Amid the ongoing debate about the number of operational Ka-52 helicopters on the frontlines, I've analyzed and compiled imagery of bases used for helicopter operations by the Russians. The findings are summarized in this 🧵Thread:
1/
2/ Based on acquired Maxar images from November 1st, the Taganrog airbase hosted at least 4 operational Ka-52 helicopters on its tarmac. The surrounding activity indicates their use, a fact further supported by their absence in earlier shots.
3/ The Buturlinovka Airbase accommodates a minimum of 5 Ka-52 helicopters. Although Helicopter #7 is not distinctly visible in this image, the next image includes a slightly older photo of the same helicopter at the same location for clarity.
4/ Identifying helicopters in high-resolution imagery (0.5 - 1m) can be challenging, but certain distinct characteristics help with recognition: fuselage length, two coaxial rotors, a shorter tail, and a unique frontal shape, among others.
5/ Zernograd airbase, the home of the 16th Army Aviation Brigade, currently houses approximately 8 additional Ka-52 helicopters.
6/ In these calculations, I excluded several Ka-52 helicopters undergoing repairs or maintenance, evident from the missing rotor blades. Additionally, for OPSEC reasons, I didn't account for 2 more Ka-52 helicopters located at FARP.
7/ The scope of my analysis focuses on the operational Ka-52 helicopters on the frontlines. I didn't add helicopters located in other regions of Russia, such as Central Russia and the Far East.
8/ With a 90% confidence level and error not exceeding 30%, presented evidence strongly indicates that Russia still maintains operational Ka-52 helicopters.
9/ Both the Ka-52 and numerous Mi-28 helicopters continue to pose a significant threat to Ukrainian forces along the frontline. Their ability to deploy LMUR and Vikhr missiles extends their reach, enabling them to engage targets beyond the range of SHORAD
10/ Moving on to the next base, Rovenki Airbase, traditionally home to a substantial number of helicopters, has recently dispersed its helicopters in response to emerging threats, due to its proximity to the border.
11/ In October and early November, Rovenki Airbase accommodated more than three Ka-52 helicopters. I counted only three Ka-52 helicopters, excluding those with missing blades, as their operational status is hard to determine
12/ Kirovske Airbase in Crimea housed a total of 6 Ka-52 helicopters.
13/ Let's assume that roughly 30% of the helicopters I've identified could be duplicates (the same helicopter at different locations and times), partially or fully inoperable, or mistakenly identified.
14/ Rounding gives us around 8 helicopters. Even assuming 8 were included wrongly, we still have 17 operational helicopters. Therefore, claims suggesting there are no or only a few functional Ka-52s are invalid.
15/ In summary, satellite evidence collectively indicates that Russia currently maintains a fleet of at least 25 operational Ka-52 helicopters, with the actual number likely much higher.
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A few broad observations on the course of war, based on observations, discussions with officers, soldiers, and analysts, data, and other relevant sources. I will begin with a high-level sociopolitical overview before gradually moving toward operational-tactical level. 🧵Thread:
2/ Overall, the situation for Ukraine has not improved since last year. Ukraine has markedly increased its long-range strike capabilities, which have very tangible effects across Russian society. However, the battlefield initiative remains with Russia, much as it did most of 2024
3/ A plausible Ukrainian "victory" approach can be summarized as: disrupt logistics, degrade the Russian economy, and avoid catastrophic operational collapses. Russia’s apparent approach is simpler: keep pressing until Ukraine exhausts its will or physical capacity to resist.
According to Russian milblogger Fighterbomber, who has a wide network within the Russian Air Force, an Il-76 was shot down in Sudan on November 4 by the Rapid Support Forces. According to him, the aircraft had been purchased in Kyrgyzstan a month and a half ago for $12 million
2/ A video showing a burning object falling from the sky, likely the claimed Il-76, has also been recorded and published
3/ While I do not have solid sources in Sudan, one of my contacts located there has confirmed that reports about a downed Il-76 have been circulating within the RSF since yesterday. Government forces are actively using the Air Force to supply besieged cities
Some observers have described the fall of Pokrovsk as “sudden.” That may be true if one followed the wrong analysts. In reality, the defense deterioration was apparent as early as 2024 and became unmistakable by 2025, as the underlying dynamics made the outcome nearly inevitable:
2/ That the city continued to hold out until November is, in itself, an achievement. Still, the rapid loss of positions in summer/fall 2024, which left logistics vulnerable and exposed the flanks, combined with manpower shortages, largely dictated the outcome now unfolding
3/ Launching a counteroffensive capable of retaking the city and securing its flanks, or even holding for another year, would have required diverting significant resources from other sectors of the front, a tradeoff that would result in disastrous situation elsewhere.
North Korea and Russia are rapidly building their first road bridge to enhance logistics and expand military and economic ties. Frontelligence Insight has analyzed satellite imagery and project documents to estimate its completion and potential impact. 🧵Thread:
2/ Today, Russia and North Korea have no direct road connection. The only land crossing is the 1950s-era Korea - Russia Friendship Railroad Bridge. Air and maritime routes, via Pyongyang Airport and ports like Rajin, exist, but their capacity and costs are often suboptimal.
3/ In the summer of 2024, Russia confirmed plans to build a road bridge over the Tumen River, with construction led by Russia’s TunnelYuzhStroy. The project is budgeted at ~9 billion rubles (~$110M), spanning 4.7 km in total, with the bridge itself about 1 km long
A multi-day analysis of battlefield dynamics and internal Russian data: both public and non-public, points to multiple trends and key points which we summarized. 🧵Thread:
2/ Ukraine’s deep strike drone campaign has inflicted significant direct and secondary damage across Russia, contributing to a perceptible shift in perceptions of the war’s trajectory and its cost benefit among both military command and law enforcement senior leadership.
3/ According to analyzed communications from dozens of senior Russian officers in Moscow and in the field, there is a growing perception that the war has effectively reached a strategic and political dead end - sustained primarily by President Putin’s personal insistence
SLB, the world’s largest offshore drilling company headquartered in Texas, continues to operate in Russia despite international sanctions, according to documents published by the analytical firm @dallasparkua. 🧵Thread:
2/ In March 2022, SLB publicly announced that it would suspend all new investments in the Russian market in response to international sanctions. This was in the statement from Chief Executive Officer Olivier Le Peuch, issued from the company’s Houston headquarter
3/ In October 2022, the company underwent a global rebranding, changing its name from Schlumberger to SLB. The Russian subsidiary retained the name Schlumberger Technology Company. However, leaked correspondence point that it continues to be integrated into SLB’s global framework