Despite dense cloud cover blocking satellite, drone, and optical surveillance of the Avdiivka battlefield, our team continued the analysis using Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) systems. Here is what we learned about the current situation. 🧵Thread:
2/ Before we move further, let's clarify what Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) is. It's a technology that employs radar to generate images of the Earth's surface. By capturing and processing reflected waves, SAR provides detailed imagery regardless of weather conditions or daylight
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We combined SAR data with on-the-ground testimonials and open-source video materials to gain comprehensive insights.
Some Key Observations
- Vehicle Reduction: In contrast to the initial month of assaults, russian forces are employing fewer vehicles in smaller numbers.
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- Tactical Shift: There's a notable increase in the use of small tactical groups, consistently moving in the same areas despite prior losses.
- Guided Aerial bombs: There is a consistent uptick in the use of guided aerial bombs by Russian forces.
5/ As we correctly predicted, worsened weather conditions have hindered russian overextended logistics routes. Consequently, this limitation made it difficult to develop initial successes, particularly in the northern sector of Avdiivka, notably around Berdychi.
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Following an initial success north of Avdiivka, Russian forces extended their assaults for over a month. Despite tactical successes, they failed to establish persistent footholds in the AKHZ plant.
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Recently, russians seized control of parts of the industrial zone south of Avdiivka. These gains were primarily attributed to continuous infantry assaults, posing potential challenges for Ukrainian defenders in the coming weeks
8/ Russian forces persist in deploying small tactical groups, despite a high mortality rate. This sustained tactic, where one group follows another, has the potential to exhaust Ukrainian troops and compromise their positions over time
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The deployment of cluster bombs, as well as 250-1500kg bombs equipped with the UMPK kit poses a significant problem. Despite them being inaccurate, they are still dangerous due to the big explosive charge, particularly problematic in urban areas, leading to severe destruction
10/ In simpler terms, facing substantial losses and challenging weather, russians ramped up offensives using readily available resources—infantry, artillery, and aerial bombs.
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They shifted their focus to AKHZ, Berychi, and the southern industrial zone, reducing the emphasis on the initial plan to encircle Avdiivka with mechanized forces—a development we anticipated.
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Predicting future developments is challenging, hinging on russia's ability to persist with deploying infantry without adequate cover. This attritional approach, aimed at wearing down defenders, makes it hard to provide any solid estimates.
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If you'd like to support the defenders of Avdiivka, I recommend checking @jana_skhidna , as she consistently raises funds for brigades and units in the area.
There’s been a lot of discussion about the potential threat FPV drones could pose to US forces on the ground, with some going as far as claiming that American troops would suffer heavy casualties from FPV drones. That’s possible, but it’s also worth questioning the assumptions:
2/ First, it’s not clear to what extent Iran has actually trained and prepared its ground forces for large-scale use of small drones. Even relatively decentralized militaries still operate within ORBAT and logistics. So far, there isn’t strong evidence of systemic changes within the Iranian army to support widespread FPV deployment.
3/ Second, we’ve seen relatively little FPV usage from Iran-supported groups like Hamas or Hezbollah, despite continuous war with Israel. A few examples have emerged from Iraq, but we’re talking about a handful of videos at most. That’s not a level of a large-scale implementation
With an uncertain battlefield position, Russia has intensified hybrid operations to shape European public opinion. A key element is the spread of narratives portraying Ukraine as using “energy blackmail” against Europe, often echoed by politically sympathetic actors. 🧵Thread:
2/ Since the full-scale invasion began, Russian missile and drone strikes have targeted Ukraine’s energy system, damaging power plants, gas facilities, and transmission networks nationwide. Ukraine has lost about 11.5 GW of capacity, with damage reportedly exceeding $24.8 billion
3/ The war has also affected energy transport infrastructure. Ukrainian oil facilities have been attacked more than 400 times since the invasion began. On 27 January 2026, a strike damaged equipment working for the Druzhba pipeline near Brody in western Ukraine.
Leaked internal files from Moscow reveal that Russia’s ruling party, United Russia, keeps intelligence-style dossiers on its own politicians. They document corruption facts, criminal ties, and personal vulnerabilities, information used to manage Russia’s politics
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2/ United Russia is the political party that dominates Russia’s parliament and regional governments and serves as the main political vehicle of Putin.
Leaked documents from the party, published by @dallasparkua and @256CyberAssault, reveal details of an internal vetting process
3/ Meet Evgeniy Gnedov, who oversees the vetting of candidates for various lawmaking bodies - from local assemblies to the federal parliament.
A longtime security official, he spent decades inside the Federal Penitentiary Service of Russia, eventually rising to a senior role
Russia’s war in Ukraine has increasingly become a war of drones, but artillery still plays a key role on the battlefield. Newly obtained documents from 2014 to 2025 show that Russia continues to modernize its artillery production using industrial machinery from Europe. 🧵Thread:
2/ In a joint analysis, Frontelligence Insight and the @dallasparkua company reviewed hundreds of internal documents from Russian defense contractor Zenit-Investprom and found that Plant No. 9, a maker of artillery barrels and tank guns, went through major upgrades in 2025
3/ Six facilities within the Uralmash industrial zone were found to be undergoing modernization, including planned delivery of industrial machinery from several European countries. Several workshops were dedicated to work on the Armata project and the Koalitsiya SPG.
As we approach a point marking the beginning of the war’s 5th year, it is time to discuss how we assess the war’s overall dynamics, strictly from a military standpoint. One method many analysts use is the pace of territory capture. However, this methodology has a serious issue🧵:
2/ Generally, this is not a bad method of analyzing battlefield dynamics, as the history of wars shows far more cases of states advancing along frontlines or into enemy territory before a war ends in their favor than the opposite. The devil, however, lies in the details
3/ Putting aside other domains of war, such as economics and socio-politics, battlefield dynamics are often judged by metrics like casualty rates and square kilometers of controlled territory. This can produce a distorted picture, a problem I informally term the “Sahara Fallacy”