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Tatarigami_UA Profile picture
@Tatarigami_UA
Dec 7, 2023 • 8 tweets • 3 min read • Read on X
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While public attention was on airfields in Luhansk and Berdyans'k, russians set up secret helicopter bases and FARPs in various locations.

This was initially exclusive to paid subscribers, but I am now releasing it, especially in light of the recent SBU strike in the region. Image
2/ In November, as Ukrainian forces advanced towards Kherson, the Russian military opted to move their helicopters from the Chaplynka Airdrome to more secure inland locations, including a fenced beach resort in Arabat Split near Crimea. Image
3/ In this image, 20 helicopter pads are visible, some occupied by Russian helicopters like Mi-24, Mi-8, Ka-52, and possibly Mi-28. Notably, the site is within the beach resort "Volna," enclosed by a fence. Image
4/ Further analysis of 2021 imagery shows no helicopter pads at this location, hinting at rapid efforts to establish an ad-hoc helicopter base conveniently placed among beach resorts and hotels, potentially serving as accommodations for their pilots. Image
5/ Russians didn't use this location during the early stages of the war. Historical imagery analysis indicates that construction commenced around October 2022, coinciding with the Kherson offensive. This effort was probably aimed at relocating from Chaplynka, Kherson oblast.
6/ The evacuation and relocation of the Chaplynka airbase, as previously mentioned, exemplify the Russian necessity to establish new concealed locations due to concerns about potential targeting. Given the growing range of Ukrainian weaponry, this pattern will continue. Image
7/ Simultaneously, it must be acknowledged that the quality and frequency of concealment measures have notably improved compared to 2022. The Russians have been notably successful in concealing some of their new helicopter sites and command centers for a while
8/ Please like and share the first message of the thread, and follow to stay updated on future developments.

This analysis as well as some of these images is possible thanks to contributions via BuyMeACoffee and support from paid subscribers.

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More from @Tatarigami_UA

Tatarigami_UA Profile picture
May 6
How bad is Russia’s war chest? Has the country entered stagflation? Why does it fear falling oil prices, but not a crash? And how is the tariff war hurting Russia?
These questions — and more — are explored in a special interview with Russian economist Vladimir Milov.

🧵Thread: Image
2/ Tariff wars:

China’s economic slowdown has closed its market to many Russian products, hitting major industries hard. The China-focused Russian coal industry is struggling, and Russian non-energy and non-commodity exports are down by about a quarter compared to pre-2022 levels
3/ Tariff war will obviously exacerbate the Chinese slowdown. The slower Chinese growth, the less market for Russian goods. Share of China in the total Russian exports is as high as a third now - we're heavily dependent on this market and its well-being.
Read 15 tweets
Tatarigami_UA Profile picture
Apr 19
Thread🧵

1/ The exhaustion of Russia’s vehicle fleet is becoming increasingly evident. The reduced use of armored vehicles and the growing reliance on civilian: including motorcycles, golf carts, and vans, continues to signal a degradation in Russian maneuvering capabilities.
2/ During the winter, outside of Kursk, Russia achieved mostly tactical gains, notably in Kharkiv Oblast, the Chasiv Yar area and Kurakhove–Velyka Novosilka axis. While these advances have been troubling for Ukraine, Russia has so far failed to capitalize on them strategically.
3/ Despite slow progress, Russia still retains the resources and capability to conduct active offensive operations through the summer and fall of 2025. However, as I noted in my analysis last year, the diminishing returns will determine whether Russia will continue this war
Read 7 tweets
Tatarigami_UA Profile picture
Apr 10
While our team continues working on the latest updates, here are a few updates on the current state of the frontline:

1/ Despite holding the advantage along much of the frontline, Russia’s winter campaign yielded limited results - indicating Ukraine’s situation is not dire
2/ The Pokrovsk area now appears more stable than in February. At that time, Russian forces had established a foothold in Zvirove, with deeper advances into Pokrovsk looking imminent. Since then, not only have the Russians stalled, but they have actually lost some ground.
3/ The overall composition and number of Russian forces near Sumy oblast currently seem insufficient to support a large-scale offensive operation deep into the region.
Read 7 tweets
Tatarigami_UA Profile picture
Mar 30
One of the biggest problems of this war is that Ukraine and the West haven’t clearly defined what "winning" looks like. This has allowed the Russians to present the "Istanbul Agreements" as the only viable negotiation framework, due to the absence of a well-defined alternative.
2/ The "Victory Plan" presented by Zelensky is not a true negotiation framework, and it didn’t resonate with the previous administration, let alone the current White House administration. Of course, there are alternative options, such as Russia retreating to 1991 borders
3/ The problem is that Russia won't do that, and there is no realistic enforcement mechanism, short of intervention. The United States isn’t going to bomb Russia. This raises the question: what does a "desired outcome," based on the realities on the ground, actually look like?
Read 8 tweets
Tatarigami_UA Profile picture
Mar 25
Almost every day, we hear about strikes against targets inside Russia, but we rarely get the full picture of their actual impact on the war. Radio Liberty and Frontelligence Insight have joined efforts to analyze hundreds of data points to answer this question.

🧵Thread Image
2/ Our research covered the period from September 2024 to February 2025, divided into two sections: strikes on military targets, infrastructure, and on the energy sector. We found that strikes on Russia’s energy sector caused at least $658 million in damage over ~6 months
3/ The real damage to the Russian energy sector and the economy as a whole may be higher. In at least 67 out of 100 cases, Ukrainian strikes were successful, while in another 33 cases the result of the attacks remains unknown or it is impossible to prove Ukraine's involvement. Image
Read 23 tweets
Tatarigami_UA Profile picture
Mar 21
Kursk Offensive: A Preliminary Assessment by Frontelligence Insight.
A condensed version of report for X. 🧵Thread:

1/ With Ukrainian forces withdrawing from Sudzha, the operation is clearly approaching its conclusion though it is not yet entirely over.Image
2/ To assess the operation, not in isolation, but within the broader context of the war, we broke down the Kursk operation into 3 key questions: whether its geopolitical objectives were met, whether the attrition rate was favorable, and whether it achieved battlefield success
3/ To determine equipment attrition, we analyzed data from OSINT analyst @naalsio26, who tracks losses across multiple frontlines. Our graphs show losses from August to March but are not exhaustive, as they exclude some retreat-related losses. The cut-off date was March 10. Image
Read 20 tweets

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