While public attention was on airfields in Luhansk and Berdyans'k, russians set up secret helicopter bases and FARPs in various locations.
This was initially exclusive to paid subscribers, but I am now releasing it, especially in light of the recent SBU strike in the region.
2/ In November, as Ukrainian forces advanced towards Kherson, the Russian military opted to move their helicopters from the Chaplynka Airdrome to more secure inland locations, including a fenced beach resort in Arabat Split near Crimea.
3/ In this image, 20 helicopter pads are visible, some occupied by Russian helicopters like Mi-24, Mi-8, Ka-52, and possibly Mi-28. Notably, the site is within the beach resort "Volna," enclosed by a fence.
4/ Further analysis of 2021 imagery shows no helicopter pads at this location, hinting at rapid efforts to establish an ad-hoc helicopter base conveniently placed among beach resorts and hotels, potentially serving as accommodations for their pilots.
5/ Russians didn't use this location during the early stages of the war. Historical imagery analysis indicates that construction commenced around October 2022, coinciding with the Kherson offensive. This effort was probably aimed at relocating from Chaplynka, Kherson oblast.
6/ The evacuation and relocation of the Chaplynka airbase, as previously mentioned, exemplify the Russian necessity to establish new concealed locations due to concerns about potential targeting. Given the growing range of Ukrainian weaponry, this pattern will continue.
7/ Simultaneously, it must be acknowledged that the quality and frequency of concealment measures have notably improved compared to 2022. The Russians have been notably successful in concealing some of their new helicopter sites and command centers for a while
8/ Please like and share the first message of the thread, and follow to stay updated on future developments.
This analysis as well as some of these images is possible thanks to contributions via BuyMeACoffee and support from paid subscribers.
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Breaking: On October 13, Russia’s Government Legislative Commission backed a Defense Ministry bill allowing the use of reservists for defense-related tasks in peacetime. The measure expands the military’s authority to call up reservists for wartime needs. 🧵Thread:
2/ According to the draft law, “special assemblies” are military call-ups for specific defense missions during armed conflicts, counterterrorism operations, or when forces are deployed abroad. Only reservists will be subject to these special assemblies.
3/ Russia’s mobilization reserve consists of individuals who have voluntarily signed contracts to remain in reserve. Putin established the country’s mobilization manpower reserve in 2015 through an executive decree.
Our report on Russia’s tank production and expansion plans has, predictably, drawn significant attention and generated many questions. Rather than replying individually, we decided to answer the most common ones - and even address questions about the Armata. 🧵Thread:
Russia’s T-90 tank production in 2024 reached around 240 units, including both new and modernized tanks. But internal planning papers analyzed by Frontelligence Insight show Moscow’s plan to lift output by 80% and launch production of a new T90 variant. 🧵Our Special Report:
2/ Our investigation began with what appeared to be a routine document: Uralvagonzavod requested “IS-445” engine RPM sensors from Zagorsk Optical-Mechanical Plant (ZOMZ) for a project listed as “Product 188M2.” This single line became the starting point of a larger discovery
3/ Digging deeper, we identified “Product 188M2” as the T-90M2, the latest variant of the T-90M (Product 188M). A careless online bio from a Russian engineer posted on Russian Scientific and Engineering Union revealed its name: “Ryvok-1", which roughly can be translated as Dash-1
Recently, @CITeam_en has raised some good and bad points about verifying the authenticity of RU mil documents. I’ll start with a pushback: the notion that the legitimacy of Russian documents can be judged by whether they have all the formal characteristics is outdated:
2/ While it is true that all classified documents follow strict protocols, the reality of war is far messier. Most documents are produced internally, shared outside of formal chains: in Excel, Word, or PDF formats and shared through messengers, email, or other convenient channels
3/ I have personally reviewed hundreds, if not thousands, of pages of Russian documents: leaks, data from captured phones or submissions to our team, that contained sensitive information. Yet only a tiny fraction carried any formal classification stamps, despite being valuable
Despite progress, including holding Pokrovsk, inflicting tangible casualties, and striking Russia’s oil and gas infrastructure, it would be dangerous for Europe to assume that “Ukraine has this.”
The battlefield situation has improved but remains suboptimal.
🧵Thread:
2/ The recent negative dynamics in Kupyansk show that the fundamental issue of Ukraine’s military remains: it is forced to operate in a fire-brigade fashion, reinforcing threatened sectors of the front such as Pokrovsk at the cost of other directions.
3/ As our team’s investigation into desertions shows, Russian troops are abandoning their posts at increasingly growing rate. Yet desertions still remain more frequent on the Ukrainian side, and Moscow is more effective at returning its troops to the front.
The Ukrainian project @hochuzhit_com has published a photo of a document with Russian losses over 8 months, from January to September 2025. According to it, total KIA numbers 86,744, roughly 10,843 per month, which is very close to our earlier estimates. Total losses are 281,550
2/ The published document contains a breakdown by units. Our team will work tonight to verify whether the numbers match the Russian documents we have on hand, but at first glance, it appears authentic. Notably, over 33,966 are listed as MIA, so the majority of them are likely KIA
3/ This is very close to our earlier estimates published in July and August, which pointed to 8,400–10,500 KIA per month. These estimates have proven to be quite accurate, demonstrating that our methodology is precise and reliable