The battle of Bakhmut continues. The Russians have recently been attacking with some success.
Ukraine is facing some difficulties especially on the northern side of the city of Bakhmut, and some of the gains made during the spring and summer have been lost. 1/
During summer 2023, the situation looked promising for a while. On the northern side of Bakhmut, Ukrainians reached Berkhivka and advanced towards Yahidne. On the southern side, Ukrainians reached Klischchiivka. 12 kilometers of Donets-Donbas canal was cleared of the enemy. 2/
However, in August, Russians started pushing back on the northern flank. Ukraine pulled out from Berkhivka and the situation became static. The southern flank also slowed down. Ukraine liberated Klischichiivka and Andriivka during fall, but no further success was achieved. 3/
Now the Russians have begun a series of attacks. They reached the Khromove road (O0506) and try to continue towards Bohdanivka. Fighting is going on in the same fields where Ukraine stopped the Russian encirclement efforts during spring. 4/
The situation is difficult, but recent Russian gains do not alter the big picture significantly. Holding on to the Khromove road isn’t critical anymore, as Ukraine has not had any presence in Bakhmut since May. Trading some kilometers for better positions can be reasonable. 5/
Russia has also attacked in the area of Klishchiivka. According to Russians, they managed to recapture the fortifications next to the village. However we have not yet seen any geolocatable proof of this. Ukrainians are still holding onto the village. 6/
If Russians manage to recapture Klishchiivka, Ukrainian operations east of the village of Andriivka would be threatened. However, no immediate collapse is in sight, and the Russians don't show signs of having the capacity for larger breakthroughs on either side of Bakhmut. 7/
Ukraine is able to continue an organised defence, but it's likely there won’t be any larger offensive operations in the Bakhmut area for some time. Smaller infantry operations are, however, likely to continue, and the recent Russian gains may be challenged in the coming weeks. 8/
Our team @black_birdgroup continues to map the war. Frequent updates on our interactive map!
Some might have noticed I’ve been a bit less active here on X during the past two months – nothing dramatic has happened, just a lot of work and other stuff! 9/9
The latest Ukrainian counterattack has drawn significant attention. The Ukrainians have claimed to liberate over 400 km².
There’s some sensationalism in the information space, as there seems to be some misunderstanding of what a liberated square kilometer here actually means. 1/
In Jan-Feb 2026, Ukraine conducted counterattacks in eastern Zaporizhzhia & Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. It’s the same area where Russia made a significant amount of their gains in late 2025. The area mostly consists of fields and small villages, without significant cities nearby. 2/
The Ukrainians are executing a localized operation to enhance their tactical positioning, rather than a broad counteroffensive with operational objectives. Politically and in the information space, these successes are vital, given the scarcity of positive news. 3/
2025 can reasonably be seen as an operational and strategic failure for Russia, but all scenarios remain on the table. Any optimism is premature, as Ukraine also faces serious challenges.
In this thread: An assessment of the past year and its broader implications. 1/
First, some numbers. Russia took under 4,600 km² of Ukrainian territory in 2025, compared to roughly 3,500 km² in 2024.
Despite the increase, focusing only on square kilometers provides poor tools for analyzing current dynamics and the war’s future. 2/
Russia failed to achieve operational goals. The front advanced relatively evenly despite local salients. Most captured territory consisted of fields, villages and small towns.
Even when brief momentum appeared, Russian forces were unable to turn it into a larger breakthrough. 3/
Ukraine may be repeating a costly mistake in Pokrovsk.
It’s a recurring pattern, seen for example in Vuhledar and Kursk – a reluctance to conduct a controlled, militarily justified withdrawal from a threatened salient when the situation no longer favors the defender. 1/
The situation in Pokrovsk is difficult for the Ukrainians. Russians have consolidated positions in the southern parts of the city, and are advancing further north. Most of the city is a gray zone, where infantry groups fight without a clear frontline. 2/
The latest Ukrainian counterattacks have not turned the situation decisively in Ukraine's favor. They managed to recapture various positions in Rodynske and in the Dobropillia direction, but the threat of encirclement in Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad has not been removed. 3/
According to Ukrainian 1st Corps (Azov), the situation east of Dobropillia has been stabilized and the Russians have been pushed out of six villages. They also reported that the combined Russian losses in the area are 385 men, 37 vehicles, 2 AFVs and 1 tank.
A few thoughts: 1/🧵
It is evident that this operation was not merely a few infiltration groups slipping past Ukrainian lines only to be destroyed. While it may have begun as a lighter operation, Russian forces were prepared to exploit breakthroughs, successfully advancing into the Ukrainian rear. 2/
If the reported losses are accurate, it implies multiple Russian battalions were engaged in the battle, with many still fighting, as Russia has not lost all gained territory. The Russians are now likely trying to consolidate and defend the southern part of the corridor. 3/
Russians have recently advanced deep in the area east of Dobropillia. The situation has concerning elements which can escalate it into a serious crisis, but at this stage we’re still not witnessing a disaster – and by definition, not even a breakthrough. I’ll explain. 1/
The situation had been deteriorating for some time. The Russians had been attempting to advance in the Dobropillia direction earlier this month. A gray zone had formed in the area, as the Ukrainians struggled to maintain a firm defence against the infiltrating enemy. 2/
Russia has an advantage in expendable manpower – once it finds a weak spot, it can aggressively try to exploit it by pushing more infantry into the area. Small infiltration groups will try to advance as far as possible, which is enabled by the porous Ukrainian defences. 3/
According to our data, the Russians did not accelerate their advance during June. The pace isn't slow, but most of the Russian gains last month were in less crucial areas.
It can be argued that Russia mostly wasted June without achieving significant success. 1/
The situation isn't great for Ukraine, but it could be worse.
The salient between Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka is still an issue, but it didn't rapidly expand in June. The front in Sumy was also stabilized. The worst-case scenarios didn't materialize, at least not yet. 2/
A large part of the Russian gains were south of Pokrovsk, where they are pushing towards the administrative borders of Donetsk oblast. Entering Dnipropetrovsk oblast doesn't change the general situation much, even though there's a lot of Russian propaganda about it. 3/