NEW: The US has a much higher stake in Russia's war on Ukraine than most people think.
As Americans consider the costs of continuing to help Ukraine fight the Russians in the coming years, they deserve a careful consideration of the costs of allowing Russia to win. 🧵(1/19)
2/ A Russian conquest of all of Ukraine is by no means impossible if the United States cuts off all military assistance and Europe follows suit. Such an outcome would bring a battered but triumphant Russian army right up to NATO’s border from the Black Sea to the Arctic Ocean.
3/ If Russia wins, a victorious Russian army at the end of this war will be combat experienced and considerably larger than the pre-2022 Russian land forces.
4/ A hypothetical Russian victory would allow the Russian economy to gradually recover as sanctions inevitably erode and Moscow develops ways to circumvent or mitigate those that remain.
5/ A victorious Russia would over time replace its equipment and rebuild its coherence, drawing on a wealth of hard-won experience fighting mechanized warfare.
6/ If Russia wins in Ukraine, it will bring with it advanced air defense systems that only American stealth aircraft—badly needed to deter and confront China—can reliably penetrate.
7/ Russian victory in Ukraine would allow Russia to pose a major conventional military threat to NATO for the first time since the 1990s in a timeframe set to a considerable extent by how much the Kremlin invests in its military.
8/ To deter and defend against a renewed Russian threat following a full Russian victory in Ukraine the US would have to deploy to Eastern Europe a sizable portion of its ground forces.
9/ The US would have to station in Europe a large number of stealth aircraft, likely forcing the US to make a terrible choice between keeping enough in Asia to defend Taiwan and its other Asian allies and deterring or defeating a Russian attack on NATO. isw.pub/Ukraine121423
10/ The entire undertaking would cost a fortune, and the cost would last as long as the Russian threat continues—potentially indefinitely. Almost any other outcome of the Ukraine war is preferable to this one.
11/ Helping Ukraine keep the lines where they are through continuous Western military support is far more advantageous and cheaper for the US than allowing Ukraine to lose.
12/ “Freezing” the conflict is worse than continuing to help Ukraine fight—that would simply give Russia time and space to prepare for a renewed war to conquer Ukraine and confront NATO.
13/ Helping Ukraine regain control of all or most of its territory would be much more advantageous, as it would drive Russian forces even further to the east.
14/ Best of all, supporting Ukraine to its victory and then helping it rebuild would put the largest and most combat-effective military on the European continent at the forefront of the defense of NATO—whether Ukraine does or does not ultimately join the alliance.
15/ ISW has today published a new report and accompanying maps that illustrate four military situations related to this war and its outcomes and consider their military-strategic and financial implications for the US. Read it here: isw.pub/Ukraine121423
16/ We have considered elsewhere the important question of possible Russian escalations in the face of defeat and we do not minimize those considerations.
17/ We have argued strongly that American values align with American interests in Ukraine and that there is a strong and cogent values-based argument for helping Ukraine liberate all its land and its people. We still believe that that is true.
18/ But the American people are being asked to spend a lot of money helping Ukraine fight Russia, and it is not unreasonable for them also wonder what the financial cost of not helping Ukraine would be.
19/ This essay is meant solely to serve as a departure point for a data-driven and realistic discussion answering that question.
NEW: The Houthis have become a major strategic threat with ties to multiple US adversaries. The US has sought to “avoid escalation” in response to Houthi actions since Oct 2023 with half-measures that have failed to materially degrade Houthi military capabilities. (🧵1/8)
2/ The Houthis are undeterred and have collected significant insight into US defenses against their attack systems of all varieties. The Houthis will almost certainly exploit this insight to improve the efficacy of their own attacks and provide it to other US adversaries.
3/ The US failure to disrupt or deter Houthi escalation in the Red Sea has forced US policymakers to prioritize the Red Sea over the Western Pacific. This prioritization of the Middle East in this way is unsustainable, especially in the event of a Taiwan Strait scenario.
Lebanon: Documents seized by the IDF in the Gaza Strip highlight Iranian efforts to promote interoperability between Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah. The documents depict Iran-Hamas discussions to send thousands of Hamas fighters to Lebanon to integrate into Hezbollah SOF units. These units are trained to conduct ground attacks into Israel.
2/ Iran: The United States and E3 submitted a censure resolution against Iran to the IAEA Board of Governors in response to Iran's refusal to cooperate fully with the IAEA. Iran is trying to prevent the censure resolution from passing by threatening unspecified retaliation.
3/ Iraq: The Iraqi federal government is trying to prevent Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks on Israel in order to prevent Israeli strikes on Iraq. Iranian-backed Iraqi attacks on Israel increased by almost 150 percent between September and October 2024.
NEW: Ukrainian drone operations continue to play a critical role in constraining Russian mechanized maneuver and preventing Russian forces from fully exploiting Ukraine's ongoing manpower constraints.
Special Report: The Ukrainian Defense of Pokrovsk Has Compelled Russia to Change Its Approach in Eastern Ukraine 🧵(1/6)
2/ Russian forces launched offensive operations intended to seize Pokrovsk in Donetsk Oblast during Spring 2024 at the moment of greatest constraints on Ukraine's manpower and materiel following the suspension of US assistance in Fall 2023.
3/ Russian forces have not taken Pokrovsk after eight months of grinding but consistent advances in western Donetsk Oblast.
NEW: Ukrainian drone operations continue to play a critical role in constraining Russian mechanized maneuver and preventing Russian forces from fully exploiting Ukraine's ongoing manpower constraints.
🧵(1/7)
2/ Zelensky said during an interview that Russian forces are currently advancing along the frontline due in part to decreased Ukrainian morale exacerbated by delays in staffing & equipping new Ukrainian brigades and granting frontline Ukrainian defenders necessary rest/rotation.
3/ Zelensky stressed the importance of standing up new brigades to replace and reinforce Ukrainian forces currently serving on the frontline but noted that Russian forces also continue to take significant manpower losses in exchange for minimal gains.
1. Putin modified compensation promised for Russian servicemen wounded while fighting in Ukraine — a clear indicator that the Kremlin is trying to cut the mounting short- and long-term costs of the war and restore balance to the Russian economy. 🧵(1/5)
2/ Putin originally introduced the policy offering all wounded Russian servicemen three million rubles to incentivize military recruitment after he had decided against declaring general mobilization in Spring 2022.
3/ Financial incentives became the key pillar of the Russian military's recruitment campaign and personnel retention efforts over the past nearly three years, and the reversal of such incentives indicates that the system is becoming economically unsustainable for the Kremlin.
ICYMI: Russia cannot defeat Ukraine or the West - and will likely lose - if the West mobilizes its resources to resist the Kremlin. If we lean in and surge, Russia loses. (🧵1/5)
2/ The notion that the Ukraine war is unwinnable because of Russia’s dominance is a Russian information operation, which gives us a glimpse of the Kremlin’s real strategy and only real hope of success. The Kremlin must get the United States to the sidelines, allowing Russia to fight Ukraine in isolation and then proceed to Moscow’s next targets, which Russia will also seek to isolate.
3/ The Kremlin needs the United States to choose inaction and embrace the false inevitability that Russia will prevail in Ukraine. Vladimir Putin’s center of gravity is his ability to shape the will and decisions of the West, Ukraine, and Russia itself.