Let's start with the fact we are looking a North Korean D-20 152mm howitzer with dry rotted to nothing wheels, using North Korean 152mm ammo.
This underlines four things true in every war: 1. There are never enough artillery shells 2. There are never enough tires 3. There
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(3. con't)...are never enough barrel liners. 4. There is never enough productive capability for new guns barrels.
And one thing that is true in this war that no one noticed for 80 years. The lack of mechanized logistics in the form of pallets & forklifts in the Russian Army.
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The amount of brute, back breaking, manual labor to place a D-20 howitzer _without tires_ into that firing position beggars the imagination.
And here is the thing, you can't move the puppy outside it's mount firing azimuth without vehicles dragging the thing.
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Good luck with that now that its mud season, shooting into Ukrainian counter-battery radar coverage and under Ukrainian 25 km range FPV drones.
I've done a couple of 2022 threads on the logistical problems RuAF artillery, particularly barrel life.
These D-20's had, at best, 1,500 equivalent full charge rounds (EFC) of barrel life brand new (and more likely 1,000) with a range 2/3rds of a M777 towed gun.
And this D-20 is not new
No one knows how many shells RuAF or DPRK frontline or "reserve" barrels had through them
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...before the latest Russian invasion of Ukraine kicked off.
Older M777 and newer Russian guns last 2,000 rounds.
According to the Perun Youtube channel, older Soviet guns like the D-20 last from 1000 to 1,500 EFC.
And the newest Russian guns have corruption problems.
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Russia lacks production foundries for the necessary grades of high strength steel for gun barrel liners
Nadin Brzezinski's July 17, 2022 article "Logistics Collapse" goes deeply into the corruption of Russian Artillery barrel liner metallurgy.
Shooting poor dimensional quality DPRK (North Korean) artillery shells through 65-to 75 year old barrels of doubtful life span and serviceability is a violently explosive way to commit lethal self-harm.😱
....with yellow highlighting is from the US Marine Corps FMFRP 3-203 Lessons Learned: Iran–Iraq War Volume 1 and details the masses of late 1940's to 1960's guns pawned off on the Iraqi's to kill Iranian militia.
Ukraine's new 155mm/39 caliber & 155mm/52 caliber guns...
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...coming from Europe can sit at 22 km and eat D-20's right out of their immobile positions.
But why should Ukraine bother when FPV drones that can do the job, and avoid "Shell hunger" in the first place? 13/
The X accounts pooping their trousers about Ukraine "being buried by huge numbers of DPRK D-20 guns firing shells" really need to take a chill pill.
Russia is having to put more and more effort using scarce foreign exchange to achieve less and less military results.
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Putin's Regime started the war with $650 billion. It lost ~$325 Billion frozen overseas to sanctions.
It blew another $150 Billion propping up the Ruble.
And of the ~$175 Billion left, $120 billion went to military spending so far.
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Nominally, Putin's state bank has $60 billion left over from the original $650 billion plus whatever the state has from sanctioned oil and has stolen from private firms.
And Putin is buying D-20 guns with dry rotted tires & poor dimensional quality shells from DPRK with it🤭
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There is another name for Russia is having to do more effort to achieve less military capability.
It's called Lanchester Square Law Collapse.
It's the trend from Msta-S guns to towed D-20s & Kamaz Tactical Trucks to UAZ/Loaf/Scooby Doo vans.
The major problem that I have in _disbelieving_ that opening paragraph are the (in)actions of the Biden Administration with retaliating against Iranian proxy militias.
A Trump vs Wagner mercs in Syria sized curb stomping of Iranian proxies is required. 2/
Instead, the Biden Administration is doing things like asking China for help in getting Iran to stop being on a 1979 and counting mission from G-d against the 'Great Satan' (Mullahese for the USA).🙄
I reported another video of this AFU strike, but this one tells us a great deal about RuAF logistical operational patterns.
1. The RuAF tactical trucks were escorted by armored mobility vehicles through Ukraine from Crimea to protect it from Ukrainian partisans/Special Forces 1/
This report from @CovertShores is an extraordinarily important one for what it tells us about Ukraine's expanding anti-access area denial (A2AD) bubble it is building against RuAF logistics to occupied Eastern Kherson.
The Ondatra & Serna-class landing craft are roughly the equivalent of a WW2 era US Navy LCM.
Gen. MacArthur's Engineer Special Brigades use them to move troops 100's of km. in the S. Philippines campaign shore to shore in the Victor & King operations 2/
This graphic from @HamWa07 of an actual S-300 missile sites' radar coverage (left) near the Kerch Straits compared to the claimed S-400 system performance (right), based on drawing circles of missile range and claimed detection range, shows why the human factor matters.
It takes trained human skills to get the best out of any weapons system.
Surface to air missile battery performance is heavily dependent on the staff work in properly placing the radars and telecommunications relaying radar data to missile launchers.
This is always a game
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...of compromise with available defenses, terrain, and existing civilian infrastructure that may affect the placement of your SAM battery.
@HamWa07 map shows the S-300 can only cover the east to south east well.
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And we are seeing that right now with Russian complaints at #Krynky .
This is because observed artillery fire with precision guided artillery projectiles have in part replaced crewed airpower in retail close air support and battlefield interdiction
There are so few crewed strike jets now compared to WW2, with too many levels of command claiming "Higher Priorities" for a highly expensive & scarce asset, that Field artillery & attack helicopters have taken up the roles.
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