On the sixtieth anniversary of John F. Kennedy's assassination, here's a thread on his relationship with Nikita Khrushchev, one of the most important relationships of the Cold War.
Moscow welcomed JFK's election as President in 1960. Khrushchev's relationship with Eisenhower deteriorated sharply after the U2 incident in May 1960. He privately called Ike a "non-entity", and derided Vice President Nixon, as a "careerist," a "time-server", and "an empty suit."
The young and untried Kennedy was therefore a welcome change, and Khrushchev would later claim that he had "voted" for him by agreeing to release detained US airmen from the downed reconnaissance plane RB-47H.
Khrushchev expected to do business with Kennedy. What he really wanted was to reach an agreement on Berlin, which the Soviet leader called a "rotten tooth". But when the two met at a summit in Vienna in June 1961, Khrushchev discovered that Kennedy was unbending on the issue.
BTW there is a widespread view in the historiography that Khrushchev managed to intimidate the inexperienced Kennedy at the Vienna summit. It is an erroneous view in my opinion. Kennedy stood his ground, and Khrushchev's bullying tactics got him nowhere.
But Khrushchev did have this very peculiar view of Kennedy as being manipulatable by what is today sometimes called the "deep state," but which for Khrushchev entailed some combination of the military brass and the American oligarchy.
He worried about this, because he thought that these shady manipulators would press Kennedy into starting a war that the young President wanted to avoid, etc.
This view of Khrushchev's (completely baseless btw) was consequential in his decision-making in Berlin (he decided against pushing JFK into the corner, and ultimately ordered to build the Berlin Wall in August 1961, which helped diffuse the crisis in the medium-term).
Then came the Cuban Missile Crisis. Khrushchev and Kennedy were somehow able to feel each other out, and to find the common ground, which allowed them to step back from the brink. You know what I find striking in their interaction in October 1962?
It wasn't Kennedy's toughness (oversold), nor Khrushchev's combativeness (he was in fact a lot less combative than we tend to assume). It was their shared experience of war (both were of course WWII veterans), and their absolute determination to avoid a repetition.
I worry that today's leaders, lacking this direct experience of a major war, are rather less cautious. I am thinking of Putin's comments last year (on the anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis) that he was no Nikita Khrushchev. True. And that's worrying.
Anyway, the shared experience "on the brink" brought Khrushchev and Kennedy closer. What followed was a period of improving relations, a mini-detente, sadly cut short by Kennedy's assassination in 1963 and Khrushchev's overthrow in 1964.
Khrushchev was deeply saddened by the assassination (contrary to conspiracy theories, he had nothing at all to do with it). On Nov. 23 he visited the US Embassy in Moscow where, in a conversation with Ambassador Foy D. Kohler, he praised JFK's "tact," "realism" and "knowledge."
Here are some snippets from this conversation, from the Russian archives (never published before): "N.S. Khrushchev says that Kennedy made a strong impression on him. This was a man, who, although he was young, knew how to handle himself."
And then: "N.S. Khrushchev says that Kennedy had one important trait: a feeling for reality, which cannot be learned through any diplomatic science."
A lot more on the Kennedy-Khrushchev relationship in my forthcoming book, To Run the World, which you can pre-order here: . Use the code TRTW20 to receive 20% off your order. cambridge.org/it/universityp…
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A few comments on Putin in Beijing.
Putin attended the third BRI forum (Oct. 17-18). This is his second trip outside of Russia this year (the first was to Bishkek a few days ago). So it's a big deal. Let's take a closer look.
Xi Jinping literally put Putin front and Center. Here's the group photo, where you see Xi flanked by Putin (on the right) and his wife Peng Liyuan (on the left). I won't venture to guess whom he feels closer to.
Putin and Xi met for three hours. I dug out the Chinese read-out in English translation. . In the excerpt below, Putin is laying it on thick, commending Xi for his "vision" & "strategic judgement," adopting Xi's very language "changes unseen in a century". brfmc2023.cn/en/detail/1697…
An interesting article by Timothy Snyder: . As a fellow historian with pretensions of a public intellectual, I will disagree with my esteemed colleague's analysis. I find that his key points are 1) theoretically unsustainable and 2) potentially defamatory.amp.theguardian.com/commentisfree/…
First this here. Snyder argues that Ukrainian strikes on Crimea are "de-escalatory, as such attacks reduce Russia's capability to attack Ukrainian territory." The argument is of course directed at @elonmusk's claim that attacking Crimea could have been deemed escalatory.
Snyder's argument doesn't actually make any sense. If reducing the enemy's capability to carry out military operations were deemed de-escalatory, then *any* military actions would become de-escalatory.
Very significant language from the Putin-Kim meeting, where Kim claims Russia is waging a "sacred struggle", and says that he "always supported and supports all decisions by President Putin."
Elsewhere Kim says relations with Russia are North Korea's "foremost priority". This will not go unnoticed by the Chinese.
Perhaps a bit early to say but I think what we are seeing here is the emergence of a de facto alliance between Pyongyang and Moscow. That is a major development with significant regional implications, which will have the following elements:
An interesting thread. A couple of notes.
For a start, the Chechen war actually started before Putin (under Yeltsin), though of course it was put on hold at Khasavyurt. Second - much more importantly - criticism such as this seems unfair.
The key issue for American policy-makers in the 1990s and early 2000s was how to strengthen democratic tendencies in Russia at a time when Russia was clearly facing democratic backsliding and a nationalistic resurgence. The line to be walked was thin and far from obvious.
To say that the Americans did not care about Russian atrocities in Chechnya is wrong: the issue overshadowed Russian-American relations throughout this period.Just read a few of Clinton's memcons from the declassified set at the Clinton library and you'll see how agitated he was.
Let's talk about where we are with Russia.
For the second time in three days, Putin addressed the Russian people to condemn an "armed rebellion." In this second iteration, he came across as much angrier. Yet, in the end, he simply repeated that Wagner can leave for Belarus.
Putin's impotent rage highlights the underlying weakness of his position. Long gone are the days when he promised to "beat the shit out of terrorists in the outhouse." Today's Putin has to settle for compromise solutions, and even resort to the services of Lukashenko.
Lukashenko, the tinpot dictator, who himself held to power by the skin of his teeth! It's humiliating. But there are more profound underlying questions.
Putin links Prigozhin to Ukraine, suggesting that they were working towards the same goal: Russia's defeat.
Main takeaways: 1) No backing down (Shoigu remains in post). 2) Harsh condemnation of Prigozhin's "treason" 3) Those Wagnerites who want to, can "exit" freely to Belarus.
Lukashenko earns a notable mention, suggesting that, as I previously argued, he has increased his weight relative to Putin's, as someone who saved Russia from a civil war.
Claims that the "rebellion" has been defeated due to the consolidation of the Russian society, which continues to show "unity" before formidable challenges. This part is a good spin, of course, but it just doesn't add up. Russia's society is not united.