While public attention was on airfields in Luhansk and Berdyans'k, russians set up secret helicopter bases and FARPs in various locations.
This was initially exclusive to paid subscribers, but I am now releasing it, especially in light of the recent SBU strike in the region.
2/ In November, as Ukrainian forces advanced towards Kherson, the Russian military opted to move their helicopters from the Chaplynka Airdrome to more secure inland locations, including a fenced beach resort in Arabat Split near Crimea.
3/ In this image, 20 helicopter pads are visible, some occupied by Russian helicopters like Mi-24, Mi-8, Ka-52, and possibly Mi-28. Notably, the site is within the beach resort "Volna," enclosed by a fence.
4/ Further analysis of 2021 imagery shows no helicopter pads at this location, hinting at rapid efforts to establish an ad-hoc helicopter base conveniently placed among beach resorts and hotels, potentially serving as accommodations for their pilots.
5/ Russians didn't use this location during the early stages of the war. Historical imagery analysis indicates that construction commenced around October 2022, coinciding with the Kherson offensive. This effort was probably aimed at relocating from Chaplynka, Kherson oblast.
6/ The evacuation and relocation of the Chaplynka airbase, as previously mentioned, exemplify the Russian necessity to establish new concealed locations due to concerns about potential targeting. Given the growing range of Ukrainian weaponry, this pattern will continue.
7/ Simultaneously, it must be acknowledged that the quality and frequency of concealment measures have notably improved compared to 2022. The Russians have been notably successful in concealing some of their new helicopter sites and command centers for a while
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This analysis as well as some of these images is possible thanks to contributions via BuyMeACoffee and support from paid subscribers.
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There’s been a lot of discussion about the potential threat FPV drones could pose to US forces on the ground, with some going as far as claiming that American troops would suffer heavy casualties from FPV drones. That’s possible, but it’s also worth questioning the assumptions:
2/ First, it’s not clear to what extent Iran has actually trained and prepared its ground forces for large-scale use of small drones. Even relatively decentralized militaries still operate within ORBAT and logistics. So far, there isn’t strong evidence of systemic changes within the Iranian army to support widespread FPV deployment.
3/ Second, we’ve seen relatively little FPV usage from Iran-supported groups like Hamas or Hezbollah, despite continuous war with Israel. A few examples have emerged from Iraq, but we’re talking about a handful of videos at most. That’s not a level of a large-scale implementation
With an uncertain battlefield position, Russia has intensified hybrid operations to shape European public opinion. A key element is the spread of narratives portraying Ukraine as using “energy blackmail” against Europe, often echoed by politically sympathetic actors. 🧵Thread:
2/ Since the full-scale invasion began, Russian missile and drone strikes have targeted Ukraine’s energy system, damaging power plants, gas facilities, and transmission networks nationwide. Ukraine has lost about 11.5 GW of capacity, with damage reportedly exceeding $24.8 billion
3/ The war has also affected energy transport infrastructure. Ukrainian oil facilities have been attacked more than 400 times since the invasion began. On 27 January 2026, a strike damaged equipment working for the Druzhba pipeline near Brody in western Ukraine.
Leaked internal files from Moscow reveal that Russia’s ruling party, United Russia, keeps intelligence-style dossiers on its own politicians. They document corruption facts, criminal ties, and personal vulnerabilities, information used to manage Russia’s politics
Thread 🧵:
2/ United Russia is the political party that dominates Russia’s parliament and regional governments and serves as the main political vehicle of Putin.
Leaked documents from the party, published by @dallasparkua and @256CyberAssault, reveal details of an internal vetting process
3/ Meet Evgeniy Gnedov, who oversees the vetting of candidates for various lawmaking bodies - from local assemblies to the federal parliament.
A longtime security official, he spent decades inside the Federal Penitentiary Service of Russia, eventually rising to a senior role
Russia’s war in Ukraine has increasingly become a war of drones, but artillery still plays a key role on the battlefield. Newly obtained documents from 2014 to 2025 show that Russia continues to modernize its artillery production using industrial machinery from Europe. 🧵Thread:
2/ In a joint analysis, Frontelligence Insight and the @dallasparkua company reviewed hundreds of internal documents from Russian defense contractor Zenit-Investprom and found that Plant No. 9, a maker of artillery barrels and tank guns, went through major upgrades in 2025
3/ Six facilities within the Uralmash industrial zone were found to be undergoing modernization, including planned delivery of industrial machinery from several European countries. Several workshops were dedicated to work on the Armata project and the Koalitsiya SPG.
As we approach a point marking the beginning of the war’s 5th year, it is time to discuss how we assess the war’s overall dynamics, strictly from a military standpoint. One method many analysts use is the pace of territory capture. However, this methodology has a serious issue🧵:
2/ Generally, this is not a bad method of analyzing battlefield dynamics, as the history of wars shows far more cases of states advancing along frontlines or into enemy territory before a war ends in their favor than the opposite. The devil, however, lies in the details
3/ Putting aside other domains of war, such as economics and socio-politics, battlefield dynamics are often judged by metrics like casualty rates and square kilometers of controlled territory. This can produce a distorted picture, a problem I informally term the “Sahara Fallacy”