China has a ton of reserves -- including a growing share of high yielding US agencies. And China's state banks have lent a ton to the world, generally in dollars and at a floating rate. China's investment income could be soaring ...
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I constructed a model of China's income balance in the balance of payments. China doesn't provide a breakdown of either interest or dividend payments, so I applied an assumed rate of return to the disclosed stocks.
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I was able to get a good fit with the disclosed data on outbound payments (with an assumed return of 8% on FDI in China).
But the fit on China's assets broke down recently ...
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Global rates are a lot higher today than 2018, but China's income receipts are lower -- which doesn't really make sense. Matt Klein noticed the same gap as well
Remember that China has 2 big international policy banks -- Exim and CDB, and 4-5 big state owned "commercial" banks active internationally.
China defined the CDB to be a commercial creditor, along with its "commercial" state commercial banks.
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This isn't just an academic point -- China Exim has just over $4b in exposure to Zambia, while the commercial bank creditors (mostly China!) have $3b in exposure ... and much of China's exposure to Sri Lanka is via the CDB's fiscal support loans (couple billion ... )
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The obvious solution to this dilemma is for China to rely on fiscal easing to support its economy -- backed with quantitative rather than price based monetary and credit easing as needed.
I did a fairly technical blog on this topic (directed in part the IMF, which is pushing a shift toward price based monetary policy transmission at the wrong time imo) a few weeks ago ... when it was a bit lost amid all bond market noise
China has more scope than most to hold its currency stable v the dollar with domestic interest rates below US rates:
-- it generates fx from its massive goods surplus;
-- has enormous fx reserves (and another $1 trillion or so in the state banks;
-- it has real capital controls
There is a lot of interest in foreign demand for US Treasuries (and US bonds generally) these days, given the scale of forthcoming issuance.
And in aggregate foreign demand for US bonds has actually been pretty strong, in line or above the post global crisis norm
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the higher frequency data from the Fed (and now the Treasury) based on the valuation adjusted monthly survey data tells the same story -- solid overall demand, with a modest shift toward Agencies in the last 12ms
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Treasury demand appears to be coming largely from private investors -- which makes sense given that reserve growth has been weak and Treasuries offer an absolute yield pickup.
China on net has sold Treasuries in the last 12ms of data even adjusting for Belgium/euroclear
China's current account surplus is disappearing. At least in the Chinese data.
I know the negative print on FDI will get all the attention, but the $500b gap between the $850b goods surplus and the $350b CA surplus matters even more.
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$200b of the $500b gap can be explained by China's services trade deficit (mostly tourism/ travel).
But the gap between customs goods and BoP goods accounts for an even bigger share of the gap, and that gap makes NO SENSE
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this gap is very new and now very big. And (per @adamkwolfe and others) it has no apparent foundation. The IMF really should not take China's current account surplus as face value until China clears this up
It actually is complicated. Japan holds a ton of foreign bonds. But the world holds a ton of zero yielding JGBs too. The net sum isn't that big.
and yes, this is confusing ...
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Japan has run persistent current account surpluses, and Japan has a hugely positive net international investment position and it generates a ton of income (interest and dividends from its foreign holdings)
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but what isn't well understood (and hell, I didn't understand it ten years ago) is that Japan's net international investment position is all FDI and reserves, not private holdings of foreign bonds. that should be clear from the cumulative BoP
Japan went from a very large net buyer in 2020 to a very large net seller in 2022 --
It has basically been flat in 2023. Some purchases but nothing like the past.
What is still not well understood is that the bulk of the Japanese flow was a hedged flow, and they key to the hedged flow was the fact that the US curve was much steeper than the Japanese curve.
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