Amid the ongoing debate about the number of operational Ka-52 helicopters on the frontlines, I've analyzed and compiled imagery of bases used for helicopter operations by the Russians. The findings are summarized in this 🧵Thread:
1/
2/ Based on acquired Maxar images from November 1st, the Taganrog airbase hosted at least 4 operational Ka-52 helicopters on its tarmac. The surrounding activity indicates their use, a fact further supported by their absence in earlier shots.
3/ The Buturlinovka Airbase accommodates a minimum of 5 Ka-52 helicopters. Although Helicopter #7 is not distinctly visible in this image, the next image includes a slightly older photo of the same helicopter at the same location for clarity.
4/ Identifying helicopters in high-resolution imagery (0.5 - 1m) can be challenging, but certain distinct characteristics help with recognition: fuselage length, two coaxial rotors, a shorter tail, and a unique frontal shape, among others.
5/ Zernograd airbase, the home of the 16th Army Aviation Brigade, currently houses approximately 8 additional Ka-52 helicopters.
6/ In these calculations, I excluded several Ka-52 helicopters undergoing repairs or maintenance, evident from the missing rotor blades. Additionally, for OPSEC reasons, I didn't account for 2 more Ka-52 helicopters located at FARP.
7/ The scope of my analysis focuses on the operational Ka-52 helicopters on the frontlines. I didn't add helicopters located in other regions of Russia, such as Central Russia and the Far East.
8/ With a 90% confidence level and error not exceeding 30%, presented evidence strongly indicates that Russia still maintains operational Ka-52 helicopters.
9/ Both the Ka-52 and numerous Mi-28 helicopters continue to pose a significant threat to Ukrainian forces along the frontline. Their ability to deploy LMUR and Vikhr missiles extends their reach, enabling them to engage targets beyond the range of SHORAD
10/ Moving on to the next base, Rovenki Airbase, traditionally home to a substantial number of helicopters, has recently dispersed its helicopters in response to emerging threats, due to its proximity to the border.
11/ In October and early November, Rovenki Airbase accommodated more than three Ka-52 helicopters. I counted only three Ka-52 helicopters, excluding those with missing blades, as their operational status is hard to determine
12/ Kirovske Airbase in Crimea housed a total of 6 Ka-52 helicopters.
13/ Let's assume that roughly 30% of the helicopters I've identified could be duplicates (the same helicopter at different locations and times), partially or fully inoperable, or mistakenly identified.
14/ Rounding gives us around 8 helicopters. Even assuming 8 were included wrongly, we still have 17 operational helicopters. Therefore, claims suggesting there are no or only a few functional Ka-52s are invalid.
15/ In summary, satellite evidence collectively indicates that Russia currently maintains a fleet of at least 25 operational Ka-52 helicopters, with the actual number likely much higher.
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Reminder: the account that posted a photo said to show Iryna Zarutska, with a BLM poster in the background, drew 18 million views. In May 2025, France’s defense and security secretariat tied this account to Storm-1516, a state-backed Russian disinfo group. But there’s more:
2/ According to a report by VIGINUM, the French agency for countering foreign digital interference and disinformation under the General Secretariat for Defence and National Security, this unit is a Russian information manipulation set (IMS) linked to Russia’s intelligence (GRU)
3/ EclecticIQ, a Dutch cybersecurity and threat-intelligence firm, identified the LordBebo account as linked to the Storm-1516 disinformation unit in its report on disinformation campaigns. My team also looked into the matter and found a rather interesting pattern:
A recurring question is whether Russia categorizes AWOL cases as a way to conceal combat deaths in its official reports. The short answer is no. The longer answer is more complicated, and requires looking at how AWOL is treated within the Russian military system. 🧵Short thread:
2/ Most AWOL cases can escalate into actual criminal proceedings if all other measures to bring soldiers back fail. High rates of desertion or absence trigger investigations on record - problems that weigh more heavily on commanders and unit statistics than combat losses do
3/ Casualties themselves are rarely the main concern, provided objectives set by higher command are met. By contrast, desertion is seen as evidence of weak leadership and poor control over subordinates. KIA and MIA are regarded as an acceptable cost of war; AWOL is not.
AWOL and desertion cases in the Russian army have doubled and tripled in recent months, with battlefield desertions rising sharply, according to tens of thousands of records reviewed by Frontelligence Insight. 🧵This thread summarizes the key insights drawn from the data:
2/ Before proceeding, we thank the Ukrainian project @hochuzhit_com for providing additional documents containing the full list of service members. While the source is trusted, we carried out our own inspection and verification to confirm the list’s authenticity.
3/ Our team randomly selected 21 cases from the file and used third-party services to verify each soldier’s name, date of birth, and address or region. In 19 cases the data fully matched; the two discrepancies were in addresses, likely due to changes before/after enlistment
Since July, our team has published 4 major investigations: on foreign mercenaries and Cuban fighters in Russia’s ranks; procurement and targeting pod issues with the Su-57; and China’s role in Shahed UAV production. We also analyzed Russian losses in units and North Korean arms:
2/ We’ve also completed, but not yet published, data on Russian desertions and losses in several major units. Our research on artillery barrels is wrapping up, after which we’ll also release exclusive investigations into Russia’s weapons production
3/ None of this would be possible without your continued financial support and donations. Some of our earlier investigations have already helped several governments pursue their own inquiries into sanctions evasion
So far, Ukraine’s stabilization measures around Pokrovsk look broadly promising. While many speculated that Kyiv might strike elsewhere, Ukrainian forces have instead pushed back Russian troops in an area where Moscow’s leadership had placed its biggest bet. 🧵Thread:
2/ With only days left before the fall season, the chances of Russia taking Pokrovsk by summer’s end are virtually nil. Amid the so-called “peace talks,” the lack of progress risks undermining Russia’s resolve to fight for “years”, as they like to boast
3/ That does not mean Russia will stop advancing. But if the political goal remains the takeover of Donbas, achieving it by the end of this year appears impossible.
Drones, ISR, communications, battlefield awareness, electronic warfare, and mobile anti-tank systems: North Korea appears to have taken notes from the battlefields of Kursk. Its latest propaganda video offers clues, Frontelligence Insight finds in its newest analysis. 🧵Thread:
2/ When North Korean forces arrived in Kursk in the latter half of 2024, they entered a war already deep into its “drone phase.” Adapting to this reality required three urgent adjustments: countermeasures, offensive drone tactics, and battlefield surveillance.
3/ In a 19-minute video released by Korean Central Television, an FPV drone team, a pilot and a co-pilot, is shown striking Ukrainian vehicles in Kursk Oblast. The wiring setup suggests a reconnaissance unit with quadcopters was likely operating from the same building.