NEW: The US has a much higher stake in Russia's war on Ukraine than most people think.
As Americans consider the costs of continuing to help Ukraine fight the Russians in the coming years, they deserve a careful consideration of the costs of allowing Russia to win. 🧵(1/19)
2/ A Russian conquest of all of Ukraine is by no means impossible if the United States cuts off all military assistance and Europe follows suit. Such an outcome would bring a battered but triumphant Russian army right up to NATO’s border from the Black Sea to the Arctic Ocean.
3/ If Russia wins, a victorious Russian army at the end of this war will be combat experienced and considerably larger than the pre-2022 Russian land forces.
4/ A hypothetical Russian victory would allow the Russian economy to gradually recover as sanctions inevitably erode and Moscow develops ways to circumvent or mitigate those that remain.
5/ A victorious Russia would over time replace its equipment and rebuild its coherence, drawing on a wealth of hard-won experience fighting mechanized warfare.
6/ If Russia wins in Ukraine, it will bring with it advanced air defense systems that only American stealth aircraft—badly needed to deter and confront China—can reliably penetrate.
7/ Russian victory in Ukraine would allow Russia to pose a major conventional military threat to NATO for the first time since the 1990s in a timeframe set to a considerable extent by how much the Kremlin invests in its military.
8/ To deter and defend against a renewed Russian threat following a full Russian victory in Ukraine the US would have to deploy to Eastern Europe a sizable portion of its ground forces.
9/ The US would have to station in Europe a large number of stealth aircraft, likely forcing the US to make a terrible choice between keeping enough in Asia to defend Taiwan and its other Asian allies and deterring or defeating a Russian attack on NATO. isw.pub/Ukraine121423
10/ The entire undertaking would cost a fortune, and the cost would last as long as the Russian threat continues—potentially indefinitely. Almost any other outcome of the Ukraine war is preferable to this one.
11/ Helping Ukraine keep the lines where they are through continuous Western military support is far more advantageous and cheaper for the US than allowing Ukraine to lose.
12/ “Freezing” the conflict is worse than continuing to help Ukraine fight—that would simply give Russia time and space to prepare for a renewed war to conquer Ukraine and confront NATO.
13/ Helping Ukraine regain control of all or most of its territory would be much more advantageous, as it would drive Russian forces even further to the east.
14/ Best of all, supporting Ukraine to its victory and then helping it rebuild would put the largest and most combat-effective military on the European continent at the forefront of the defense of NATO—whether Ukraine does or does not ultimately join the alliance.
15/ ISW has today published a new report and accompanying maps that illustrate four military situations related to this war and its outcomes and consider their military-strategic and financial implications for the US. Read it here: isw.pub/Ukraine121423
16/ We have considered elsewhere the important question of possible Russian escalations in the face of defeat and we do not minimize those considerations.
17/ We have argued strongly that American values align with American interests in Ukraine and that there is a strong and cogent values-based argument for helping Ukraine liberate all its land and its people. We still believe that that is true.
18/ But the American people are being asked to spend a lot of money helping Ukraine fight Russia, and it is not unreasonable for them also wonder what the financial cost of not helping Ukraine would be.
19/ This essay is meant solely to serve as a departure point for a data-driven and realistic discussion answering that question.
2/ Russian sources claimed on May 6 and 7 that Russian forces continued to advance northwest of Svatove near Kyslivka and Kotlyarivka, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.
3/ Russian forces also cont'd offensive operations NE of Kupyansk near Synkivka; NW of Svatove near Pishchane, Berestove, & Stelmakhivka; NW of Kreminna near Nevske; west of Kreminna near Terny & Yampolivka; & south of Kreminna near the Serebryanske forest area & Bilohorivka.
2/ Russian forces conducted ground attacks northeast of Chasiv Yar near Bohdanivka; in eastern Chasiv Yar in the Novyi Microraion; east of Chasiv Yar near Ivanivske; and southeast of Chasiv Yar near Klishchiivka and Andriivka.
3/ Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn stated that Ukrainian forces are rebuilding bridges across the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal to reestablish communications routes.
Russian forces recently made confirmed advances northwest of Svatove, near Avdiivka, in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast. 1/8
2/ Ukrainian Zaporizhia Oblast Head Ivan Fedorov stated that Russian authorities have created the infrastructure necessary to conscript Ukrainians in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast and plan to conscript more than 150,000 Ukrainians into the Russian army in an unspecified time period.
3/ Russian elites and Kremlin officials are reportedly vying for influential positions in the Russian government ahead of the Russian presidential inauguration on May 7 to prematurely secure powerful roles in the event that Putin leaves power around the end of his new term.
NEW | Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 6, 2024: The Kremlin appears to be re-intensifying a reflexive control campaign targeting Western decision-making using nuclear threats and diplomatic manipulation. 1/4 🧵
2/ Reflexive control is a key element of Russia’s hybrid warfare toolkit — it is a tactic that relies on shaping an adversary with targeted rhetoric and information operations in such a way that the adversary voluntarily takes actions that are advantageous to Russia.
3/ Russia has frequently used nuclear saber-rattling throughout the course of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine to cause the West (Russia’s self-defined adversary) to stop providing military support for Ukraine, and this nuclear saber-rattling has become a frequently used form of Russian reflexive control.
2/ ...although ISW continues to assess that Ukraine should contest the theater-wide initiative as soon as possible because ceding the theater-wide initiative to Russia for the entirety of 2024 will present Russia with several benefits.
3/ Ukraine’s ability to liberate its territory and conduct counteroffensive operations rests on a number of unmade decisions in the West, Russia, and Ukraine.
Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk and Robotyne.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on May 5 that Russian forces seized Ocheretyne (northwest of Avdiivka).
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on May 5 but did not make confirmed territorial gains.
2/ Russian forces recently seized Kotlyarivka (southeast of Kupyansk) no later than May 4 and made other confirmed advances along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna amid continued Russian attacks in the area on May 5.
3/ Geolocated footage published on May 4 indicates that Russian forces advanced in western Kotlyarivka (southeast of Kupyansk) and south of Novoselivske (northwest of Svatove).