1/ Throughout this year I have been monitoring someone who has withdrawn 11,200+ ETH ($25M) from Tornado Cash and spent the majority of it on Magic The Gathering (MTG) trading cards.
Here’s my analysis of where the funds went and what the potential source of funds could be.
2/ This person has withdrawn 110 X 100 ETH from Tornado to 11 addresses.
After they would: 1) Wrap the ETH 2) Transfer WETH to new address 3) Unwrap the WETH 4) Transfer USDC to MTG broker
(this is a strategy used to trick KYT at exchanges)
3/ After USDC was sent to a MTG US based broker that accepts crypto
How did I find the broker used?
1) Instagram username was same as on OpenSea
2) Directly contacted a few MTG sellers the broker interacted w/ on-chain
Using timing and multi denomination reveal heuristics I arrived at the thesis that the funds potentially originated from the $50M Uranium Finance hack that occurred in April 2021.
Anubis had previously potentially been solved however and Casino did not deposit enough ETH earlier in the year to match the withdrawals of this person.
7/ Here’s some of my rationale behind it being the Uranium hacker:
Oct 4, 2022 the Uranium hacker deposited 5.01 ETH total to Aztec (privacy tool) at 22:03 UTC
8/ In March 2023 the Uranium hacker deposited 52 X 100 ETH to Tornado & this person received 52 X 100 ETH
March 6 & 14: Uranium Hacker deposits 52 X 100 ETH to Tornado
March 7 & 15: Our person withdrew huge volumes from Tornado
After they finished the Uranium hacker deposits more in May
9/ While my analysis could be incorrect I find it very suspicious that this person:
-spends 8 figures on MTG
-is overpaying for MTG
-shields identity through broker who likely does not know what Tornado is
-receives $13.2M from Tornado post OFAC while in the US
-uses WETH method to obfuscate source
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1/ An investigation into how I identified one of suspects tied to the $28M Bittensor hack from 2024 by identifying anime NFT wash trades linked to a former employee and earned a whitehat bounty for my efforts.
2/ 32 $TAO holders experienced unauthorized transfers in excess of $28M from May to July 2024 and the Bittensor network was temporarily halted on July 2, 2024.
A post-mortem published by the team revealed the thefts were the result of a supply chain attack after a malicious PyPi package was uploaded in late May 2024
Victims who downloaded the package and performed specific operations accidentally compromised private keys.
3/ I began tracing the stolen funds from two initial theft addresses, TAO was bridged to Ethereum via Bittensor native bridge, and then transferred to instant exchanges where the attackers swapped to XMR.
1/ An unnamed source recently compromised a DPRK IT worker device which provided insights into how a small team of five ITWs operated 30+ fake identities with government IDs and purchased Upwork/LinkedIn accounts to obtain developer jobs at projects.
2/ An export of their Google Drive, Chrome profiles, and screenshots from their devices was obtained.
Google products were extensively used by them to organize their team’s schedules, tasks, and budgets with communications primarily in English.
3/ Another spreadsheet shows weekly reports for team members from 2025 which provides insight into how they operate and what they think about.
“I can't understand job requirement, and don't know what I need to do”
1/ An investigation into how @cryptobeastreal scammed followers by lying they were not behind the $190M -> $3M $ALT market cap crash where 45+ connected insider wallets sold $11M+ on July 14, 2025.
2/ Earlier this month Crypto Beast began aggressively promoting $ALT on X and TG.
On July 14, 2025 ALT crashed from 0.19 to 0.003 after insiders sold a large percent of the total supply.
All of these posts promoting the token. have since been deleted.
3/ Crypto Beast previously shared a public wallet on X & TG in now deleted posts.
1/ My recent investigation uncovered more than $16.58M in payments since January 1, 2025 or $2.76M per month has been sent to North Korean IT workers hired as developers at various projects & companies.
To put this in perspective payments range from $3K-8K per month meaning they have infiltrated 345 jobs on the low end or 920 jobs on the high end.
2/ Here’s a look into one of the six clusters I have been monitoring and was able to attribute 8 different DPRK ITWs that obtained roles at 12+ projects.
I traced out the payment addresses from the table to two consolidation addresses.
1/ Multiple projects tied to Pepe creator Matt Furie & ChainSaw as well as another project Favrr were exploited in the past week which resulted in ~$1M stolen
My analysis links both attacks to the same cluster of DPRK IT workers who were likely accidentally hired as developers.
2/ On Jun 18, 2025 at 4:25 am UTC ownership for ‘Replicandy’ from Matt Furie & ChainSaw was transferred to a new EOA 0x9Fca.
Jun 18, 2025
6:20 pm UTC: 0x9Fca withdrew mint proceeds from the contract
Jun 19, 2025
5:11 am UTC: 0x9Fca unpauses the mint
The attacker then minted NFTs and sold into bids causing the floor price to fall to zero.
3/ On Jun 23, 2025 the attacker transferred ownership from the ChainSaw deployer to 0x9Fca for Peplicator, Hedz, Zogz.
Similarly the attacker minted NFTs and sold them into bids causing the floor price to fall to zero.