Amid the ongoing debate about the number of operational Ka-52 helicopters on the frontlines, I've analyzed and compiled imagery of bases used for helicopter operations by the Russians. The findings are summarized in this 🧵Thread:
1/
2/ Based on acquired Maxar images from November 1st, the Taganrog airbase hosted at least 4 operational Ka-52 helicopters on its tarmac. The surrounding activity indicates their use, a fact further supported by their absence in earlier shots.
3/ The Buturlinovka Airbase accommodates a minimum of 5 Ka-52 helicopters. Although Helicopter #7 is not distinctly visible in this image, the next image includes a slightly older photo of the same helicopter at the same location for clarity.
4/ Identifying helicopters in high-resolution imagery (0.5 - 1m) can be challenging, but certain distinct characteristics help with recognition: fuselage length, two coaxial rotors, a shorter tail, and a unique frontal shape, among others.
5/ Zernograd airbase, the home of the 16th Army Aviation Brigade, currently houses approximately 8 additional Ka-52 helicopters.
6/ In these calculations, I excluded several Ka-52 helicopters undergoing repairs or maintenance, evident from the missing rotor blades. Additionally, for OPSEC reasons, I didn't account for 2 more Ka-52 helicopters located at FARP.
7/ The scope of my analysis focuses on the operational Ka-52 helicopters on the frontlines. I didn't add helicopters located in other regions of Russia, such as Central Russia and the Far East.
8/ With a 90% confidence level and error not exceeding 30%, presented evidence strongly indicates that Russia still maintains operational Ka-52 helicopters.
9/ Both the Ka-52 and numerous Mi-28 helicopters continue to pose a significant threat to Ukrainian forces along the frontline. Their ability to deploy LMUR and Vikhr missiles extends their reach, enabling them to engage targets beyond the range of SHORAD
10/ Moving on to the next base, Rovenki Airbase, traditionally home to a substantial number of helicopters, has recently dispersed its helicopters in response to emerging threats, due to its proximity to the border.
11/ In October and early November, Rovenki Airbase accommodated more than three Ka-52 helicopters. I counted only three Ka-52 helicopters, excluding those with missing blades, as their operational status is hard to determine
12/ Kirovske Airbase in Crimea housed a total of 6 Ka-52 helicopters.
13/ Let's assume that roughly 30% of the helicopters I've identified could be duplicates (the same helicopter at different locations and times), partially or fully inoperable, or mistakenly identified.
14/ Rounding gives us around 8 helicopters. Even assuming 8 were included wrongly, we still have 17 operational helicopters. Therefore, claims suggesting there are no or only a few functional Ka-52s are invalid.
15/ In summary, satellite evidence collectively indicates that Russia currently maintains a fleet of at least 25 operational Ka-52 helicopters, with the actual number likely much higher.
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Ukraine has just struck multiple Wildberries logistics hubs. One of them, in St. Petersburg, is engulfed in flames, disrupting Russia's second-largest city.
Here's one of Russia's largest 24/7 news websites (auto-translated). This is the virtual reality many Russians live in.
2/ The only mention of the attack is a brief report claiming that drones were shot down. Here's the auto-translated version:
The crisis in Crimea continues, with conditions worsening. After Crimea's occupation head, Sergey Aksyonov, claimed steps were being taken to address the situation in a recent Telegram post, hundreds of locals flooded the comments, challenging his narrative. 🧵Translations:
2/ "Please, just do something! Have you forgotten about northern Crimea? Have you abandoned the people? Soon people will be starving, and we are already close to breaking down! At least say something! Declare an evacuation, do anything at all! This is not life, this is suffering"
3/ "I wonder if Aksyonov (governor) would be willing to bring his family and come stay with us in Dzhankoy, sitting through the complete blackout that has already lasted a week, while telling us to hold on until mid-August."
The situation in Crimea is becoming critical. As authorities remain largely silent, residents are flooding the Telegram channel of the head of Crimea with complaints about power outages, communication disruptions, fuel shortages, and water supply issues. Thread with translations:
1/ "Why is gasoline so expensive? It's twice the price compared to the mainland! Are people here supposed to be twice as rich or something? 😳"
2/ "The city of Dzhankoy has been without electricity for more than 24 hours. If the situation does not improve in the near future, a collective complaint will be drafted and sent to Moscow tomorrow."
The grooming of Orban's regime as a Trojan horse inside the EU and NATO is no longer speculative: it's now evidence-based, confirmed by leaked Budapest-Moscow communications. Agentstvo reports that roughly half of all Russian embassy staff maintain ties to intelligence services:
2/ The EU officially identifies Russia as one of its primary security threats. Yet Orban has been systematically distancing Hungary from both the EU and NATO, deteriorating relations with neighbors including Ukraine, while growing increasingly reliant on Russian influence.
3/ Moscow has no genuine interest in Hungary itself, or in the country's long-term wellbeing. What it wants is a lever - to undermine EU institutions, erode European support for Ukraine, and seed distrust between member states toward one of their own EU members and NATO allies
There’s been a lot of discussion about the potential threat FPV drones could pose to US forces on the ground, with some going as far as claiming that American troops would suffer heavy casualties from FPV drones. That’s possible, but it’s also worth questioning the assumptions:
2/ First, it’s not clear to what extent Iran has actually trained and prepared its ground forces for large-scale use of small drones. Even relatively decentralized militaries still operate within ORBAT and logistics. So far, there isn’t strong evidence of systemic changes within the Iranian army to support widespread FPV deployment.
3/ Second, we’ve seen relatively little FPV usage from Iran-supported groups like Hamas or Hezbollah, despite continuous war with Israel. A few examples have emerged from Iraq, but we’re talking about a handful of videos at most. That’s not a level of a large-scale implementation