While public attention was on airfields in Luhansk and Berdyans'k, russians set up secret helicopter bases and FARPs in various locations.
This was initially exclusive to paid subscribers, but I am now releasing it, especially in light of the recent SBU strike in the region.
2/ In November, as Ukrainian forces advanced towards Kherson, the Russian military opted to move their helicopters from the Chaplynka Airdrome to more secure inland locations, including a fenced beach resort in Arabat Split near Crimea.
3/ In this image, 20 helicopter pads are visible, some occupied by Russian helicopters like Mi-24, Mi-8, Ka-52, and possibly Mi-28. Notably, the site is within the beach resort "Volna," enclosed by a fence.
4/ Further analysis of 2021 imagery shows no helicopter pads at this location, hinting at rapid efforts to establish an ad-hoc helicopter base conveniently placed among beach resorts and hotels, potentially serving as accommodations for their pilots.
5/ Russians didn't use this location during the early stages of the war. Historical imagery analysis indicates that construction commenced around October 2022, coinciding with the Kherson offensive. This effort was probably aimed at relocating from Chaplynka, Kherson oblast.
6/ The evacuation and relocation of the Chaplynka airbase, as previously mentioned, exemplify the Russian necessity to establish new concealed locations due to concerns about potential targeting. Given the growing range of Ukrainian weaponry, this pattern will continue.
7/ Simultaneously, it must be acknowledged that the quality and frequency of concealment measures have notably improved compared to 2022. The Russians have been notably successful in concealing some of their new helicopter sites and command centers for a while
8/ Please like and share the first message of the thread, and follow to stay updated on future developments.
This analysis as well as some of these images is possible thanks to contributions via BuyMeACoffee and support from paid subscribers.
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Recently, @CITeam_en has raised some good and bad points about verifying the authenticity of RU mil documents. I’ll start with a pushback: the notion that the legitimacy of Russian documents can be judged by whether they have all the formal characteristics is outdated:
2/ While it is true that all classified documents follow strict protocols, the reality of war is far messier. Most documents are produced internally, shared outside of formal chains: in Excel, Word, or PDF formats and shared through messengers, email, or other convenient channels
3/ I have personally reviewed hundreds, if not thousands, of pages of Russian documents: leaks, data from captured phones or submissions to our team, that contained sensitive information. Yet only a tiny fraction carried any formal classification stamps, despite being valuable
Despite progress, including holding Pokrovsk, inflicting tangible casualties, and striking Russia’s oil and gas infrastructure, it would be dangerous for Europe to assume that “Ukraine has this.”
The battlefield situation has improved but remains suboptimal.
🧵Thread:
2/ The recent negative dynamics in Kupyansk show that the fundamental issue of Ukraine’s military remains: it is forced to operate in a fire-brigade fashion, reinforcing threatened sectors of the front such as Pokrovsk at the cost of other directions.
3/ As our team’s investigation into desertions shows, Russian troops are abandoning their posts at increasingly growing rate. Yet desertions still remain more frequent on the Ukrainian side, and Moscow is more effective at returning its troops to the front.
The Ukrainian project @hochuzhit_com has published a photo of a document with Russian losses over 8 months, from January to September 2025. According to it, total KIA numbers 86,744, roughly 10,843 per month, which is very close to our earlier estimates. Total losses are 281,550
2/ The published document contains a breakdown by units. Our team will work tonight to verify whether the numbers match the Russian documents we have on hand, but at first glance, it appears authentic. Notably, over 33,966 are listed as MIA, so the majority of them are likely KIA
3/ This is very close to our earlier estimates published in July and August, which pointed to 8,400–10,500 KIA per month. These estimates have proven to be quite accurate, demonstrating that our methodology is precise and reliable
About 60% of the deep strikes on Russian territory are carried out by Ukrainian Fire Point FP-1 drones, which with a smaller payload can reach targets 1,500km within Russia and have sophisticated software that has proved resistant to EW jamming.
🧵Thread:
2/ Olena Kryzhanivska, an expert on Ukrainian weapons systems, notes that the FP-1s cost only about $55,000 each and are now being churned out at a rate more than 100 a day. Ukraine is also using the heavier and more expensive Lyutyi drone, which has a range of 2,000km
3/ There are also reports that FP-5 “Flamingo” cruise missiles have begun to be used. They are much faster than the drones, flying just 50 metres above the ground, with a range of over 3,000km and packing a huge punch thanks to a 1,150kg warhead
Russia is resorting to increasingly drastic measures to find recruits. The list has grown: beyond coercing detainees and conscripts, Moscow is now pressuring businesses to supply contract soldiers while further raising enlistment payments. 🧵Thread with all recent updates:
2/ Thanks to recent updates from @CITeam_en and iStories, we’ve learned that In Russia’s Primorsky region, officials told local business leaders they must help recruit men for the front. Employers were instructed to pressure their staff into signing contracts or contribute money
3/ In Voronezh oblast, officials sharply raised the bonus for signing a contract with the Defense Ministry. Governor Alexander Gusev boosted the regional payout from 505,000 rubles to 2.1 million. With federal payments added, the total now stands at 2.5 million rubles (~$27,000)
Since January, 21 of Russia’s 38 major refineries, facilities that process crude into fuels such as gasoline and diesel, have been hit, a new BBC Verify investigation found. The tally of successful attacks is already 48% higher than the total for all of 2024. 🧵Thread:
2/ BBC analysis shows reported attacks hit a record in August, when Ukrainian drones targeted 14 refineries, followed by eight more in September. Some of the strikes reached facilities deep inside Russia.
3/ In late September, the Gazprom Neftekhim Salavat refinery in Bashkortostan was struck twice. Satellite images showed smoke rising from the facility, which sits more than 1,100 kilometers from the Ukrainian border.