out and vote like non-patronage Democrats.
Well, as it turns out, they do: electoral support goes up, and it goes up closer to the recipient.
In the period after these cops were hired, they were rewarded with promotions if they helped out the Democratic party more.
Moreover, unlike regular cops, they were no less likely to receive a promotion if they were issued fines.
Now as it turns out, cops who did better on their standardized exams earned fewer fines in the line of duty.
But patronage employees did worse on those exams, and due to corruption, they could get by doing less, too. So patronage robustly associated with earning more fines:
These patronage employees received 22.6% more fines for negligence than their meritorious counterparts.
On a subset of employees with test scores, it was possible to show that test scores were valid, but they didn't explain this gap:
The Tammany machine engaged in handing out the "spoils" of political wins until the 1930s, and the machine worked: patronage politics made Democratic voters, and it also made negligent cops.
The abandonment of meritocracy had consequences.
Bill the Butcher died an opponent of Tammany less because of this and more because he hated the Irish, but given what Tammany did, it was good that at least someone opposed it.
A review of the 23,551 randomized clinical trials in the Cochrane Database suggests that power is generally very low.
- "Significant" effects are usually overestimates
- "Nonsignificant effects" are frequently important
- Contradictory studies often disagree due to noise
The modal study achieving significance has too little power to accept any reasonable, non-extreme effect size. Hence exaggeration.
The modal study failing to achieve significance is so weak that large effects won't tend to be statistically significant. Hence erroneous failures.
When studies fail to replicate, a common reason is likely to be that the replications just weren't powered for it. Hence a potential unreal replication crisis.
The situation is decidedly bad.
Simply put: if clinical trials are this poor, imagine the state of clinical guidance.
Proponents of environmental theories of group differences regularly treat open sharing of code and data like their biggest fear
A session at the Behavior Genetics Assn. meeting today included the argument that hereditarians have weaponized transparency (i.e., doing good science)
It has always been true that hereditarians have been more into doing science correctly, because they are generally the sorts of people who want to know if they're right, so they demand tests.
Their opponents, on the other hand, promote ignorance, make incoherent arguments, and mislead, with intent. People like Kamin and Lewontin used to be open about misleading others. People like Turkheimer now simply act like scientific discovery is impossible, without real reason.
The whole "nanny dog" thing is made up and there is no historical evidence that pit bulls were ever bred to be stewards or friends to children.
The evidence for that myth is basically 'someone said it on Facebook.'
Even many sources that are favorable towards pit bulls or active promoters of them will occasionally admit there's no real basis for the "nanny dog" claim.
Yesterday was Juneteenth, a federal holiday in the U.S. dedicated to celebrating the day the last slaves in America were freed when the Emancipation Proclamation was enforced in Texas.
Economically, what were the fates of slaves? What about slaveowners?
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Starting with slaves, a paper that came out last year looked into the matter.
The paper used Census and administrative records from 1850 to 2000 to compare Black Americans whose ancestors were enslaved for different amounts of time.
Compare these trajectories:
One thing that stands out is that, in terms of literacy, there's a lot of convergence. In terms of occupational quality, not so much.
Depending on how you think, this might be obvious or a surprise.
In 2014, David Graeber wrote an article for the Guardian in which he argued "Working-class people... care more about their friends, families, and communities. In aggregate... they're just fundamentally nicer."
The Economist put up a similar article at the time.
Were they right?
To make his case, Graeber wove a nice little narrative together about how the rich don't need to care, so they don't, and thus they're bad at empathy and they do things like hiring out the sons and daughters of the poor to do the job when empathy is needed.
The meat of Graeber's case was a set of two social psychological papers.
The first was a set of three studies in which the poor appeared to outclass the rich at tasks like the Mind in the Eyes, or figuring out the emotions of people they're talking to.