Despite dense cloud cover blocking satellite, drone, and optical surveillance of the Avdiivka battlefield, our team continued the analysis using Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) systems. Here is what we learned about the current situation. 🧵Thread:
2/ Before we move further, let's clarify what Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) is. It's a technology that employs radar to generate images of the Earth's surface. By capturing and processing reflected waves, SAR provides detailed imagery regardless of weather conditions or daylight
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We combined SAR data with on-the-ground testimonials and open-source video materials to gain comprehensive insights.
Some Key Observations
- Vehicle Reduction: In contrast to the initial month of assaults, russian forces are employing fewer vehicles in smaller numbers.
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- Tactical Shift: There's a notable increase in the use of small tactical groups, consistently moving in the same areas despite prior losses.
- Guided Aerial bombs: There is a consistent uptick in the use of guided aerial bombs by Russian forces.
5/ As we correctly predicted, worsened weather conditions have hindered russian overextended logistics routes. Consequently, this limitation made it difficult to develop initial successes, particularly in the northern sector of Avdiivka, notably around Berdychi.
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Following an initial success north of Avdiivka, Russian forces extended their assaults for over a month. Despite tactical successes, they failed to establish persistent footholds in the AKHZ plant.
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Recently, russians seized control of parts of the industrial zone south of Avdiivka. These gains were primarily attributed to continuous infantry assaults, posing potential challenges for Ukrainian defenders in the coming weeks
8/ Russian forces persist in deploying small tactical groups, despite a high mortality rate. This sustained tactic, where one group follows another, has the potential to exhaust Ukrainian troops and compromise their positions over time
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The deployment of cluster bombs, as well as 250-1500kg bombs equipped with the UMPK kit poses a significant problem. Despite them being inaccurate, they are still dangerous due to the big explosive charge, particularly problematic in urban areas, leading to severe destruction
10/ In simpler terms, facing substantial losses and challenging weather, russians ramped up offensives using readily available resources—infantry, artillery, and aerial bombs.
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They shifted their focus to AKHZ, Berychi, and the southern industrial zone, reducing the emphasis on the initial plan to encircle Avdiivka with mechanized forces—a development we anticipated.
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Predicting future developments is challenging, hinging on russia's ability to persist with deploying infantry without adequate cover. This attritional approach, aimed at wearing down defenders, makes it hard to provide any solid estimates.
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If you'd like to support the defenders of Avdiivka, I recommend checking @jana_skhidna , as she consistently raises funds for brigades and units in the area.
Most know Kirill Dmitriev as the Russian president’s envoy. But to more than 200 investors in Ukraine, he is known for taking part in a Kyiv real estate project that ended in a fraud and criminal case. Using articles from 2011, I was able to find more details. 🧵Thread:
2/ The story begins in 2000s, when N. Lahuna and A. Dmitriev (Kirill Dmitriev’s father) planned the elite suburban “Olympic Park.” Construction was to be carried out by Traverz-Bud, a subsidiary of "Evropa", in which, according to "Argument," Kirill Dmitriev held a majority stake
3/ Based on court documents cited in the media, in 2011 (links at the end), a prosecutor’s audit found that construction of the properties, which under agreements with the developers of the “Olympic Park” was due to be completed by the end of 2008, has not been carried out
The Financial Times, a media outlet I respect and one of the few that consistently produces exceptional reporting on Ukraine, has released a new editorial opinion. Many, including myself, agree that changes are needed. However, I believe the timing is extremely problematic:
2/ The situation on the frontlines is currently very difficult. At the same time, Kyiv is facing external pressure from Washington, where many are echoing Kremlin-style “capitulation” narratives. In moments like these, the President must stand on solid ground.
3/ This is not about Zelensky personally - it is about the institution of the Presidency. Completely overhauling the government and appointing untested figures in the name of transparency could create a situation where we might end up with no state and government at all
Financial Times reports that, under the draft plan, Ukraine would be required to cede full control of the Donbas region and halve the size of its armed forces. The plan would also require Ukraine to give up certain types of weaponry:
2/ The plan would also require Ukraine to recognize Russian as an official state language and grant official status to the local branch of the Russian Orthodox Church, provisions that echo long-standing Kremlin political objectives.
3/ Officials in Kyiv briefed on the plan said it closely aligns with the Kremlin’s maximalist demands and would be a non-starter for Ukraine without significant changes, according to @ChristopherJM with @FT
A clear video showing a Kh-family cruise missile descending, releasing flares and striking a residential building in Ternopil this morning indicates the attack was deliberate, contradicting claims by Russian propaganda and bot networks that it resulted from air-defense.🧵Thread:
2/ In the first second of the video, the sound of the cruise missile is clearly audible, and flares can be seen deploying before impact. Russians started to use flares on their missiles as countermeasures against air-defence systems, including MANPADS around 2023.
3/ The missile’s silhouette, with its relatively short, swept-back wings and boat-shaped fuselage, closely matches the Kh-series of cruise missiles
In November, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs reported that 44 Indian nationals were serving in the Russian army. Frontelligence Insight obtained and reviewed data that shows the real number is higher. At least 146 Indian citizens have signed contracts. 🧵Thread:
2/ Thanks to data provided by @hochuzhit_com and our own investigation, we found that Russia, working through local recruiters in India, actively targeting Indian nationals and pulling them into military service despite the Indian government’s attempts to reduce such activities.
3/ We identified more than a dozen ongoing or recently concluded advertising campaigns targeting Indian citizens. In the image below, you can see examples from Facebook, YouTube, and other social-media platforms promotions. Notably, some advertisements directly mention Alabuga
A year and a half ago, in April 2024, I warned (the section is highlighted in the auto-translated text) that aid to Ukraine would continue to dwindle, and that without proper changes we would find ourselves in a poor position. What we’re seeing now was set in motion a while ago.
2/ Besides Europe, which I was mostly addressing in that post, Ukraine has also fallen short, mainly in strategic-level organization, despite several successes such as expanding and deploying unmanned forces and improving long-range strikes that have hurt the Russian economy.
3/ The winning strategy, as my team outlined after the 2023 counteroffensive, can be summed up as “stall the enemy while destroying the rear,” meaning inflict maximum socio-economic damage while preventing the enemy from making real gains and making the war plainly too costly.