Amid the ongoing debate about the number of operational Ka-52 helicopters on the frontlines, I've analyzed and compiled imagery of bases used for helicopter operations by the Russians. The findings are summarized in this 🧵Thread:
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2/ Based on acquired Maxar images from November 1st, the Taganrog airbase hosted at least 4 operational Ka-52 helicopters on its tarmac. The surrounding activity indicates their use, a fact further supported by their absence in earlier shots.
3/ The Buturlinovka Airbase accommodates a minimum of 5 Ka-52 helicopters. Although Helicopter #7 is not distinctly visible in this image, the next image includes a slightly older photo of the same helicopter at the same location for clarity.
4/ Identifying helicopters in high-resolution imagery (0.5 - 1m) can be challenging, but certain distinct characteristics help with recognition: fuselage length, two coaxial rotors, a shorter tail, and a unique frontal shape, among others.
5/ Zernograd airbase, the home of the 16th Army Aviation Brigade, currently houses approximately 8 additional Ka-52 helicopters.
6/ In these calculations, I excluded several Ka-52 helicopters undergoing repairs or maintenance, evident from the missing rotor blades. Additionally, for OPSEC reasons, I didn't account for 2 more Ka-52 helicopters located at FARP.
7/ The scope of my analysis focuses on the operational Ka-52 helicopters on the frontlines. I didn't add helicopters located in other regions of Russia, such as Central Russia and the Far East.
8/ With a 90% confidence level and error not exceeding 30%, presented evidence strongly indicates that Russia still maintains operational Ka-52 helicopters.
9/ Both the Ka-52 and numerous Mi-28 helicopters continue to pose a significant threat to Ukrainian forces along the frontline. Their ability to deploy LMUR and Vikhr missiles extends their reach, enabling them to engage targets beyond the range of SHORAD
10/ Moving on to the next base, Rovenki Airbase, traditionally home to a substantial number of helicopters, has recently dispersed its helicopters in response to emerging threats, due to its proximity to the border.
11/ In October and early November, Rovenki Airbase accommodated more than three Ka-52 helicopters. I counted only three Ka-52 helicopters, excluding those with missing blades, as their operational status is hard to determine
12/ Kirovske Airbase in Crimea housed a total of 6 Ka-52 helicopters.
13/ Let's assume that roughly 30% of the helicopters I've identified could be duplicates (the same helicopter at different locations and times), partially or fully inoperable, or mistakenly identified.
14/ Rounding gives us around 8 helicopters. Even assuming 8 were included wrongly, we still have 17 operational helicopters. Therefore, claims suggesting there are no or only a few functional Ka-52s are invalid.
15/ In summary, satellite evidence collectively indicates that Russia currently maintains a fleet of at least 25 operational Ka-52 helicopters, with the actual number likely much higher.
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Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence has posted a 3D model of an unidentified Russian UAV on its WarSanctions platform, complete with detailed descriptions and an interactive view. Key details on the drone, in 🧵thread:
2/ It can serve as a reconnaissance drone, loitering munition, or a decoy meant to overload Ukraine’s air defenses. Structurally, the drone features a delta-wing fuselage, similar to the Geran-1 (Shahed-131) but slightly smaller.
3/ The unidentified drone is powered by a two-stroke gasoline DLE engine produced by China’s Mile Haoxiang Technology Co.
The DLE engine is mounted in the nose of the fuselage, making the drone most similar to the “Italmas” loitering munition produced by Russia’s Zala Group
If we focus on the bigger picture today, the overall situation is not that bad. We went from Russia’s 2022 demands: military downsizing, government changes, the secession of multiple regions, and other demands: to a much shorter list of demands today:
2/ Notably, Ukraine has also stepped back from its maximalist demands for a de facto return to its 1991 borders and the full withdrawal of Russian forces. Clearly, its stance against direct negotiations has been abandoned as well.
3/ Whether this will work or not is beyond the scope of this message, but interestingly, if you read some of the more-or-less “semi-independent” Russian “Z” channels, not just those that repeat state propaganda, you can see that this realization is starting to take hold
So far, Russia has failed to achieve any of its stated strategic goals in this war:
Demilitarization – failed.
Regime change in Kyiv – failed.
Full control over Donbas – failed.
Preventing NATO enlargement – failed.
🧵Short thread:
2/ Demilitarization of Ukraine. The Ukrainian military is now larger, better armed, and far more experienced than before the war. It is more technologically advanced and capable than ever before.
3/ Russia failed to remove Zelenskyy or his government. Kyiv remains fully under Ukrainian control. The chances of a pro-Russian party winning the next election are slim to none
1/ As I noted from the outset, based on the limited information then available, there was no “operational breakthrough”. The penetration was tactical, involving roughly a battalion-sized force. Still, it is too soon for celebration
2/ Initially, the situation was especially risky, as Russian units managed to break east of Dobropillia. I would not describe this as a DRG (sabotage group) operation or a simple raid, since neither term accurately reflects the size of the force or its mission in the context
3/ It is positive that Ukrainian forces contained the threat and prevented it from developing into an operational breakthrough. However, the scale of reinforcements required was significant. According to Deep State, the following units were involved in the reinforcement effort:
Missing Targeting Pods, Inflated Bills: An Exclusive Investigation into the Su-57 Procurement Problems by Frontelligence Insight. 🧵Thread:
1/ Newly obtained classified documents, show that Russia purchased its 5-generation Su-57 fighters for more than 3 billion rubles each;
2/ Data provided by Analytical Company "Dallas" (@dallasparkua) shows that in 2021 & 2022, Su-57 fighter jets were delivered without targeting pods, leaving them short of their advertised capabilities. At the time, the cost of a single Su-57 was roughly $42.1 million in USD terms
3/ The documents show that in 2021, a year before the war, the Russian Defense Ministry formally accepted Su-57 aircraft without the 101KS-N, an electro-optical targeting subsystem. This was allowed under Additional Agreement No. 8.
Debates over losses are always heated, but hard data cuts through the noise. Frontelligence Insight analyzed Russian documents released by the I Want to Live project, giving insight on soldiers of the 8th Army who went missing in action. 🧵Thread:
2/ From January 2024 to June 2025, 6,921 soldiers and officers of the 8th Army were reported missing in action. Part of the Southern Military District, the 8th Army has primarily operated in Donetsk Oblast, with elements recently deployed at Pokrovsk to reinforce the 58th Army.
3/ Looking at the timeline, losses in 2025 have significantly peaked compared with 2024. The number of monthly MIA cases more than doubled and remained consistent throughout 2025, reflecting the period of active offensive operations, particularly in Donetsk.