1/ A recent Ukrainian attack in the Kherson region village of Yuvileine killed 4 police staff and injured another 17. The details of the casualties highlight both collaborationist activities and how officials from Russia have been recruited to manage the occupied regions. ⬇️
2/ The attack, which was likely carried out using HIMARS, struck a police building on the left bank of the Dnipro that was reportedly being used for a high-level meeting. It housed the so-called "Novokakhovsky Department of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation".
3/ The ASTRA Telegram channel has named several of the dead and wounded. It reports that most were police officials from Russia, who were "recruited to work in the occupied territories of Ukraine with promises of double salaries and other privileges."
4/ The four people killed were:
🔺 46-year-old senior police lieutenant Mergen Nimgirov (pictured), who came from the Moscow region to work in the Kherson region;
🔺 33-year-old police major Artur Dzhunusov, deputy chief of the department;
5/🔺 39-year-old police major Vladimir Novikov, who held the position of chief of logistics;
🔺 45-year-old police captain Sergei Novikov, who held the position of "inspector for juvenile affairs."
6/ The Russian wounded included:
🔺 36-year-old lieutenant of justice Elena Golodiaeva, who worked as a senior investigator and came to the Kherson region from Astrakhan;
7/ 🔺 36-year-old police captain Yuri Panchenko (left) who also worked as a senior investigator after coming from Stavropol in Crimea;
🔺 39-year-old Lieutenant Colonel of Justice Amida Midelashvili (right), head of the investigation department, who also came from Astrakhan;
8/ 🔺 38-year-old police lieutenant colonel Dmitry Baranov, chief of the traffic police department;
🔺 37-year-old police captain Sergei Lysenkov.
9/ Several Ukrainian collaborationists working for the Russians were also injured in the attack. They included:
🔺 46-year-old police lieutenant Zhanna Khabirova, deputy head of department, who graduated from the Odesa Law Academy.
10/ 🔺 29-year-old junior police lieutenant, Nikolai Trubchanov, who graduated from the Kharkiv National University of Internal Affairs.
The police are a key component of the Russian occupation, working to support the Russian military and suppress any partisan activity.
11/ The attack was likely intended to signal to the Russian police officials and their Ukrainian collaborationist co-workers that they are regarded as legitimate targets, and to weaken Russian control by disrupting the policing of frontline areas. /end
1/ Russia's air defences are doing great, according to Russian warbloggers. However, they say that those of Laos (a synecdoche for Russia, to evade censors) are crippled by shortages of manpower and resources, and an inflexible command and control system.
2/ Two popular Russian Telegram warbloggers discuss problems with the Russian air defence system, using carefully worded euphemisms to avoid getting into trouble with the authorities. 'RAG&E' writes:
3/ "The Russian Armed Forces rank second in the world military rankings, but its air defence capabilities are clearly and rightfully ranked first.
I think everyone agrees on this, so let's move on to Laos.
1/ Russian journalist and analyst Yuri Baranchik asks plaintively: "why have they started terrorising the people?" He joins the dots between various recent actions by the Russian government, including the blocking of Telegram, and warns of a "1917 [or] 1989" scenario. ⬇️
2/ Baranchik's lament is the latest in a growing trend of Russian commentators suddenly becoming aware that the repressive power of the state is being turned on 'loyal Russians', rather than just against the despised liberals or anti-war protesters.
1/ Muscovites are being locked into an ever-growing 'digital gulag', complain Russian warbloggers, as a still-mysterious mobile Internet shutdown in central Moscow enters its second week. The shutdown is reported to be causing huge commercial losses and inconvenience. ⬇️
2/ Starting March 5th, Internet access in central Moscow was shut down, apparently on the orders of the Russian government. It has even extended to shutting down Wi-Fi on the Moscow Metro and the parliamentary Wi-Fi network in the State Duma.
3/ 'Blue Beard' says the city is being plunged back into the primeval darkness of 2007:
"The only app that works in the city centre in the evening, regardless of mobile internet conditions, is Yandex Music.
Meanwhile, Sberbank and T-Bank's banking apps have crashed."
1/ In recent weeks, an entire genre has sprung up on Telegram of Russian bloggers suddenly realising that they live in a repressive dictatorship. They complain bitterly that they were "fools", they are being "enslaved", and forced to endure a "cultural counter-revolution". ⬇️
2/ The forthcoming ban on Telegram – likely to be announced on 1 April – appears to have woken up many Russian bloggers to the way the Russian government is systematically attacking free speech. 'Under the ice' predicts catastrophe:
3/ "In general, the desire to confine all citizens of the country to a sterile information bubble, eliminating the use of inappropriate social networks, books, music, and films, will have the most devastating consequences for the state itself.
1/ Russia simply isn't capable of doing in Ukraine what the US and Israeli air forces are doing in Iran, a prominent Russian warblogger admits. He blames the Russian air force's "organisational backwardness, underdeveloped intelligence, and lack of specialised aviation." ⬇️
2/ Ukraine's aviation situation is starkly different to that of Iran's, despite facing a theoretically more powerful opponent. The Ukrainian Air Force is not only still flying in substantial numbers but has expanded its capabilities with the addition of Western aircraft.
3/ 'Military Informant' discusses why the Russian Aerospace Forces are still unable to achieve air superiority over Ukraine after over four years of full-scale war:
1/ News that the Iranian regime is proving more resilient than expected highlights its unusual governing structure as a 'polydictatorship'. In many ways, it was designed from the ground up to resist regime change. ⬇️
2/ The regime comprises a multi-layered set of elected and unelected institutions that shares power across religious bodies bodies, the armed forces (particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), and economic entities. Each provides a separate and distinct power centre.
3/ They each have their own institutional bases, resources, coercive capacity, and claims to legitimacy — none of which fully controls the others, but which collectively make the regime more resilient to internal and external shocks.