For those in town making choices on security assistance to Ukraine, if you need more reasons, then I have a warning to share with you about the Kremlin. I feel that I have a duty to warn. /1
The Kremlin is starting to gloat that it is beating us – the west. If they feel like they can win by outlasting the political will of the United States and Europe about Ukraine, they will become much worse in the years to come, cocky and partially reconstituted. /2
It is my job to look at different futures being rebuilt on the horizon. And I tell you that a bruised , vengeful, and overconfident Russia is one of them that I see on the path we are on, unless choices are made now. /3
Why? Every time the Russians think that they have “won” in a conflict under Putin -- Georgia 2008, Ukraine 2014, Syria 2015 – they learn something about us – and they become overconfident in their abilities and in a few years they try bigger and bolder operations. /4
If the Kremlin concludes they can outlast Ukraine and Western support, they will tell themselves they overcame or defeated US and NATO intelligence, planning, weapons, tactics, will, and defense production. It would be an inaccurate but dangerous conclusion for them to arrive at.
If Russia were to conclude that their repetitive brute force methods and DIB can overcome western aid to Ukraine and outlast NATO political will and types of support- the outcome would be very dangerous, and it must not be allowed to happen. It could upend deterrence./6
Prior to 2022, the Russians believed they had several economic, political, and military disadvantages vis-à-vis NATO. If they snatch a type of victory in Ukraine by exhausting and outlasting Ukraine and the West, I believe they will downgrade their assessments about NATO power./7
The most important reason to continue to fund security assistance to Ukraine is for Ukraine. They want to live free from Kremlin subjugation and brutality. They fight hard, they do not ask anyone to fight for them. Look what they've done already to the Russian army./8
Have a look at these demands from the Russian MFA. They want the west to give up, and for Ukraine to give up and live in subjugation. It is not subtle. /9
(The immediate response that came to mind was Gen. McAuliffe’s 1944 Christmas letter: “N U T S!” ) /10 warontherocks.com/2022/12/nuts-m…
It is appropriate to talk about strategy for 2024 and matching ends, ways, and means - that is a good idea and it's time to do it. Open door offer to talk. But stopping aid now would mean giving up on Ukrainian soldiers in the field./11
It is in our interests to continue supporting Ukraine for many reasons. Inaction at a critical time could lead once again to a vicious, regenerating, and overconfident Kremlin in the years ahead and would be a political and military catastrophe for all. /end
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Russia's Secretary of the Security Council Patrushev made remarks today about economic mobilization while in the Central Federal District (green below). It's important to read his speech in context. Most of it was about securing sites from drone attacks and preventing sabotage /1
Patrushev claimed Russia has dealt with "8,000 attacks by the Ukrainian Armed Forces" in border regions Bryansk, Kursk, and Belgorod. Note: these districts have been under increased restrictions for over a year. (think of their status like martial law ultra-lite)/2
Patrushev then adds the importance of protecting critical infrastructure from drones and sabotage, and for this region to develop countermeasures. He often emphasized "biologically hazardous facilities" as needing extra protection /3
A few observations about Russian forces in recent weeks that I'm watching: improvements to targeting, continued assaults on Avdiivka, possible missile hoarding, and new loitering munitions. /1
Last week, Russian forces used an Iskandr SRBM missile to target the UAF 128th Brigade and potential CP during an award ceremony, killing experienced artillery teams. /2
This gathering is a fleeting event, or time-sensitive target, so the Russians either had foreknowledge of it, or observed it by drone footage and had the ability to quickly call an Iskandr strike in - which is a CAA-level asset /3
It appears that the Russians may be losing multiple brigade elements from the 2nd CAA and DNR forces in their assault on Avdiivka. Gerasimov strikes again, this time with no pushback on his bad ideas (so far). Yet there are some troubling issues to consider. A thread. (/1)
If you’ve followed me for a while, you know that I don’t give Gerasimov’s command in this war high marks, to say the least. /2
He and Shoigu have personality conflicts with their subordinates when (presumably) they were advocate for different ways forward more appropriate to the damaged status of the Russian army (like assuming defensive postures or relieving forces on time)/ 3
Excellent geospatial analysis from @OSIA_RUSI, identifying one location for DPRK-supplied weapons (most likely artillery shells) to Russia. A thread with a few thoughts. 1: This facility is beyond missile strike range for UAF but not drone range.
2: The modifications made at this facility are small vehicle-sized berms that are not standard for artillery storage facilities farther east in Russia. But still safer than throwing it in a pile with a barbed wire fence, like they did in field depots in 2014-2015 in the Donbas.
3: The berm spacing is poor from a safety perspective, if they fill them with ammunition as @COUPSURE pointed out. There is always the possibility they don’t fill each berm or skip berms, or space them with howitizers etc.
This is the first September in 15 years that the Russian military has not conducted a large-scale military exercise. ZAPAD-2023 was cancelled after it was announced. Most Russian military exercises are disrupted this year as a result of strain and war in Ukraine. A brief thread:
The biggest cancellation was ZAPAD-2023, announced by MOD in December 22 then cancelled. It would have involved multiple military districts. When asked about why this fall, Defmin Shoigu had this to say: "this year we have training in Ukraine". Meaning, /2
ZAPAD-2023 was probably cancelled due to strain, visible cracks in last year's VOSTOK 2022, conserving funds, elements of all units are deployed, poor availability of equipment and trainers to put together an exercise of this scale. Can't rule out they thought optics were bad./3
There’s a few ways to interpret this: the VDV is being used to shore up worn out 58th Army units that have been engaging UAF brigades for months and add new challenges to UAF’s main attack. Also, that Russia may not have other skilled units ready for that task. (/1)
Side note: these are the same 58th Army units that Popov warned were at the breaking point months ago and got exiled in Syria for leaked audio criticizing Gerasimov’s bad leadership. Those units have been backstopped by other units a few times before this current rotation /2
Wearing down the VDV would degrade the last units with real combat capacity. It depends on how they are using them though. Teplinskiy is deputy commander of the SMO and also head of VDV so if he’s still around, I assume he will try to make the best use, to the extent possible /3