Thread by @AlexGabuev

As I argue in my latest piece for @WSJ, in Russia, the war against Ukraine is now the organizing principle around which most decisions are made, and at the core of Russia’s domestic, economic and foreign policy. Short summary in a 🧵 wsj.com/world/russia/r…

2/ On the domestic front: in their recent in-depth research paper into attitudes toward the war, my colleagues @AndrKolesnikov and Denis Volkov showed that about 75% of the population support it. Most of Russia doesn’t look or feel like a nation at war. carnegieendowment.org/2023/11/28/alt…

3/ The elites, too, have demonstrated remarkable cohesion and the inability to challenge the Kremlin’s course. Even the infamous mercenary leader Yevgeny Prigozhin’s failed mutiny earlier this year only strengthened Putin’s grip on power. ft.com/content/0960e7…

4/ The war is also becoming a mainstay of the Kremlin’s economic policy. In the 2024 budget, military spending is set at 6% of GDP, exceeding social expenditure. Around 39% of the budget will go on the war in Ukraine, as my colleague @amenka points out. carnegieendowment.org/politika/90753

5/ The war and resulting Western sanctions have also led to the reintroduction of capital controls, fresh efforts to encourage import substitution, and a tolerance of high budget deficits. War and the boom in military production have driven unemployment to historic lows of 3%.

6/ Compensation for those killed or wounded & soldiers’ salaries are driving domestic demand & being channeled to finance domestic production or buy Chinese imports that have replaced Western brands. The Russian economy is expected to grow by 2.8% this year, despite sanctions.

7/ Finally, war has also become a central tenet of Russia’s foreign policy. Every relationship is judged on whether it can help Russia’s war effort through the supply of military goods, by filling the Kremlin’s war chest, or helping Moscow punish the West.

8/ That gives tremendous leverage to countries that are still willing to do business with Russia, allowing them to extract hefty prices for their services to Putin’s war effort.

9/ So when Azerbaijan took Nagorno-Karabakh by force in September, Moscow did nothing to protect the interests of its treaty ally Armenia, mostly because Baku and its Turkish backers have become indispensable in helping the Kremlin to withstand sanctions. ft.com/content/38a592…

10/ In addition, Moscow has been forced to source artillery shells, drones and missiles from Iran and North Korea in exchange for large payments and sharing sensitive military technology with these regimes

11/ It has also had to take sides in regional conflicts where Moscow had previously hedged its bets: the Kremlin’s muted reaction to the Hamas terrorist attacks and ensuing full-throated criticism of Israel’s war in Gaza would once have been unimaginable.

12/ It’s no surprise, therefore, that this year, China finally became Russia’s single most important foreign partner. The relationship with Beijing checks all three boxes of the Kremlin’s foreign policy requirements. foreignaffairs.com/united-states/…

13/ Next year, Putin looks set to win a new six-year term in staged elections slated for March. Unfortunately, he will continue his course of destroying Ukraine in the hope that he will be able to wear down the Ukrainians and their Western supporters.

14/ With war the organizing principle of Russian life, the continuation of aggression against Ukraine and the crusade against Western interests at home and abroad is becoming the raison d’être for the entire machinery of Putinism. wsj.com/world/russia/r…