I've been late to this absolute masterclass in CYA from the Washington Post. And while no doubt this article has been endlessly lampooned by Z-posters, some of the points are interesting to consider.
Ukraine and the US built the offensive on a series of wargames where they were able to sweep away the Russian defenders and break through to the Sea of Azov. Garbage data fed the assumptions and stats used in the wargames. Garbage in, garbage out. /2
What is highly credible to me is the reported disconnect between the US and Ukrainian leaderships, where the US wanted one axis of attack while Ukraine continued to prioritize other fronts. Key thing to note here is that Zelensky and Zaluzhny were both behind this. /3
I've been saying for a while that Zaluzhny is a midwit at best, and nothing I have seen or heard has disabused me of that opinion. There was a rather astute observation the other day by @ClaytonNicholas /4
@ClaytonNicholas Ukrocope now on how wargaming doesn't work. Sorry, you can only rehearse and simulate since you don't have a replica Russian army to test this on. You're the ones who fed garbage data into the sims, and the West stupidly believed you. No takebacks. /5
@ClaytonNicholas And then the mutual blame game, where the US accuses Ukraine of getting cold feet and Ukraine accuses the west of supplying broken equipment. Honestly, Ukraine got everything they wanted and more. Remember Zaluzhny's shopping list last year? Yeah. /6
@ClaytonNicholas Ultimately, if Ukraine said they wanted to fight a WW2 style breakthrough battle, they should have committed to it. Granted, the 30-40% casualties wargamed was a bullshit lowball, but for the type of battle they wanted to fight 60-80% would have been worth it. /7
@ClaytonNicholas This is not explained in the article, since it is more about CYA than actual military analysis, and because journalists usually have a piss poor understanding of military affairs, but because Ukraine didn't attack all at once, logistical attrition made critical mass impossible./8
@ClaytonNicholas The article's effort to shift the blame onto Ukraine's leadership does land quite well, honestly speaking, but it is missing the big picture. Ukraine likely approached this from the perspective of a typical client, looking at weapons as tokens of political support. /9
@ClaytonNicholas Look, every Third World client state has crap logistics and can't be expected to sustain a long conflict. The US didn't understand this, and Ukrainians deep down are just hoping they'd get bailed out by Western intervention. That's the real reason for this shit. /10
@ClaytonNicholas 2nd part begins with some analysis of the tactical execution of the counteroffensive, and here I'll be more critical of the banal observations and cliches parroted by the WaPo and its unnamed Western sources. /11 archive.ph/Dy26C
@ClaytonNicholas A key point of contention is how the Ukrainians were ill-trained.
Who gives a shit? How well trained was the average trooper in WW2?
The main problem was the lack of coordinated mass in the breakthrough battle. You aren't going to be clever breaking through a trench line. /12
@ClaytonNicholas And again, noting the prevalence of drones. Article hilariously quotes US officials saying to use artillery on them. That's going to stop FPVs, yeah, that'll do it. /13
@ClaytonNicholas Again, here's the problem. Ukraine, as a weaker, less technologically capable country, are trying to attack a country that can outproduce the collective west. The only thing you bring to the table is meat. You can only bring more of it. That's the only resource you have. /14
@ClaytonNicholas Article ends with the new stalemate cope. Let them think this for as long as they want. /15 END
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Ok, I had to do a double take on this post before getting that this is indeed a serious post.
Yes, the cornerstone of the US’s technological policy and the reason why we’re living under the threat of WW3 boils down to Apple’s ability to offer thinner bezels and USB-C. /1
People cite TSMC as the reason why Taiwan is so strategic in global affairs, because of their seeming near-monopoly on the latest lithography nodes. Which leads to some dumb speculation that China wants Taiwan for the fabs. /2eurasiantimes.com/us-threatens-t…
As I’ve said many times before, owning Taiwanese fabs means little to China as Taiwan has none of the indigenous production chain. All the machinery has to be imported, which means TSMC dies off in a few years without them. /3reddit.com/r/explainlikei…
Estimating the US's Patriot stockpile. First the easy stuff. According to the budgets, 1943 of the PAC-3 MSE had been procured thru FY22. Prior to that the original PAC-3 whose production ended in '13 was produced at ~1200 units. Prior, 6575 older missiles were produced in 80/90s
The US has stopped producing new PAC-2 missiles but has instead continuously refurbished its older stockpile with the modernized GEM series (GEM, GEM-C, GEM-T). The precise number here is unclear, but there was a PR in 2010 announcing the 1000th GEM-T prnewswire.com/news-releases/…
Since then, I can't find find another army contract other than one additional orders in 2011 and 2012, each one maybe ~130. There has not been an announcement for the 2000th GEM-T, so I presume this is where procurement paused ~1250 raytheon.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43…militaryaerospace.com/defense-execut…
Took some time today to flip through the 2024 Pentagon budget proposal, the unprecedented $842B budget.
1) Production isn't being dramatically increased 2) Increased $ topline comes from inflation and switch to more advanced variants comptroller.defense.gov/Budget-Materia…
Something basic, like the JLTV will not only cost more for fewer vehicles (3108) but will likely miss production goals in 2023 (3311 out of 3721 projected).
Same story for the AMPV, which instead of the 72 for $380m will only see 43 deliveries this year. 2024 has 91 projected.
Certain systems like the M1 Abrams and the PIM sp-arty production will be increased but seem to be capped out at a production capacity limit. Note the increasing costs over last year's projections. 2024 budget reduces order numbers substantially, though additional upgrades slated
An excellent documentary on Maryy Airbase, which was the site of the USSR's "Top Gun" analogue. Not exactly a direct analogue, but it was part of the Soviet Air Force's efforts to rebuild its fighter doctrine from the ground up following the 60s. /1
What was impressive about the program was just how fast it was started after the failure of the Soviet Air Force in a dogfight with Israel over Egypt in 1969. By 1972 the redesigned training regimen was instituted and became an annual regimental-level review and certification. /2
The practice of annual regimental scale exercises stopped with the end of the USSR, and since then the priority had been to economize and reduce wear and tear on airframes. You see the effects on the current VKS, which really don't do much more than squadron level CAP and CAS. /3
A few days ago I proposed much more modest goals for the winter, and why I think that the rumored grand offensive Ukrainian and western officials are hyping is little more than public opinion shaping to justify more gibs to Ukraine. Russia is dealing with organizational issues /1
To me, the failed push on Ugledar was confirmation of something that I had suspected for some time, which is that the process of reassembling the BTGs into brigades is broken on some level. Mobilization happened but it did not translate into offensive force generation. /2
Instead you are seeing familiar patterns of just elite units (Naval Infantry/VDV) supported by irregulars (Wagner/LDPR militias/etc) leading offensive actions, without much contribution from regular rifle brigades. This was something that was observed during the Afghan War. /3
When it comes down to it, there is no substitute for maneuver warfare, encirclement and annihilation. Ukraine's only purpose is to keep up the attrition against Russia and as long as Russia accepts this pace, it is within the West's calculations.
Fundamentally, this is a very 20th century war with tanks, trenches, artillery, etc. The Soviets understood the geography of this type of battlefield and understood the solutions to prevent conventional conflicts from dragging on interminably. Both sides think they're clever.