Peace in Europe for the next decade, the rules 1) Putin wants to control Eastern and Central Europe 2) Countries in the region must be able to defend themselves / deter Russia with own military power 3) Or rely on credible defense & deterrence by another power / an alliance
In other words, Putin can only be stopped by a balance of power that is unfavorable to him. He will not sign up to any agreement or accept any order that is not backed up by such a balance of power.
Instead of thinking about a "deal" with Russia or a "new security order", the West must focus on creating a balance of military power that is unfavorable to Russia.
That means: build op own defenses and weaken Russia's military power.
With countries who reject the liberal order (agreements, win-win, rules-based order), liberal countries must build a relationship based on realism, ie balance of power.
The mistake the West made with Russia in the last decades was to assume that it can have a relationship with Russia based on liberal principles. Zeitenwende means that the relationship must switch to a balance of power.
The question is whether Berlin, Paris and others understand that now -- and finally start seriously arming Ukraine. Or whether they wait until the situation becomes far more dramatic and dangerous; with massive costs piling up.
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Fiona Hill: "A world in which Putin chalks up a win in Ukraine is one where the US’s standing is diminished, where Iran and North Korea are emboldened, where China dominates the Indo-Pacific, where the Middle East becomes more unstable and where nuclear proliferation takes off".
"The problem is that many members of Congress don’t want to see President Biden win on any front. People are incapable now of separating off ‘giving Biden a win’ from actually allowing Ukraine to win." politico.com/news/magazine/…
"In that regard, whether they like it or not, members of Congress are doing exactly the same thing as Vladimir Putin. They hate that. They want to refute that. But Vladimir Putin wants Biden to lose, and they want Biden to be seen to lose as well."
Kissinger has passed away, and it would be good if we — analysts and strategists — could now leave the struggle between „realism“ and „liberalism“ behind, of which Kissinger was a product, in some ways. Quick thread.
Realism emerged in reaction to the failure of the Wilson „world“ to prevent the rise of Nazi Germany and WWII. Kissinger's generation realized that you won’t prevent war through institutions and treaties, and was looking to alternative approaches, trying to leave Wilson behind.
Kissinger went back to the world against which Wilson had built his: the (very German) world of monarchies, secret treaties and cynical diplomacy of Vienna 1814-15, the world of Metternich and Gentz — representing everything Wilson thought was responsible for the outbreak of WWI.
1) Russland will die Ukraine als Staat und Nation auslöschen. Es ist bereit, dafür massive Ressourcen zu investieren.
2) Angesichts der bloß gebremsten, womöglich abnehmenden Unterstützung der Ukraine sieht Russland sich auf der Gewinnerstraße und hat keinerlei Veranlassung, den Krieg zu beenden.
Es gibt keinen Frieden mit Russland als Option. Für Putin geht es um die Unterwerfung der Ukraine, und dafür ist er bereit, Hunderttausende russischer Leben zu opfern, und er sieht sich auf der Siegerstrasse.
Zugleich geht es Putin um mehr, wie er in zwei Ultimaten an Nato und Washington deutlich gemacht hat: die Rückgängigmachung der Neuordnung Ost- und Ostmitteleuropas seit 1989. Das ist sein Projekt.
Four quick comments on the European debate about Gaza.
1. It’s the duty of humanitarian organisations to focus exclusively on the damage on civilians in a conflict. Yet it is the duty of policy-makers to address the underlying conflict and find ways out of it with political means; that's different.
2. To recognize „Palestine“ as a state, as Spain just announced it will do, risks to send a damaging signal to Gaza and the region: that the act of large-scale terror attack, planned and perpetrated by Hamas against Israel, has paid off; that this is the way to go ahead.
Trying to hold the line, the strategy of team Biden, isn't enough. Powerful autocrats feel emboldened and push harder for a post-American world, in which they would be powerful hegemons in their region, not challenged anymore by liberal-democratic principles.
Three exhibits:
Despite all "peaceful rise" rhetoric in San Francisco, Xi puts increasing pressure on Taiwan.