Thread by @alessionaval

Good evening. The pas few weeks have been quite eventful from a naval perspective. Several theatres have seen different types of action - all providing evidence of the declination of sea power in the contemporary world, and of how contested order at sea stands. A thread:

I know. Cheeky to start off with an AI generated image. Rather misleading too because this thread is not about the US Navy -yet, it is important to stress that the irony of today’s contested seas is 25 years of assumed dominance leading to a critical lack of sustained investment.

The crisis of success. In 2007, my colleague and mentor Geoff Till captured what was a crucial trend. Navies belonging to the club of US-allies and partners had largely moved in a ‘postmodern’ reality in which exploitation of control was the key concern. sciencedirect.com/science/articl…

Whilst European forces were among those affected the most, as @JeremyStohs explains here: ; the problem was wider and deeper, the lack of a conventional challenge affected the ability of USN too to link innovation to strategy: cimsec.org/on-the-decline…
amzn.eu/d/fY5mG68

This is important background information to introduce a wider set of observations about what was happening at sea more broadly:
A. UNCLOS was creating the legal ammunition for a new type of contestation over the ocean, not just about across its expanses;

B. Countries like China, Russia, Iran, DPRK, to mention the more significant, unlike the US-led naval partners, all had doctrines with clearly identified opponents which led to a different focus on innovation and fleet developments;

C. Global connectivity, physical and digital, became more dependent upon the sea, creating a new layer of potential strategic vulnerability. Shipping has always been vulnerable to attack, but the scale and breath expanded considerably;

D. Geography rewarded the land over the sea. Development in land-based capabilities, coupled by new enabling tech innovation in autonomous and automated systems, expanded the capacity and affordability of land actors to affect events at sea.

The past few weeks the consequences of these changes have been in full display, all at the same time:

A. UNCLOS and the contestation of the ocean as a place of national assertion. Think about here the weekly updates on how the CCG and Militias behave in the SCS towards the PH. Of course, in this case there is also a convergence with the strategic importance of this space;

https://twitter.com/sabatech_pr/status/1733491561902838146

B. The opponent has a vote. Here one could use a number of examples. I’ll focus on a couple which are distinctive of long-term continuous efforts: DPRK submarine progress ; and PRC’s SSBNS and nuclear capabilities as presented here: ;reuters.com/world/asia-pac…
media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/20…

C. Nodes that matter. Here again, the last few days have been interesting in terms of how shipping is a constantly exposed critical artery of global prosperity. The attacks in the Red Sea are symptomatic of how connectivity can be linked to events on land;

https://twitter.com/navylookout/status/1731430823084081369

D. The Sea pushing back on the land. Just the other day USS Carone’s released a video with a wealth of new images on its multiple engagements of missiles and drones launched from Houthi held territory in Yemen.

https://twitter.com/osinttechnical/status/1733704447199412689

Going back to where I started, where does this leave us? Well, the good news is that we are all recognising the scope of the challenge and, in some respect its scale. The thread below is very good at explaining how others are meeting the new challenges.

https://twitter.com/audrands/status/1733776136453140518

Yet, as the thread above shows, at the moment our successes are coming at costs that are not sustainable long term. This, in turn, leads to an even larger question: where is the mass needed to face the greater scope and scale in which opponents will set a challenge?

This is, to my mind, the single most remarkable contradiction of today’s world: we live in an age in which contestation at sea is back, it’s more profound, and on a broader spectrum. Yet, the assumption seemingly continues to be that few boutique multi missions assets are enough;

Technologists reassure me that smart will compensate for mass. Maybe. But maybe that might not suffice, and above all, there something deeply unsettling about betting on a strategy of unknowns. One thing is certain: the sea is back in the strategic debate, and it’s here to stay.