#Russian Off. Campaign Assessment, Nov. 29, 2023: The apparent Russian failure to establish a cohesive cmd. structure among forces defending on the east (left) bank of #Kherson Oblast continues to degrade Russian morale & combat capabilities. 1/6
The #Russian “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces is increasingly comprised of disparate elements of recently transferred and degraded units and new formations, which may be contributing to this apparent lack of cohesive command structure. 2/6
The #Russian ”Dnepr” Grouping of Forces appears to be comprised of elements of the Black Sea Fleet, the Caspian Flotilla, the Southern Military District, the Central Military District, the Northern Fleet, and the Russian Airborne (VDV) forces. 3/6
#Russia’s other grouping of forces in Ukraine largely correspond with Russia’s military districts reinforced in some cases with VDV units, making the ”Dnepr” Grouping of Forces a notable aberration. 4/6
The #Russian military command is unlikely to remedy the ”Dnepr” Grouping of Force’s command issues in the short term, however, and the continuation of Ukrainian ground operations on the left bank will likely only complicate these efforts. 5/6
It is not yet clear if the command-and-control challenges facing #Russian forces in #Kherson will generate notable battlefield effects. 6/6 isw.pub/UkrWar112923
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1/ #Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian military bureaucracy is impeding Russian drone usage & acquisition among RU forces operating on east (left) bank #Kherson amid cont'd complaints about weak RU capabilities on the east bank. isw.pub/UkrWar113023
2/ RU Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov notably did not promote Kremlin information operations feigning interest in negotiations during his speech at the OSCE Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in North Macedonia on Nov. 30, and instead promoted escalatory rhetoric about #Moldova.
3/ Russian forces conducted multiple series of missile and drone strikes on #Ukraine that struck civilian infrastructure on November 29 and 30.
NEW: A recent Russian opinion poll indicates that the number of Russians who fully support the war in #Ukraine has almost halved since Feb. 2023 and that more Russians support a withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine than do not. (1/4)
2/ The Russian war in #Ukraine has created new social tensions and exacerbated existing ones within #Russia, which remain highly visible in the Russian information space despite ongoing #Kremlin censorship efforts.
3/ The #Kremlin is likely concerned about how changing RU perceptions of the war in #Ukraine will affect the outcome of the March 2024 RU presidential election & is implementing measures to ensure that #Putin’s actual electoral support does not rest on RU battlefield successes.
1/ Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks in the east (left) bank of #Kherson Obl. on Nov. 29 & reportedly advanced. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced SW of Krynky & established a foothold in a nearby forest area. isw.pub/UkrWar112923
2/ Russian milbloggers claimed that battles are ongoing near #Krynky and that Russian aviation and artillery units are heavily striking the area.
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces maintain positions on the east bank of the #Dnipro River.
3/ Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to transfer new assault groups to the left bank and that 300 to 400 Ukrainian personnel are operating near #Krynky.
The restrictions of the proposed migration status likely aim to further alienate large numbers of migrants from economic and social life in #Russia and make military service one of the few avenues for remaining in the country. 🧵(1/10) isw.pub/UkrWar112823
2/ #Kremlin news wire TASS reported on November 28 that the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) drafted a proposed bill that would create a “controlled stay” regime in #Russia for migrants who do not have legal grounds for staying in the country...
3/ ...including those with expired or nullified migration documents and those who have illegally entered #Russia.
The bill will reportedly propose the following restrictions on migrants in Russia on the controlled stay regime:
Latest #Iran Update covering the #IsraelHamasWar w/ @criticalthreats: isw.pub/IranUpdate1128…
Key Takeaways 🧵
1/ #Hamas’ governance capacity appears to be breaking down in the #Gaza Strip, even in the southern part, which will complexify Israeli clearing operations.
2/ #Israel and Hamas both reported at least one violation of the temporary truce agreement in the #Gaza Strip, but neither side escalated the situation to more general fighting across the strip.
1/ Head of the #Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church Patriarch Kirill of #Moscow stated that Russia needs to “significantly adjust” its migration policies for the “preservation of Russian culture,” highlighting the perceived superiority of ethnic Russians.
2/ Russian officials appear to be attempting to further disenfranchise migrants living in #Russia, likely to support ongoing efforts to coerce migrants into military service while also appeasing increasingly xenophobic Russian ultranationalists. isw.pub/UkrWar112823
3/ The #Kremlin continues to focus heavily on setting informational conditions for the upcoming 2024 Russian presidential elections and will likely formally commence Putin’s “campaign” on December 14.